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ABSTRACT
SHORT TERM PRICE BEHAVIOR
ON THE COMMODITIES FUTURES MARKET
by
Tadaaki Chigusa and William Meyer
Submitted to the Alfred P. Sloan School of
Management on May 10, 1974, in
partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Science
in Management.
The purpose of this thesis was to analyze the behavior of
daily futures price movements in selected commodities over a
relatively short time horizon.
After reviewing past research conducted in this area and
analyzing three theories which dominate the literature--the
theory of normal backwardation, the random-walk theory, and
the theory of anticipatory prices--a hypothesis was postulated
which was a variation of past theories. This variation was
termed a "theory of partial non-randomness."
The hypothesis which was tested was the following: commod-
ities futures short term price movements are non-random and
predictable within acceptable levels of confidence conditional
upon and subsequent to the occurrence of certain causal-events
external to the market and effect-events internal to the market.
Mean-standard deviation tests conducted on daily price,
volume, and open interest data for September Cocoa and May Maine
Potatoes substantiated the hypothesis in part. Internal effect-
events proved to be indicators of short-term non-random price
behavior; the tests were inconclusive regarding price behavior
caused by external events partly because of a lack of compre-
hensive and rigorously organized data describing such events
for use in testing.
In addition, a theoretical basis for a trading system using
the mean-standard deviation forecasts,which resulted from the
foregoing analysis, was developed; and two preliminary formu-
lations of this trading system were tested.
Thesis Supervisor: Robert C. Merton
Title: Professor of Management
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The commodities futures market has become one of the larg-
est opportunities for investment of speculative and corporate
capital in the United States. Since 1960, the growth in trad-
ing on the thirteen commodity exchanges in this country has
more than quadrupled.1  In 1960, less than four million futures
contracts were traded; by 1972, trading amounted to over eight-
million contracts. The value of contracts traded in 1960 was
$30 billion, while the value of trading in 1972 was $189 bil-
lion.
The commodities futures market is now larger in terms of
annual trading dollars than the stock market. The two largest
commodities futures exchanges--the Chicago Board of Trade and
the Chicago Merchantile Exchange--handle well over half of the
aggregate volume of annual trading. Comparing the monthly dol-
lar volume of trading on these two exchanges with the monthly
dollar volume on the two largest stock exchanges for August,
21970, yields the following:
New York Stock Exchange $6.4 billion
American Stock Exchange .6 billion
TOTAL $7.0 billion
1 Bruce Gould, Dow Jones-Irwin Guide to Commodities Trading,
page 3.
2 Ibid, page 3.
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Chicago Board of Trade $7.1 billion
Chicago Merchantile Exchange 2.4 billion
TOTAL $9.5 billion
One of the main differences between the two markets is the
number of traders. Over thirty million individuals and com-
panies trade in the stock market while only about two million
trade on the commodities exchanges. 3 There are a couple of
reasons for this. First of all, futures trading is a principal
part of the business management of companies who are involved
in production, distribution, and/or processing of actual com-
modities. These companies hold large positions in the futures
market to protect their profits. Secondly, the speculator is
able to hold relatively large positions in the market because
of the low margin requirements of commodities relative to
stocks.
The commodities futures market is continuing to grow as a
speculative vehicle for investors and offers a challenging sub-
ject for students of capital markets and one which is not
nearly as well studied and documented as the stock market.
The approach employed in this thesis to examine this mar-
ket is based on technical, non-economic analysis of price
behavior as opposed to fundamental economic analysis of supply
and demand factors as they affect price movements. The quan-
titative method used for analysis in this thesis is conditional
Bruce Gould, Dow Jones-Irwin Guide to Commodities Trading,
page 6.
-10-
probability. Many other methods--including regression analy-
sis, spectral analysis, and simutaneous econometric equations--
have been used in past research. The approach selected for
this effort was purposely different from those used in the
past in order to demonstrate its relative utility and the
specific insights into price behavior which it might yield.
Also, most past substantive commodities market analysis
has concentrated on relatively long term price movements
(months and years). This thesis effort purposely concentrated
on short term (days and weeks) price behavior in order to con-
tribute to the body of research related to commodities futures
markets in an area which appeared to lack needed attention.
The results of this work provide a point of departure for much
more research and, in fact, would have been undertaken by these
writers--time and budgets permitting.
Before describing, however, the basis for the hypothesis
which was tested in this thesis and the rationale for postula-
tion, a brief historical digression will be made in the next
chapter to provide a context for understanding how and why the
commodities futures market exists.
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CHAPTER 2
THE EVOLUTION OF COMMODITIES FUTURES TRADING
The evolution of the commodities futures market in the
United States had its beginnings with simple agricultural ex-
changes between farmers and consumers. As each party became
more spohisticated and as more roles began to be played in the
economic theater between the producer and the consumer, the
product exchanges became subject to additional controls and
more sophisticated trading mechanisms. There are many ways to
explain the development of the market for commodities, but per-
haps the most illustrative is a case example. The case history
upon which much of the following discussion will focus will be
the evolution of trading in butter and egg futures starting
from the middle of the nineteenth century in the United States.l
In early American agricultural society, the supply of eggs
was limited to the amount needed to provide for the immediate
needs of the owner of the chickens. Egg production was highly
seasonal with most laying occuring during the spring and very
little during the winter. By 1880, after the Civil War, farms
began to produce a surplus of eggs--more than the amount re-
quired to supply the consumption needs of the owner. Eggs, as
a result, were often used as a form of currency to trade at
local stores for other consumer goods. During the surplus sea-
son, however, the value of these eggs was very low. Also, the
1 H. S. Irwin, Evolution of Futures Trading,
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main producing center of eggs was rapidly becoming the Midwest,
and primitive distribution channels began to become established
to transport eggs to the East Coast regions.
Chicago soon became a central transshipment point and
wholesale egg market because of its central geographic location,
the concentration of railroads, and refrigerated storage facili-
ties. In 1874, the Chicago Produce Exchange was formed and
became the first official trade organization to handle butter
and eggs, among other perishable commodities. Later in 1898,
the butter and egg dealers withdrew from the Produce Exchange
and formed the Chicago Butter and Egg Board.
Before eggs were placedunder refrigeration, the egg market
was highly seasonal. Once refrigeration became perfected, much
of the egg production during the heavy spring season was kept
from immediate consumption and stored for later use. Almost all
of the seasonal surplus, however, was carried forward by dealers
as opposed to farmers who in many other commodities do the
"carry forward." This build up of inventories by dealers during
certain periods of the year was called "accumulation." Accumula-
tion became highly concentrated in the Chicago area by 1939, and
ownership was spread among a relatively small number of dealers.
Speculation in eggs by individuals outside of the egg busi-
ness began somewhat earlier, however: soon after the technique
of refrigerated storage was developed. At first, most of the
outside investors (speculators) had friends in the produce
houses who acted as their agents. Later, as brokers came into
-13-
being to serve as intermediaries between dealers, speculators
began to rely more heavily on them for making investments in
commodities.
As the egg market grew in size and complexity, "time con-
2tracts" came into existence. The first reference to these
contracts in trade journals was in the late 1890s, although
other sources indicate that such contracts had been in use up
to a decade before. Two types of time contracts were initially
used. The two parties involved in the first type were the egg
dealer (or refrigerator) and the final retail distributor.
This called for delivery of refrigerated eggs in the fall or
early winter at a specified price. It provided the dealer a
means for reducing his risks and insuring his profits.
The other type of time contract ("futures" contract) was
between the egg shipper--the individual who transported eggs
from the farmer to the refrigeration storage locations--and
the dealer. This kind of contract was attractive to the
dealer because he entered into a binding agreement with a
shipper who held a reputation for delivering quality eggs, thus
insuring to some extent a continuation of future quality. It
also, of course, served as insurance for the shipper guarantee-
ing him a market for his shipments at a predetermined price.
2 "Time contracts were later to be called "futures contracts."
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By 1917, time contracts had become widely used, and stand-
ard forms for such agreements had been developed. The process
was not completely formalized; however, because since,while
most time contracts were made on floors of exchanges, some
contracts were still made outside the exchanges--particularly
in Chicago where one or two taverns served as popular unoffi-
cial exchanges.
The requirement of some kind of deposit (or margin) to be
included in tine contracts on the part of either party became
part of the rules of the Chicago Butter and Egg Board in 1911.
Ten percent was the popular size of margin and has continued
to be the case today. Margin deposits were required because
early time contracts were often unfulfilled.
Time contracts facilitated growth of the egg storage and
distribution industry since it helped to guarantee or insure
markets and profits (thus reducing risk) and shippers and
dealers to secure larger amounts of financing for expansion of
their businesses.
Unfulfilled contracts continued to be a major problem, how-
ever, and efforts to institute more formal and all-encompassing
regulations led to two factions disagreeing on what regulations
should be adcpted: the existing Chicago Butter and Egg Board
and a separate group who advocated more stringent controls than
did the Board. Eventually, in 1919, the two groups coalesced
and became what is now known as the Chicago Merchantile Ex-
change.
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The Merchantile Exchange continued to perform the functions
of the Butter and Egg Board as well as handling the transactions
of time or future contracts via an organization called the
Clearinghouse, which guaranteed all contracts with a reserve
fund. If the losses of the Clearinghouse exceeded the reserve
fund, provisions were made for the excess liability to be
shared among the members of the Clearinghouse.
The evolution of large-scale, encouraged speculation in com-
modities futures contracts by individuals and organizations
outside of the commodities business began as a result of a
shift in the business practices of producers, dealers, shippers,
and retailers of commodities. This shift was manifested by the
practice of "hedging." In early trading, time contracts were
used solely to insure profits on future sales or purchases,
were kept by the original signees, used as a merchandising con-
tract, and settled by delivery. Hedging, however, is the use
of a futures contract as a temporary substitute for a merchan-
dising contract.3 The use of time, or futures, contracts as
substitutes for actual merchandising contracts meant that, for
example, a seller of a particular commodity for future (or for-
ward) delivery was using the contract as temporary insurance
against adverse price moves never intending to actually deliver
the commodity contracted to deliver. Rather, he would "buy
Kroll and Shisko, The Commodity Futures Market Guide, page 281.
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back" (or offset) such a contract at a later date prior to the
contracted delivery data after he had sold his commodity on
the actual (or cash) market.
Kroll and Shisko in their Commodity Futures Market Guide
give a good example of this kind of trading practice: a dealer
buys 50,000 bushels of corn and looks for a customer or cus-
tomers (e.g., retailers) to sell it to. Some time will in-
evitably pass before he can sell all of the commodity, so in
order to protect himself against adverse price movements, he
sells an equivalent amount of corn futures contracts. Once he
finds a customer, he sells the actual commodity to him and
buys back his futures position. He assumes that any downward
price movement in his "actuals" will be equally reflected in
the futures market. A sequence of purchase and sales for such
a transaction is described below: 4
Cash Transaction Futures Transaction
Sept. 15 Buys 50,000 bushels Sells 50,000 bushels
corn @ 1.46. May corn @ 1.53.
Jan. 15 Sells 50,000 bushels Buys 50,000 bushels
corn @ 1.41. May corn @ 1.47 1/2.
Loss 50 per bushel Profit 5 1/2. per bushel
Such a system of trading reguires other parties who are
willing to enter into contracts but who never intend on owning
the actual commodity: this calls for the role of the speculator.
Kroll and Shisko, The Commodity Futures Market Guide, page 281.
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As the amount of hedging activity increased, the need for more
speculators increased; and Exchanges began in the 1930s to
actively attract more speculators in order to take the other
side of the increasing number of "selling" hedges. By 1939,
more than 97 percent of the "short" (i.e., dealers selling
future contracts) positions in egg futures were hedges with
an equal number of speculators and "buying hedges" holding
"long" positions.
As may be gathered by the reader already, two types of
hedging practices emerged. The most numerous type was the
"selling" hedge described in the example below, where a pro-
ducer owns a comodity, has no immediate buyer, and reduces his
risk by selling a futures contract until he finds a buyer. The
"buying hedge," while less widely used, is the inverse of the
selling hedge. A typical example is the dealer who has made a
commitment to sell a commodity he doesn't yet own and who pro-
tects himself by y a futures contract until he can pur-
chase an actual commodity to meet his commitment. Since the
number of selling (short) hedges is larger than the buying
(long) hedges over the long term, speculators are needed to fill
the gap and "balance" the market speculators necessarily hold
"net long" positions in the futures market: they are net pur-
chases of futures contracts when they initiate positions in
the market.
The bar chart presented in Exhibit II-1 on the following
page illustrates this relationship reasonably clearly. The
-18-
EXHIBIT II-1
ESTIMATED AVERAGE DOLLAR VALUES OF NET SHORT
HEDGING AND LONG SPECULATIVE OPEN CONTRACTS
(mostly 1954/55--1953/59) (million dollars)
r .... .rl.
Eggs Wool Tops MealCotton Wheat Soybeans Corn Soybean Oil
Volume and speculation are greatest on those markets with the greatest hedging interest. Total
long speculation is often greater than net short hedging (short minus long hedging). The difference is
made up by short speculation.
Holbrook Working,
Research Inst
"Speculation on Hddging Markets," Food
itute Studies 1, May 1960, page 198;
reproduced from the Dow Jones-Irwin Guide to Comnodit-
ies Trading, D.J.L., Inc., Homewood, Illinois, 1973.
100-
80 -
60-
40 -
20-
Long Speculation
Net Short Hedging
-'L
K
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reader should note that the chart shows only long speculation;
"net" long speculation would be the result of subtracting the
difference between the two bar diagrams for each commodity.
The speculative traders in the commodity futures markets
are characterized by a number of different occupational groups,
both from within and outside of agribusiness. These types of
traders and their profits and losses on the average for a
particular commodity are shown in Exhibit 11-2.
The increasing interest in the commodities futures market
as an investment opportunity has resulted in a growing number
of speculators and a greater annual trading volume for many
commodities. The behavior of prices in these markets and the
challenge of trying to describe this behavior in terms of
theoretical descriptors used for other capital markets has
prompted a nuirber of studies and research undertakings over
the past few decades and provides the basic challenge for this
effort.
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EXHIBIT 11-2
AN ANALYSIS OF SPECULATIVE TRADING IN GRAIN FUTURE3
TABLE 30.-Number of speculative traders with proflts and with losses,
and percent with profts, by grain and major occupational group
Traders with- Pretg
Commodity and occupational Tra s Total Perintage
group poafit
Profits Losses profits
WHEAT
Business managers: Number Number Number Percent
Grain business.------------- 83 189 272 30. 5
Other------------------- 702 1, 993 2, 695 26. 0
Professional.-------------------- 179 498 677 26. 4
Semiprofessional --------------- 27 64 91 29. 7'
Clerical.----------------------- 130 349 479 27. 1
Farmers.---------------------- 200 697 897 22. 3
Manual workers---------------- 214 621 835 25. 6
Retired----------------------- 240 576 816 29. 4
Unknown--------------------- 270 509 779 34. 7
Total.--------------------- 2, 045 5, 496 7, 541 27. I
CORN
Business managers:
Grain busine .------------- 76 96 172 44. 2
Other -------------------- 577 806 1,383 41.7
Professional ------------------- 133 221 354 37. 6
Semiprofessional--------------- 16 20 36 44. 4
Clerical.----------------------- 76 159 235 32. 3
Farmers................ -..-... 151 261 412 36. 7
Manual workers..--------------- 163 289 452 36. 1
Retired----------------------- 189 280 469 40. 3
Unknown--------------------- 144 271 415 34.7
Total------------------- 1, 525 2, 403 3, 928 38. 8
OATS
Business managers:
Grain busins.. ------------- 23 54 77 29. 9
Other----------- -------- 223 374 597 37. 4
Professional.------------------- 45 74 119 37.88eniprofessionial ... .-....--..- 7 7 14 50.0
Clerical. . ......- .. -- .- .... 37 50 87 42.5
Farmers -------------------.. . 57 112 169 33.7
Manual workers. -.. 53 108 161 32. 9.
Retired--.------- ---------- -69 111 18 38.3
Unknown------------- - 75 107 182 41.2
Total --------------- ----- 589 997 1, 586 37. 1
RYE
Bitsiness managorst
tain busiiaess. ------- 22 37 59 37. 3
Other --------------------- 201 303 504 39. 9
Pofiona------.-36 78 114 31. 6$emipr ioa-- ---- 2 12 14 1 14. 3
GCerical -------------------- 33 19 32 40.2
Farm .. .. 43 94 137 31.4
Manual workers ... ....... 52 83 140 37. 1
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Technical Bulletin 1001;
reproduced from the Dow Jones-Irwin Guide to Conmodit-
ies Trading, D.J.I., Inc., Homewood, Illinois, 1973.
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CHAPTER 3
PAST RESEARCH
In order to learn the lessons of the past, prevent repe-
tion of work which has previously been performed and provide
a point of departure for this thesis effort, a review of past
research as published largely in economic and statistical
journals was performed. A summary of some of the more impor-
tant, relevant and recent work is presented here with concluding
comments leading to the main hypothesis to be tested by this
thesis.
A. The Theory of Normal Backwardation
The most famous recent series of articles, replies, and
rejoinders by economists relating to the commodities futures
market were by Lester Telser and Paul Cootner in 1960. Their
work and debate was based on emperical tests which each con-
ducted related to the hypothesis first stated by Keyner in his
1930 Treatise on Money which holds that "futures prices are
downward based estimates of expected prices."1 That is, fut-
ures prices typically rise as contracts approach delivery;
Keynes termed this economic phenomenon "normal backwardation."
The Keynes hypothesis proposes an explanation to the role of
J. M. Keynes, A Treatise on Money, Volume II, pages 135-144.
-22-
the speculator in the futures market in terms of his influence
on price behavior. It states that since hedgers use the fut-
ures market to avoid risk and, in fact, transfer this risk to
speculators who are willing to accept it, the speculator re-
ceives a return for his acceptance of this risk in terms of a
fee which is obtained indirectly by the act of the speculator
(being typically in a long position) agreeing to purchase the
hedgers contract only at a price lower than the price he ex-
pects to receive when he sells the contract back to the hedger.
Telser calls this role of the speculator as defined by
Keynes as one of "sellers of insurance"2 to hedgers. He goes
on, however, to argue that this role may also be seen as one
of "buying of gambles." 3 This point of view was first advanced
in 1940 by C. 0. Hardy. The first role, if valid, would re-
sult in speculators making money; the second would result in
losses on the average for speculators.
Both Cootner and Telser eventually agreed that the Keynes-
Hicks hypothesis is probably valid, but disagree as to the
profitability of the speculator and the hedger in the futures
market. Cootner argues that if the Keynes-Hicks hypothesis is
true, then hedgers must lose money in the futures market but
that they probably make more than compensating gains on the
2 Lester Telser, "Returns to Speculators: Telser Versus
Keynes--Reply," Journal of Political Economy, LXVIII,
August, page 404.
3 Ibid.
Charles 0. Hardy, Risk and Risk Bearing.
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cash market. Neither man offers emperical proof that specula-
tors do in fact make money even though the Keynes-Hicks hypo-
thesis suggests it. Cootner argues that it is possible for
speculators to make money particularly if a strategy of being
short in the period prior to a harvest; that is, prior to the
time when substantial hedging will result in large numbers of
sales of futures contracts, thus driving prices of futures con-
tracts down.
The data sample used by both men in testing their respec-
tive interpretations of the Keynes-Hicks hypothesis is of
particular interest to this thesis effort. Ten selected years
of monthly prices were used. (Monthly average closing prices
were used by Telser and the closing price for the last day of
each month was used by Cootner.) The years selected were 1928,
'29, '33, '35, '36, '39, '40, '52, '53, and '54. They were sel-
ected by Telser because they were characterized by changes of
less than 5 percent in the Wholesale Price Index of the Nation-
al Bureau of Standards; in other words, they were meant to
represent relatively stable price years.
The Telser-Cootner emperical testing of the Keynesian nor-
mal backwardation hypothesis was complimented by the develop-
ment of the mean-variance portfolio model developed initially
by Markowitz and later expanded into the "capital asset pric-
ing" model for a general equilibrium context by Sharpe, This
approach was applied to futures market analysis by Katherine
Miller (spouse of Merton Miller) in a Ph.D. thesis written in
-24-
1971 at the University of Chicago.5 The capital market approach
as applied by Ms. Miller makes no presumption relative to in-
herent positive returns to speculators (Keynes, Cootner) or
inherent negative returns (Hardy, Telser). It implies rather
that returns on any capital asset characterized by risk will be
governed by the assets systematic riskj that is, its contribu-
tion to the risk of a large and well-diversified portfolio of
assets, 6 This differed from Keynes definition of risk which
was essentially limited to price variance of a particular
futures commodity.
In a recent M.I.T. undergraduate thesis by J. Alexander
Stevens7 the Keynes-Hicks theory of normal backwardation was
analyzed within a particular definitional framework. Normal
backwardation may be defined as the nature of futures options8
such that present prices of options are lower than their ex-
pected future value at delivery date. This is frequently mis-
interpreted to man that the prices of "near month" options
should be higher than "far month" options; that is, that the
market should be "backward" or demonstrate an inversion in the
heirarchy of option prices. As Stevens points out, however,
inversion of option price levels is not a necessary manifesta-
5 Katherine Miller, "Futures Trading and Investor Returns,"
Ph.D. diasertation, University of Chicago.
6 Ibid, page 2.
J. A. Stevens, "A Software Package for Monitoring of Wheat
Futures on the Chicago Board of Trade, B. S. Thesis,
M.I.T.
8 "Options"are commodities futures contracts scheduled for de-
livery in a particular month; for example, December wheat.
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tion of the Keynes theory; the near months option prices may
be lower than the far months so long as the expected cash value
upon future delivery of the far month options is higher than
the current price of the option. Recognizing this, Stevens pro-
ceeded to develop a computer program to identify "inverted"
markets and to test for the profitability of "long" speculation
in such markets.
Stevens defines a "bull" trend (a buying opportunity) as a
situation where "for all observations of the spot option trad-
ing at a given price, the distant options would be trading at
increasingly lower levels."9 A predictive model was proposed
and tested which, based on the data base which was being used,
resulted in greatest profits when an eighteen-day time horizon
was imposed on the model. That is, a long (buying) position
would be initiated in the market if the model predicted that in
eighteen days prices would be higher. Such a model, while not
tested on a data base different from the data from which it
was refined, is interesting in its formulation and should be
tested more rigorously. The formulation of the model is inter-
preted by the writer below:
let Pa(to) = average price weighted by open interest
for all options for a particular commodity
on day to
Pa(tx) - average price on day t. where tx is the day
which occurred at least ten business days
earlier and which had an average price
closest to Pa(to)
9 J. A. Stevens, "A Software Package for Monitoring of Wheat
Futures on the Chicago Board of Trade," B.S. Thesis,
M.I.T.
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Pl(t) = price on the spot option (nearest month)
on day t
P2(t) = price of the next nearest option on day t
dp(t 0 ) - {P1 (to)-P 2 (t0)) - {ri(t )-Pz(tx)}
d'p(t 0) = dp(t.) - -10 dp(ti)
10
With the above variables defined, the model which Stevens
tested was the following:
P a(t ) = B+A {d'p(ti)} where i = -1,-2,-3,...-100.
Ordinary least squares regression analysis using the above
model and five years of daily prices for wheat futures result-
ed in a value for i which, for the data used, has greatest
significance at i =-18; that is, the model forecasted most
accurately 18 days in advance for the data to which it was fit.
The thesis does not define explicitly the trading system that
was used in conjunction with the 18-day forecast; but in any
event, the net profits that accumulated using the undefined
trading system over the five-year period were positive and
higher than would have been achieved with filters of 5 cents
and 6 cents.
B. The Random-Walk Hypothesis
Other recent discussion and research related to the com-
modities futures market has revolved around the validity of the
random-walk hypothesis for explaining the price behavior mani-
fested by the market.
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The random-walk hypothesis may be used to describe markets
in which all past information has been considered by investors
and is thus reflected in current prices. The economic basis
for the random-walk hypothesis is that "an efficient market,
characterized by numerous well-informed participants, should
create prices which accurately reflect all current information.
Price changes will reflect new information and hence-will ap-
proximate a random variation." 10 If this theory is valid, past
prices will not provide any infromation useful in forecasting
future price changes; i.e., price moves are serially independ-
ent. The following model may be used to symbolically represent
the random-walk hypothesis.
Xt " Xt. 1+ St
(t - l,2,...n; E (St) - 0; cov (stSt+k) - 0 for K 40)
where Xt - closing price on day t
St n a random variable
The requirement of serial independence may be expressed as fol-
lows:
Pr (Xt x/Xt-l* xt-x*****) = Pr (X = X).
Using terminology initially used by Samuelson,11 Cargill
and Rausser illustrate the random-walk hypothesis in the futures
10 Stevenson and Bear, "Commodity Futures: Trends or Random
Walks?" Journal of Finance, XXV, pages 65-81.
11 Paul Samuelson, "Proof That Properly Anticipated Prices Flu-
ctuate Randomly," Industrial Management Review,
pages 41-9.
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market in another formulation: 1 2
let Pf - futures price for a particular commodity
t - present time
T - future delivery time
then Pf(T,t) - a futures price quoted at time t for a con-
tract to be delivered T periods in the
future.
at time t+l, the futures price is Pf(Tt+l),
and according to the random-walk hypothesis will manifest ef-
ficient consideration of available information pertaining to
expectations of the price of the commodity at delivery time.
The random-walk- hypothesis implies that Pf (Tt+l) -
Pf(Tt) = Et , where Et is a random variable with zero mean over
the life of the futures contract.
Arguments attempting to reject the random-walk hypothesis
abound, and many studies have been conducted, many of which are
summarized in this thesis to prove or disprove the theory. The
argument of those who are skeptical has been summarized by
Arnold Larson: 1 3
In an ideal market, existing knowledge of market
conditions would be reflected in current price,
any new information...would produce a price
movement. Truly new information emerges random-
ly, and so price movements would tend to be
random. No actual market behaves like an ideal
market. Many commodity futures markets approach
12 T. Cargill and G. Rausser, "Time Frequency Domain Representa-
tions of Futures Prices as a Stochastic Process, Journal
of the American Statistical Association, page 23.
13 Arnold Larson, "Measurement of Random Process in Futures
Prices," Food Research Institute Studies, page 316.
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the ideal and differ principally in that
traders react with varying skill to varying
sources of information, and so some of the
response to price-making forces is delayed.
A recent study by Richard A. Stevenson and Robert II.
Bear14 attempted to establish emperical evidence of the vali-
dity of the random-walk hypothesis. Their study differs from
most that have been reviewed by these researchers in that their
data base consisted of daily price movements and concerned it-
self with trading strategies relating to short-term price be-
havior. A range of tests for randomness were used including
serial correlation, analysis of runs, and filter techniques.
The data used were the twelve years of daily futures
prices including open, high, low, and closing prices for July
contracts of soybeans and corn.
The tests that were of most interest to this thesis were
the filter tests. A number of mechanical trading techniques
(filters) were tested in order to determine if returns after
commissions could be earned, which were greater than by buying
and holding through the life of the contract. The trading
techniques tested were the following:
a) A futures contract is bought at the opening price on
the first day of trading with a stop-loss order x
percent below the purchase price. The contract is
held until the last date prior to delivery or until
liquidated by the stop-loss order. Once the position
is liquidated, a new position is assumed in the same
manner for the next year's contract. (This is es-
sentially the strategy tested by Houthakker.)
14 Stevenson and Bear," Commodity Futures: Trends or Random
Walks?" Journal of Finance, XXV, pages 65-81
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b) A futures contract is bought (or sold) after the price
of the contract has moved up (or down) x percent from
the first day's closing price and a traTling stop-
loss order of x percent is used. Once the position
is liquidated via the stop-loss by an unfavorable
price move, a new position is established in a simi-
lar manner using the closing price of the day during
which the former position was liquidated as a basis.
This technique is reiterated until the last trading
day prior to delivery.
c) Assuming a position in the futures market using the
strategy described in b (above), only a position is
taken against the trend rather than with it.
d) Using the opening price on the first day as a basis,
a contract is bought (or sold) when the price moves
up (or down) x percent and liquidate when the future
moves up (or afown) x percent. This technique uses a
"stop gain" as well as a stop-loss of x percent.
Each of the above trading techniques used three values for
x: 14 percent, 3 percent, and 5 percent. The rationale behind
this choice indicated that a value of less than l percent
could not be tested without knowing daily intertemporal price
behavior, and values above 5 percent would produce very little
trading.
The profits (or losses) after commissions that resulted
from these trading rules and a buy-and-hold strategy are sum-
marized below:
STRATEGIES 1h% 3% 5%
SOYBEANS
buy & hold 8,547 8,547 8,547
a. 7,424 4,724 14,426
b. (6,657) 12,316 17,101
c. 156 8,874 (10,472)
d. (12,269) 9,138 12,332
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STRATEGIES 1% 3% 5%
CORN
buy & hold
a. (5,328) (5,228) (5,238)
b. ( 753) (2,253) (1,428)
c. (8,937) 534 2,413
d. (8,630) (1,507) ( 651)
Stevenson and Bear concluded that certain trading strateg-
ies with selected filters produced profits (i.e., strategy b
with a 3 percent filter) for both commodities which in their
words "cost considerable doubt on the random-walk hypothesis."
Other tests using serial correlation and "analysis of runs"
techniques conducted by Stevenson and Bear seem to confirm ear-
lier findings by Larson,15 and Schmidt. 1 6 Larson concluded in
his work that sudden large price movements are generally fol-
lowed by reversals over the short term with a weaker trend over
a larger term. 1 7
Schmidt concluded, after studying serial correlations in
May soybean futures that daily price changes exhibit statis-
tically negative serial independence. That is, trends in price
movements were on the average only one or two days long and
were followed by short-term reversals.
15 Arnold B. Larson, "Measurement of a Random Process in Futures
Prices," Food Research Institute Studies, page 316.
16 Seymour Schmidt, "A Test of the Serial Correlation of Price
Averages in Soybean Futures," Food Research Institute
Studies, pages 116-135.
17 This price behavior was also identified by Victor Neiderhoffer
in this Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Chicago,
which will be reviewed later in this thesis and which
forms the basis for one of the tests performed as part
of this effort.
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A review of one other study related to the random-walk hy-
pothesis is presented in the following paragraphs. H. S.
Houthakker argues in a paper prepared in 1961 that "randomness
can only be defined negatively--namely, as the absence of any
systematic pattern....Complete randomness can therefore only
be disproved, not proved."1 8 A variety of tests, according to
Houthakker, may detect a set of patterns of price behavior
which may disprove randomness. He counters the argument that
if any pattern persisted over a relatively long term, it would
be discovered by speculators and destroyed by their trading
behavior by suggesting that traders in large part are not soph-
isticated in their perception of price behavior and may not, in
all probability, discover such patterns.
He tests his hypothesis by using a trading system of stop
orders. He initiated positions (long and short) at the closing
price of the opening day of trading of a particular commodity
and with a variety of different percentage stops (from zero to
100 percent) continued in that position until the price move-
ment "stopped" the position or until four months time has
elapsed. The data used were daily price movements for wheat
and corn futures from October 1, 1921, to October 1, 1939, and
February 1, 1947, to October 1, 1956.
18 H. S. Houthakker, "Systematic and Random Elements in Short-
Term Price Movements," Proceedings of the American
Economic Association 51, page 164.
-33-
Houthakker showed profitable results in a majority of the
trading situations he tested: long and short positions in May,
September, and December options in wheat and corn. Part of
the consistent profit (or loss) he observed he attributed to
seasonality and the theory of normal backwardation.
Houthakker did no,,however, consider commissions in his
trading experiment. Nor, strangely enough, did he trade be-
yond the four month time horizon for each option and no
justification for this limitation is given. Furthermore, he
did not penalize himself when he liquidated his positions in
the test--that is, he did not take into account that stop-
losses rarely, if ever, get the trader out of the market ex-
actly where he desires.
He comments, however, that trading with stop-losses as he
used them tended to be "more effective in reducing losses than
in increasing profits" and that the potential for stop-losses
orders to effectively initiate positions in the market as well
as liquidate them was not fully explored. Furthermore, he sug-
gests that "moving stops" are probably more effective than
those based on percentages of the price level when a position
is initiated.
C. The Theory of Anticipatory Prices
The third major theory put forward in recent years for ex-
plaining price behavior on commodities futures markets is the
"Theory of Anticipatory Prices" by Holbrook Working. This theory
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provides a point of departure for the hypothesis to be tested
in this thesis. A review of that theory is presented below.
In 1921 F. W. Taussig pbulished a paper dealing with mar-
ket price determination. In it, he stated quite lucidly, that
price movements on forward markets, in many cases, cannot be
explained by supply and demand. He gives the following example
of his theory:19
... a fall in the price of eggs may cause the
country dealers and the cold storage people
not to hold back their suplies, but to send
them in hurriedly, for ear o a further fall;
while city dealers, so far from buying more,
will hesitate to buy, having the same fear.
The bottom will drop out of the market. On
the Chicago Baord of Trade the bears, when
they sell wheat short and pound away at the
price, count on the same course of events.
The lower price will not tempt others to buy,
but frighten them to sell. Your equilibrium
will not necessarily work out at all....
Taussig encpuraged the belief that there is no sound
economic reason for frequent price change over the short term,
nor is there any economic rationale for speculative trading
which involves day trading or even week trading.
Holbrook Working later offered his related theoretical
explanation of price behavior on forward markets.20 According
to Working, any theory of such markets must account for and
19 F. W. Taussig, "Is Market Price Determinate?" Quarterly
Journal of Economics, pages 396-97.
20 Holbrook Working, "A Theory of Anticipatory Prices, Ameri-
can Economic Review, pages 188-99.
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reflect expectations in the future formation of demand. Fut-
ures market participants do not typically consider current
consumption demand; rather, they anticipate future consumption
demand.
Working's anticipatory theory of prices provides needed
explanation for the non-economic price behavior which Taussig
identified. It makes the following assumptions:
* Prices are formed through the "medium of human deci-
sions," and based on information which is typically
and realistically available.
e The number of traders in the market is large enough
so that no one trader can influence price behavior
by his transactions.
e Information available to traders is far beyond what
they can acquire and use (i.e., traders will as a
result use different aggregations of available infor-
mation for their decisions) .
o All but a few traders are highly skilled and devote
full time to their trading efforts.
The acquisition and use of information which leads traders
to anticipate price movements varies widely in practice. For
example, as Working points out, the following methods are used:
o Information is used which comes from official reports
issued. at dates known to all traders.
o Some traders arrange for observers in various parts of
the country to report on conditions of crops, etcetera,
in advance of official reports.
* Weather information is a primary decision aid for many
traders.
o General business conditions at a national and inter-
national scale are decision aids for other traders.
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The result is that some traders get information early
and tend to seek quick profits. Others act on the basis of
somewhat lagged information. Still others (the less well in-
formed and less skilled) act after price movements or trends,
resulting from other traders anticipations, have begun.
The various lags with which information is received, in-
terpreted, and used results in short-term price movements,
which are explained by the anticipations of traders continu-
ously entering and exiting the market. The flow of informa-
tion is continuous, but its content is unpredictable. There-
fore, Working tentatively concludes that price changes
generated by this theory must also be unpredictable, at least
over the long term. Working, qualifies this statement, how-
ever, to acknowledge the phenomena which must be present in
short-term price movements if traders receive and interpret
similiar information at different times. This phenomena is
"gradualness of price change." This tendency, as Working
points out, introduces "short term predictability" of prices
in the market. This short-term predictability may be produced
even without knowledge of the information which initially
caused the price change by the trading behavior of "trend fol-
lowers;" that is, those speculators who simply "go with the
market."
Working goes on to generally verify his theory by emperi-
cal investigation of prices. The results of this investigation
show that price changes are highly correlated with the timing
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of release of official supply information.
The theory which Working postulates, coincides at least in
part, with a theory that the writers will postulate later in
this thesis: the commodities futures market is not completely
a random-walk market nor is it a wholly-predictable market;
rather, it is partially non-random.
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CHAPTER 4
STATEMENT OF THE HYPOTHESIS
The majority of the past studies reviewed in the previous
chapter indicate the existence of a continuing debate among
scholars of the commodities futures market as to the validity
of the random-walk theory for describing the behavior of fut-
ures price movements. This thesis postulates a "middle of the
road" hypothesis which might be termed theory of "partial non-
randomness."
The rationale for this hypothesis stems from Working's
comments in his "Theory of Anticipatory Prices." Events occur
generating information which in turn is interpreted by the in-
vestors in the market causing new price formations. Informa-
tion from certain events will have greater influence on price
behavior than information from other events. Also, one can
reasonably assume, as did Working, that not all information
available is perceived by all investors at any given time and
that some information will be assimilated by the market caus-
ing certain types of initial price and price-related behavior
which, while the effect of causal events and because of occa-
sional gradualness of price adjustments to new information,
acts as an event internal to the market which signals future
non-random price movement. When price adjustments to new in-
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formation is immediate and not gradual, then the market on such
occasions is likely to conform to the random-walk hypothesis.
The basic hypothesis to be tested in this thesis, there-
fore, may be stated in the following manner: commodities fut-
ures short-term price movements are non-random and predictable
within acceptable levels of confidence conditional upon and
subsequent to the occurence of certain causal-events external
to the market and effect-events internal to the market.
The event-types, as stated above, which are hypothesized
to give rise to non-random behavior of futures prices over the
short term are the following:
e causal events "external" to price movements
* effect events "internal" to price movements
- price moves to "legal limits"
- "gaps" in price moves
- "key reversals" in price moves
- price movements beyond a lagged "moving average"
- volume and open interest values and changes
- price penetration through local or "seasonal" limits
- high or low "market-vane" indicators
A more detailed rationale for the selection of each of the
above listed event-types as leading indicators of non-random
price behavior and any supporting data needed to test the
validity of these events is presented in the following para-
graph.
A. Causal Events External to Price Movements
While many of the significant information generating
events to which traders respond are reports from the United
-40-
States Department of Agriculture describing the supply of and
demand for particular commodities, such information is not
readily available for the time period required for the tests
to be conducted by this thesis. Also, rigorous interpretation
of the economic significance of such reports requires a level
of effort substantially beyond the scope of this thesis. Rather,
data which was easily accessible and previously interpreted had
to be used. As a primary source of such data, this thesis
relies on research done by Victor Neiderhoffer as past of a
Ph.D. dissertation prepared at the University of Chicago,1
The objective of Neiderhoffer's research was to analyze the
correlation between world events and stock price behavior.
World events were defined as occuring "when a five-to eight-
column headline occurred in The New York Times." 2 The headlines
were classified into a number of subject categories and also on
a seven-point "good/bad" scale ranging from extremely bad to
neutral to extremely good. These events were compared with sub-
sequent price movements in the Standard and Poor's Composite
Index. Neiderhoffer found the following:
* The particular subject category (e.g., United States
discovery, peace negotiations, natural calamity, etc.)
does not appear to add much additional information
concerning future stock price movements.
Victor Neiderhoffer, "World Events and Stock Prices," Ph.D.
dissertation.
2 Ibid, page 66.
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* There is a consistent pattern of price movement sub-
sequent to events classified on the bad side of the
scale: the day after such an event, the index fell;
but on days two through five, the market rose, account-
ing for a tendency for investors to initially overreact
to bad news.
The data which Neiderhoffer used are published (See Appen-
dix) and were used as part of the tests conducted by this
thesis. These data were grouped into five categories and
classified as events. The following were the categories:
(1) * extremely good event = Neiderhoffer's extremely good
(2) o good event = Neiderhoffer's slightly good, fairly good,
and extremely good
(3) o neutral event = Neiderhoffer's neutral
(4) o bad event = Neiderhoffer's slightly bad, fairly bad,
and extremely bad
(5) o extremely bad event = Neiderhoffer's extremely bad.
Price movements subsequent to these event-types were monitored
as part of the testing conducted by this thesis.
B. Effect-Events Internal to Price Movements
1. The"Legal Limit" Event
Limits on the amount a price can move during the trading
process in one day are imposed by the exchange on which a com-
modity is traded. These limits use the previous day's closing
price as a base and restrict the next day's price movement both
up and down by the same absolute value. This restraint is
somewhat foreign to a free market and presumably price move-
ments would range much further if such limits did not exist.
Therefore, it might reasonably be expected that if a price
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reaches a limit on one day, it is more likely to move past that
limit during the next day's trading and that an opportunity
for gain exists if one can enter the market at that time.
This event-type will be tested under two prior conditions
of price behavior resulting in the following variations:
(6) o price trend up prior to limit move up
(7) o price trend up prior to limit move down
(8) o price trend down prior to limit move up
(9) o price trend down prior to limit move down.
A price trend is defined in the following manner for each com-
modity:
o a cocoa price trend (APc) exists when iPt- t-101 - .25
o a potatoe price trend (APp) exists when IPt-pt-101>.08
where Pt = closing price on day t
Pt-10= closing price ten days earlier.
2. The "Gap" Event
A gap is defined as an event in price movement which re-
sults a particular day's high and low trading prices exceeding
the limits of the previous day's high and low. For example,
an "upside" gap would occur when the lowest price on one day is
higher than the high price of the day before.3 The occurance
of an abnormal price movement, as manifested by a gap, leads
many speculators to believe that more price movements in the
3 William Jiler, "Chart Analysis As an Aid to Commodity Price
Forecasting," Guide to Conmodity Price Forecasting,
page 29.
-43-
same direction will follow.
The validity of this event as an indicator of non-random
price movements was tested under the following prior conditions:
(10) o price trend up prior to upside gap
(11) o price trend up prior to downside gap
(12) e price trend down prior to upside gap
(13) o price trend down prior to downside gap
A price trend is defined in the same manner as it was for the
"legal limit" event.
3. The "Key Reversal" Event
This event is defined as a day when prices, after reach-
ing a new high (or low) short term or long term turn around
and close lower (or higher) than the previous day's close. 4
The advocates of this trading rule hold that this event is an
indicator of a reversal of prior price trends. The high and
low limits which were tested were seasonal highs and lows and
weekly and monthly highs and lows. In other words, a "key
reversal" event may occur when,on day t, after reaching:
(14) o a seasonal high, Pt< t-
(15) o a seasonal low, Pt> Pt-1
(16) o a weekly high, Pt< Pt-1
(17) o a weekly low, Pt> Pt-1
(18) e a monthly high, Pt< Pt-l
(19) o a monthly low, Pt<Pt-l
William Jiler, "Chart Analysis As an Aid to Commodity Price
Forecasting," Guide to Commodity Price Forecasting,
page 29.
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4. The "Moving Average" Event
This event is a well-known trading rule in the folklore of
the market. There are a number of approaches typically used.
First of all, a weighted average of past closing prices can be
used, giving most importance to more recent prices; or a sim-
ple average of past prices can be used. Secondly, the time
horizon of the average can vary with five to thirty days being
typical. Thirdly, the analyst can use a change in the slope
of the moving average as an indicator of future price behavior;
and lastly, the moving average can be used in a graph and com-
pared with the price movement line of a shorter term moving
average or the line of actual price movement. When the lines
intersect, this event is used as a signal of a change in the
trend of price movements. 5 The moving averages which defined
"events" for the purposes of this thesis are listed below.
Given a preceding five-day simple moving average (MAs)
and alternately a ten-day simple moving average (MA 1 0 ) , an
event signalling a change in price trend occurs if
(20) pt- > MA5 and Pt 5 MA 5
(21) Pt-l'M5 and Pt > MA 5
(22) Pt.l> MA10 and Pt S MA1O
(23) Pt. l5MA10 and Pt > MA10.
Kroll and Shisko, The Commodity Futures Market Guide,
page 155.
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5. The "Volume and Open Interest Event"
Volume is defined as the composite number of contracts
traded in a particular day. Open interest is defined as "the
total purchase or sale commitments which are outstanding "at
any particular day." 6 At any particular time, the number of
long contracts (purchase commitments) is equal to the number
of short contracts. As mentioned before, the data for each
of these items as used in the thesis is aggregated for all
options (months) for each commodity.
The impact of different types of sellers or buyers on the
change in open interest is summarized below:7
EFFECT ON
TRANSACTION OPEN INTEREST
Purchases by old sellers from old buyers Reduced
Purchases by old sellers from new sellers Unchanged
Purchases by new buyers from old buyers Unchanged
Purchases by new buyers from new sellers Increased
Sales by old buyers to new buyers Unchanged
Sales by old buyers to old sellers Reduced
Sales by new sellers to old sellers Unchanged
Sales by new sellers to new buyers Increased
Open interest changes are predictably seasonal, so the
data should first be adjusted by a seasonal index before
further analysis of the data is made. For this thesis, an in-
dex of monthly averages over the period 1955-1964 were used
to adjust the data.
6 Teweles, Harlow and Stone, The Commodity Futures Trading
Guide, page 108.
Ibid, page 108. 8 Richard Donchian, "Trend Followin Meth-
ods in Commodity Price Analysis," Guide to Commoity
Price Forecasting, page 68.
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A number of general rules have been postulated by traders
in terms of relationships between change in volume and open
interest and price behavior. The changes in volume under vari-
ous conditions of price movement are reported to have the fol-
lowing meaning. 9
* Under conditions of an upward price trend, volume will
generally increase on "rallies" (price movements in
the direction of the trend) and decrease in the direc-
tion of reactions; the converse is generally true for
downward price trends.
* Under conditions of a major termination in a trend of
price movement ("tops and bottoms") , volume will gen-
erally increase sharply prior to this termination--
suggesting that, in this case, volume change would
be a leading indicator of major price chance.
Changes in open interest under various conditions of price
movement are suggested to have the following meaning.10
* If an upward price trend is identifiable and the
change in seasonally-adjusted open interest is larger
than expected, the market is "strong," and the trend
is likely to continue. Conversely, if the change in
seasonally-adjusted open interest is lower than ex-
pected, the market is "weak," and the upward trend is
likely to reverse.
* If a downward trend is identifiable and the change in
adjusted open interest is greater than expected, the
market is "weak" and likely to reverse the trend.
Conversely, if change in adjusted open interest is less
than expected, the market is "strong", and the trend
is likely to continue.
Volume (V) and Open Interest (01) are often examined to-
gether and summarized in the following form:
9 Richard Donchian, "Trend Following Methods in Commodity Price
Analysis," Guide to Commodity Price Forecasting, page 109.
10
Ibid, page 109-110.
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* price trend up, V and 01 up: "strong" market
* price trend up, V and 01 down: "weak" market
* price trend down, V and 01 up: "weak" market
* price trend down, V and 01 dowrn:"strong" market.
With these relationships in mind, the following forms of vol-
ume and/or open-interest events were tested:
o price trend up and:
(24) VMA5 2 1.6 VA
(25) Vt~ t-4 >.2 VA, and OIt-Ot-1o ? .02 OIA
(26) Vt-Vt- 4 5 -. 2 VA, and OIt-OIt.10 -.02 OIA
o price trend down and:
(27) VMA5 Z 1.6 VA
(28) Vt-Vt-4 1 .2 VA, and OIt-Ot-10 -:.02 OIA
(29) Vt-Vt-4 S -. 2 VA, and OIftOIt-lO -. 02 OIA
(30) * ojt 0o1 t-o10 .05 OIA
(31) * ojt-0 It-l0 iS' 0 5 OIA
where VMA 5 = five-day moving average of volume
VA = average annual volume
OIA = average monthly open interest
6. The Seasonal Record Event
This event is related to the "legal limit" event in that
it assumes that a barrier to price movement exists in the mar-
ket. The barrier, in this case, is a record high and low
price level which has been reached by a particular option in
earlier months of trading. This barrier is assuned to be
psychological, not statutory as in the first case, but that
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once penetrated will result in further price movement in the
same direction and an opportunity for gain. This condition
will not be tested until an option has been traded on the mar-
ket for at least two months. Also, a variation will be tested;
'local' highs or lows in price movenent are also thought to be
psychological limits to price movements. A local high (or low)
will be defined for purposes of the thesis to be those which
were reached within one month or one week of a particular trad-
ing day. The variations on this event-type are the following:
(32) * price > seasonal high
(33) * price < seasonal low
(34) * price > weekly high
(35) * price < weekly low
(37Y * price > monthly high
(38) o price < monthly low.
7. "Market Vane" Events
This event-type is based on the assertion that if enough
small speculators strongly anticipate price movements in one
direction, they will bid the prices to a level artificially
high or low, deplete their available speculative capital in so
doing, and be highly vulnerable to adverse price movements
which will inevitably occur. Also, since the available capi-
tal of speculators is all invested in the market, no more
bidding pressure is available to push prices further thus in-
creasing the potential for price trend reversals. Once such
movements do occur, the small speculators will collectively
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liquidate their positions; and a price rebound will occur, re-
sulting in an opportunity for a gain on the price reaction.
Another reason, perhaps overly simplistic, which is given for
acting contrary to the positions small speculators take in the
market is that this group of speculators are consistent losers
in the market and typically do not remain in the market long
enough nor do they study it thoroughly enough to achieve signif-
icant gains. Thus, a position "contrary" to the expectations
of small speculators should be taken after a strong measure of
their collective expectations is identified. The measure of
this collective opinion will be data computed by the Market
Vane Commodity Service. 1 1  This data summarizes and scales the
aggregate advice given weekly by a large sample of some thirty
market newsletters. The assumption that small speculators fol-
low the advice of these newsletters is implicite; or in other
words, aggregate opinion of small speculators is reflected by
the consensus of advisors in weekly newsletters.
This consensus is determined by subjective tabulation on
a percentage basis of the comments of the weekly advisory news-
letters in the sample. The Market Vane Service scales "opinion"
according to the following general rules. The comments for each
commodity in each newsletter are rated bullish, bearish, or
neutral, with neutral advice having one or more of the following
characteristics:
Market Vane Commodity Service, P.O. Box 43, South Pasadena,
California.
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e advice which is half bullish and half bearish
* advice suggesting liquidating long (or short) positions
but not recommending reentering the market by
sellrg (or buying)
e advice suggesting no entry, either long or short, into
the market
* advice which is ambiguous.
The percentage of bullishness (or bearishness) is deter-
mined by dividing the number of bullish (or bearish) advisors
in the sample by the size of the sample.
Price behavior in the market will be tested subsequent to
the following Market Vane weekly (MVW) events:
(38) o MVw > 90%
(39) * MV, > 80%
(40) e MVw < 20%
(41) e MVW < 30%
(42) * MVw > 90% and HVW+1 M W
(43) e MVw > 80% and MVw+l MVw
(44) e 14Vw < 20% and MVW+1 MV
(45) e MVw < 30% and MVw+l M w.
RI
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CHAPTER 5
DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA
In order to test the hypothesis just described, daily
prices on one or more commodities for a relatively long time
period were required. While any of the commodities traded on
organized exchanges would have sufficed, Cocoa and Maine
Potatoes were finally selected as representatives of two con-
trasting commodities. Cocoa is a storable non-perishable
commodity, traded internationally and reputed to be "well
behaved" (that is, not prone to volatile price movements).
Maine Potatoes, on the other hand, is a perishable commodity,
traded primarily on domestic markets and known for manifesting
particularly volatile price behavior.
A note should be added here about the nature of storable
(non perishable) and non-storable (perishable or semi-
perishable) commodities since this was one of the main decision
criterion for the selection of the commodities which were test-
ed in this thesis. As ioplied in the above paragraph, price
movements in perishable commodities tend to be more volitile
than in non-perishable commodities.
Potatoes and frozen eggs are the principal perishable
commodities traded on drganized futures exchanges. These com-
modities have all the uncertainty of supply and demand which
characterizes other commodities and, in addition, are subject
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to much greater ownership risk due to "hazards of spoilage
deterioration and reduction in grade."1 Thus, additional risk
results in much more volatile changes in actual supply of the
commodity and expectations of change in supply as manifested
in price movements on the futures market.
Of the non-perishable conmodities, cocoa has been parti-
cularly attractive to speculators because of its extensive and
consistent price swings. The reason often given for the tend-
ency for long term trends in the futures prices of this com-
modity is the relative inelasticity of cocoa supply and demand?
On the supply side, cocoa is the product of a tropical tree
crop. It takes approximately five years from the time of
planting until the tree begins bearing commercially usable
fruit. Therefore, supplies and production in a given year can-
not be changed significantly by new planting of trees and are
typically not responsive to short-term price changes.
On the demand side, the elasticity of demand for cocoa
has been estimated to be about .25.3 This is mainly accounted
for by the manufacturers of cocoa products who tend to modify
sizes, recipes, use of cocoa substitutes, among other things,
1 Kroll and Shisko, The Commodity Futures Market Guide,
page 116.
2 Irwin Shisko, "How to Forecast Cocoa Prices," Guide to
Commodity Price Forecasting, page 102.
3 Ibid, page 102.
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when factor prices change rather than change their production
output and product retail prices. Given constant retail prices
of cocoa-based products, consumption of cocoa remains relative-
ly constant.
The historical data for these two commodities was obtained
in punched-card form from Dunn and Hargitt, Inc., Lafayette,
Indiana. The data extends from July 1959 to the end of 1973
and includes daily open,high, low, and closing prices for the
September option in Cocoa and the May option in Maine Potatoes.
Volume data is daily for all options in each commodity. Open
interest data is also daily for all options. Cash price data
is reported weekly and is available only for Cocoa.
Volume and open interest data are aggregated for all op-
tions in each commodity group because these particular market
statistics, when isolated for a particular option, exhibit
special behavior at the initiation of the option and just
prior to and during delivery months. That is, volume and open
interest are zero at the time an option is initiated, rise to
levels of behavior coincidental with other options being
traded a few weeks after market entry and fall back to zero at
the end of the delivery month. This "end condition" behavior
is not desirable for testing the hypothesis previously stated;
rather, the aggregated data for all options exhibits a more
consistent and continuous behavior over time and is more useful
for the purposes of this thesis.
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The data for the September option in Cocoa had "overlaps"
resulting from the fact that each option in Cocoa is traded for
more than one year. In other words, Septerber Cocoa with
delivery due in September of 1970 began to be traded on the
market in April of 1969. For five months prior to September,
1969, data for two September options was available. This over-
lap in the data was resolved by changing from the "near" option
to the "far" option on July 1. Data for forty trading days
subsequent to July 1 in the "near" option was used only for
developing forecasts which will be described later in this
thesis.
The primary source of the data as it was collected by
Dunn and Hargitt was the Market News, published by Russell-
Pearsoll News, Inc., and the Journal of Commerce.
The data was checked by the writers, and errors were
identified and corrected by data in the records of the Wall
Street Journal. The check-tests which were conducted verified
the following relationships and identified places in the data
where such relationships did not exist:
" high ! upper legal limit
* low > lower legal limit
* high > close low
" high open 2 low.
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CHAPTER 6
TESTING THEORY AND PROCEDURE
The following discussion will review the manner in which
the data was used first to test the validity of each of the
event-types described previously as leading indicators of non-
random price behavior, and secondly to simulate a trading
situation using the forecasts of expected gains subsequent to
the occurrence of event-types which proved to be the best in-
dicators of non-randomness in the first test.
The data was divided into two sets: years 1960 to 1969
were used for the evaluation of each of the event-types, and
years 1970 to 1973 were used for the trading simulation.
A. Evaluation of Event-Types
The initial testing involved computation of the expected
(or average) price change and estimated standard deviation
computed in the following manner:
na
Pt = Pt- 1) /na
na 
2
a = E (Pt-P )-Pt1
ti=l
na-I
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where Pi = Closing price on the first day after the occurrences
of event-type a
Pt = Closing price on day t
na = Number of observations of occurrences of event-
type .
Pt = Mean of price change following event-.type a
at = Standard deviation of price change following the
event-type.
Subsequent to this computation the results were examined
and a number of event-types which manifested the best combina-
tion of high expected price change (or gain) and lowest
standard deviation were selected for the trading simulation.
B. Trading Simulation
The trading simulation involved three different types of
simulations. Each event-type selected after the evaluations
conducted in the first test formed a "forecast" of expected
price movements conditional upon the occurrence of siwdlar
events during the simulation. First, the event-types were
tested separately in the simulation. Then the forecasts from
all events were tested together with each forecast remaining in
effect for forty days or until another event of the same or
different type occurred. When a new event occurred, the fore-
cast of expected price movement associated with that event took
precedence. The third simulation involved combining all the
selected event-type forecasts and introducing a mechanism to
adjust the forecasts in response to actual price movements.
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This adjusting mechanism was developed in an attempt to reduce
the undesirable (downside variance) associated with each fore-
cast.
The decision regarding entry to or exit from the market
was made whenever the expected gain indicated by the forecast
exceeded the "hurdle amount," which was the sum of the trans-
action cost plus the risk premium. The risk premium was set
at 7 percent per year on an investment equivalent to the total
cost of the commodity contract purchased. Expected gain is
equal to the expected price change indicated in the forecast
a risk-free return on the investment of the cost of the
contract less the margin required. For computation purposes,
however, the risk-free return was ignored because it is a fixed
rate of return regardless of market position.
Expressing the above in symbolic form, we have the follow-
ing:
if E(G)
P 1
Pt
Rf
Rr
HA
TC
I
M
= Expected gain
= Closing price on the first day
= Closing price on day t, where 2 t <40
= Risk-free rate (assumed to be 10% annual)
= Risk-premium rate (assued to be 7% annual)
= "Hurdle" amount
= Transaction cost
= Investment
= Margin required for market entry
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then E(G) = IPt-P I+Rf(I-M) (with R (I-M) omitted in the
actual computation)
and market entry is made if E(G)> HA, where
HA = TC + I*R e t
The following paragraphs provide the rationale for the
above decisions pertaining to market entry and exit require-
ments.
As pointed out by Katherine Miller, 1 at first glance the
margin required for entry into the commodities futures market
(approximately 10 percent of the total cost of the commodity
stock represented by the contract) seems to be the appropriate
amount t6 be treated as the capital.investment. Upon further
examination, however, it becomes evident that the margin, in-
stead of being transferred to the seller, is put in escrow by
the brokerage house. In fact, both the buyer and the seller of
a commodittes futures contract have to meet a margin require-
ment. The margin, hherefore, is "not a capital asset in the
sense of the Sharpe general equilibrium model but merely a good
faith deposite to guarantee performance by the parties to the
contract."2  If other means were available to insure no default
on contracts, such "performance bonds" would be necessary.
Furthermore, the amount of margin required for a position in a
contract can vary from zero to a large amount depending on the
1 Katherine Miller, "Futures Trading and Investor Returns,"
Ph.D. dissertation, Graduate School of Business, Univer-
sity of Chicago, page 22.
2 Ibid, page 22.
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gains or losses from a position once initiated in the market.
If a position is taken in the market, with the required margin
deposited, and the price movements are favorable, additional
contract positions may be established in the market with no
additional investment required for margin. The gains made on
the first position serve as margin for subsequent positions.
Conversely, if an initial position in the market is subject to
price movements resulting in losses, additional investment of
funds will be required to "maintain" the margin.
A more appropriate basis for the speculator's investment,
therefore, is the actual cost of the commodity itself. In this
case, the assumption is made that the speculator must, in order
to participate in the futures market, set-aside funds equal to
the total amount of the futures contract in the event that he
must take delivery if he is long or deliver if he is short.
The amount set aside is not actually invested in the market ex-
cept for that amount required at any given time for margin;
rather, it may be actually invested in another reasonably liq-
uid and risk-free asset-which may earn interest revenue.
To summarize, the investment(I)is equal to the total price
of the commodity contract multiplied by the number of contracts
(N). The rate of return may be expressed in the following
manner:
R.O.R. = IPt-Pli N + I * R-ft / t
I
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Once a decision is made during the simulation to enter the
market, actual entry is made at the closing price of the day
selected for entry. A number of entry levels were considered
before closing price was finally selected. The other options
available were the open, high, or low prices or some predeter-
mined price which would represent market entry on the basis of
an order placed with a broker to enter the market after such a
price had been reached. In the case of opening price, a pen-
alty of some amount should be used to simulate the market prob-
lem of entry at exactly a prescribed price. High or low prices
may impose undo hardships or advantages on the initial position
in the market,and entry at a price level specified to a broker
is sometimes never executed if price behavior during the day
doesn't reach the level specified. Other variations, such as
a mid-point between high and low or between open and closing
prices, could have been considered; but iny decision would in
the long run result, in all probability, in little overall dif-
ferece in resulting gains or losses. The writers accepted the
viewpoint that the closing price was a reasonably accurate re-
flection of the market's attitude toward price on any particu-
lar day. For that reason, and for ease of computation, closing
price was selected for both market entry and exit during the
simulation.
The forecast adjusting mechanism tested in the simulation
is of the following form.
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The forecast adjustment mechanisms employed in the third
type of simulation were based on the assumption that an actual
price movement significantly different from the forecasted
price change reduces the precision of the original forecast.
Two mechanisms were developed in an attempt to maintain the
precision of the forecast and reduce the "downside variance"
of the forecast.
The first adjustment mechanism may be described in the
following manner. When the actual price change (APAt) is dif.t-
ferent from the price change forecast (APFt); this difference
is defined as D = APAt-APFt. The price changes after time i
are adjusted such that
i. (APFt+i)new = (APFt)old + D(1 + d(i-1))
ii. after the first major peak within 40 days
(APFt+i)new = (APFt+i)old + D (1 + a(i*-l)
where i* is the day when the price peak occurs.
Prior to the first major peak, the price forecast has a
significant influence on the trading decision. Thus, for that
period, the price forecast is adjusted to show a more favorable
trend expressed by a higher slope for the forecast when actual
price movement is favorable and a lower slope for the forecast
when actual prices are unfavorable.
The second adjustment mechanism defined the following:
r = D/APFt
and
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(APFt+i)new = {(APFt+i) old + D} (1+ar) - APAtar
This method also allows actual price movements to be re-
flected in the forecast slope. However, the following restric-
tion is imposed: 0 < ar < 2.
In this case, more emphasis is placed on the ratio of the
forecast price change to the actual price change rather than
the absolute value of the difference between the actual and
forecasted price changes. The first forecast adjusting mechan-
ism tends to revise the forecast more conservatively, while the
second tens to revise the forecast giving more weight to actual
price behavior.
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CHAPTER 7
RESULTS
The results of the evaluation and simulation tests des-
cribed in the previous chapter are presented here. Test results
are presented first for Cocoa and then for Potatos.
A. Cocoa
The mean standard deviation and confidence of positive
gain of price movements subsequent to each of the event-types
described in Chapter IV was evaluated for Cocoa from 1960
through 1969. The results of this computation are summarized
in Exhibit VII-1 and presented in their entirety in the Appen-
dix. The computation results for the event-types which were
selected as having relatively high absolute values of expected
price change and relatively low standard deviations are pre-
sented in Exhibit VII-2. The selections ideally should have
been made using a representative commodity speculator's utility
function, but for purposes of expediency in this thesis were
made subjectively by the writers reflecting at least implicitly
their own gain versus risk preferences.
The selected event-types and their associated 40-day ex-
pected price change and estimated standard deviations were
used as forecasts for the simulation tests using data for years
1970 through 1973. These event-type forecasts gave the trading
simulation results shown on Exhibits VII-4, 5. The results
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from the simulation of individual event-types forecasts are
shown in Exhibit VII-4. The results from the event-types con-
bined into a "portfolio" of forecasts are shown in Exhibit
VII-5. The results of the two price adjusting mechanisms for
all selected event-types are shown in Exhibits VII-6 and
VII-7.
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EXHIBIT VII-1 SUMMARY OF FUTURES PRICE CHANGES SUBSEQUENT TO ALL EVENT TYPES
SEPTEMBER COCOA 1960 TO 1969
TYPE OF EVENT MAX. EXP/STD.DEV. CONF.
EXP/SD EXP SD DAY + GAIN
MAX. EXP(OP) CONE. # OF
EXP/SD EXP SD DAY + GAIN CBS.
(2) GOOD EVENT
(3) NEUTRAL EVENT
(4) BAC EVENT
(6) PRICE UP W/ LIMIT MOVE UP
(7) PRICE UP W/ LIMIT POVE DOWN
(8) PRICE COWN W/ LIMIT MOVE UP
(9) PRICE COWN W/ LIMIT MOVE DCWN
10) PRICE UP W/ UPSIDE GAP
11) PRICE UP W/ DCWNSIDE GAP
12) PRICE DOWN W/ UPSIDE GAP
13) PRICE DOWN W/ DOWNSIDE GAP
14) KEY REVERSAL W/ SEAS. HIGH
15) KEY REVERSAL i/ SEAS. LOW
16) KEY REVERSAL hI/ WEEKLY HIGH
17) KEY REVERSAL h/ WEEKLY LCW
18) KEY REVERSAL W/ MONTHLY HIGH
19) KEY REVERSAL / MONTHLY LOW
20) 5 CAY MCV AVG @ PRICE PEAK
21) 5 DAY MOV AVG @ PRICE TROUGH
22) 10 CAV MOV AVG @ PRICE PEAK
(24)
(25)
(26)
(27)
(28)
(29)
(30)
(31)
(32)
(33)
(34)
(35)
(36)
(37)
(38)
(39)
(40)
(41)
(43)
(45)
PRICE UP W/ HIGH VOL MOV AVG
PRICE UP W/ INCR VOL & 01 CHANGE
PRICE UP W/ DECR VOL Of CHANGE
PRICE DOWN W/ HIGH VOL MCV AVG
PRICE CGWN W/ INCR VOL & 0I CIANGE
PRICE DCWN W/ DECR VOL & 01 CHANGE
HIGH INCREASING 01 CHANGE
HIGH DECREASING 01 CHANGE
PRICE ABOVE SEAS HIGH
PRICE BELOW SEAS LOW
PRICE ABOVE WEEKLY HIGH
PRICE BELOW WEEKLY LOW
PRICE ABOVE MCNTHLY HIGH
PRICE BELOW MCNTHLY LOW
MKT VANE ABOVE 90 %
MKT VANE ABOVE 80 %
MKT VANE BELO% 20 1
MKT VANE BELOW 30 %
MKT VANE LAGGEC ABOVE 80 %
MKT VANE LAGGED BELOW 30 %
0.19 0.43 2.32
0.33 0.27 0.82
0.22 0.53 2.37
0.66 0.53 0.81
0.00 0.00 0.01
0.91 0.75 0.82
360.00 3.60 0.01
0.31 0.11 0.36
0.30 0.08 0.26
0.32 0.11 0.35
0.32 0.54 1.69
0.39 1.18 3.03
0.45 0.39 0.87
0.15 0.19 1.27
0.24 C.48 2.02
0.31 0.80 2.56
0.28 0.08 0.28
0.19 0.06 0.32
0.13 0.11 0.83
0.09 0.03 0.32
0.62 1.64 2.66
0.39 0.15 0.39
0.27 0.20 0.74
0.55 0.57 1.03
0.92 C.7C 0.76
0.14 0.14 1.00
0.08 0.11 1.47
0.13 C.12 0.90
0.64 2.15 3.38
0.51 0.57 1.12
0.34 1.02 3.01
0.10 0.29 2.96
0.57 1.65 2.91
0.25 0.24 0.96
4.80 2.30 0.48
1.44 0.25 0.17
0.00 0.00 0.01
18.60 1.86 0.10
0.00 0.00 0.01
112.00 1.12 0.01
26
8
35
3
40
3
7
2
2
2
28
30
11
14
34
30
2
2
4
1
40
2
8
13
12
7
14
15
33
13
36
40
33
8
34
2
40
33
40
27
60.
68.
62.
82.
50.
90.
100.
67.
67.
67.
67.
71.
74.
58.
63.
67.
66.
61.
57.
55.
81.
71.
65.
78.
90.
58.
54.
57.
82.
76.
68.
56.
79.
64.
100.
98.
50.
100.
50.
100.
0.19
0.14
0.22
0.24
0.00
0.67
360.00
0.21
0.19
0.21
0.29
0.33
0.31
0.13
0.22
0.31
0.10
0.16
0.10
0.05
0.62
0.18
0.25
0.54
0.60
0.13
0.06
0.08
0.54
0.41
0.31
0.10
0.52
0.21
4.08
0.78
0.00
3.97
0.00
3.97
0.43
0.30
0.53
0.92
0.00
1.93
3.60
0.61
0.40
0.46
0.62
1.27
0.62
0.28
0.49
0.80
0.20
0.35
0.31
0.09
1.64
0.44
0.51
1.14
1.13
0.20
0.17
0.14
2.36
1.23
1.04
0.29
1. 72
0.60
2.48
1.16
0.00
3.70
0.00
3.70
2.32
2.20
2.37
3.86
0.01
2.88
0.01
2.87
2.15
2.16
2.14
3.80
1.99
2.17
2.23
2.56
1.93
2.22
3.23
1.78
2.66
2.50
2.01
2.11
1.89
1.51
3.00
1.73
4.39
2.98
3.37
2.96
3.31
2.84
0.61
1.48
0.01
0.93
0.01
0.93
26
38
35
34
40
31
7
35
23
30
40
39
38
29
40
30
34
40
40
24
40
25
31
40
40
24
40
40
40
40
40
40
37
40
37
27
40
40
40
40
60.
58.
62.
63.
50.
83.
100.
62.
60.
62.
66.
68.
67.
57.
62.
67.
56.
59.
55.
53.
81.
60.
64.
78.
80.
57.
53.
55.
78.
72.
67.
56.
77.
62.
1cc.
87.
5c.
100.
50.
100.
45
93
61
30
0
213
66
81
256
43
36
144
139
73
63
413
143
224
80
118
34
94
49
106
41;
331
101
89
300
284
165
131
3
10
0
2
0
2
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EXHIBIT VII-2
Complete Expected Value and Standard Deviation
Computations of Futures Price Changes Subsequent
to the Occurrence of Selected Event-Types:
September Cocoa, 1960 to 1969
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(10) PRICE UP W/ UPSIDE GAP
DAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
0.06
0.11
0.13
0.16
0.19
0.17
0.21
0.21
0.24
0.25
0.24
C.29
0.29
0.30
0.32
0.34
0.35
C.38
C.38
0.38
COCOA 1960-1969
STD.DEV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.36 21 0.37
0.36 22 0.39
0.51 23 0.39
0.66 24 0.39
0.74 25 0.39
0.83 26 0.39
0.93 27 0.44
1.03 28 0.48
1.20 29 0.49
1.31 30 0.52
1.36 31 0.54
1.42 32 0.56
1.53 33 0.60
1.58 34 C.6C
1.62 35 0.61
1.64 36 0.57
1.64 37 0.57
1.73 38 0.54
1.78 39 0.55
1.87 40 0.53
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
STD.CEV.
1.98
2.08
2.17
2.24
2.23
2.28
2.42
2.52
2.61
2.68
2.74
2.78
2.81
2.85
2.87
2.93
3.02
3.10
3.19
3.29
213
(13) PRICE DOWN W/ DOWNSIDE GAP COCOA 1960-1969
DAY
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
EXP(DP)
-0.36
-0.38
-0.41
-0.44
-0.45
-0.48
-0.51
-0.54
29 -0.51
30 -0.55
31 -0.57
32 -0.59
33 -0.57
34 -0.58
35 -0.59
36 -0.60
37 -0.60
38 -0.62
39 -0.62
40 -,0.62
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
STD.DEV.
1.52
1.53
1.55
1.57
1.60
1.62
1.66
1.69
1.71
1.73
1.79
1.85
1.88
1.86
1.86
1.92
2.00
2.05
2.11
2.14
256
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
0.00
C.02
0.02
0.00
-0.03
-0.07
-0.08
-0.06
-0.09
-0.13
-0.14
-0.17
-0.20
-C.24
-0.25
-0.24
-C. 29
-0.34
-0.37
-0.38
STD.CEV.
0.35
0.32
0.46
0.55
0.62
0.69
0.78
0.82
0.88
0.94
1.01
1.04
1.13
1.22
1.28
1.33
1.39
1.42
1.47
1.53 II
I
U
U
iI
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(20) 5 CAN MCV AVG a PRICE PEAK
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
14
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
-0.06
-0.06
-0.01
-0.02
-0.03
-0.06
-c0.07
-0.06
-0010
-C.13
-0.12
-0.14
-C. 15
-0.15
-0. 16
-C.17
-0.18
-C.18
-0.18
-0.20
COCOA 1960-1969
STD.DEV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.35 21 -0.19
0.32 22 -0.23
0.49 23 -0.23
0.59 24 -0.23
0.69 25 -0.23
0.79 26 -0.22
0.83 27 -0.23
0.89 28 -0.26
0.97 29 -0.26
1.03 30 -0.27
1.09 31 -0.28
1.11 32 -0.28
1.15 33 -0.28
1.22 34 -0.30
1.29 35 -0.32
1.35 36 -0.30
1.38 37 -0.31
1.44 38 -0.32
1.51 39 -0.32
1.60 40 -0.35
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
(21) 5 DAY MCV AVG a PRICE TROUGH
STD.DEV.
1.62
1.62
1.67
1.72
1.73
1.77
1.82
1.87
1.89
1.91
1.95
1.98
2.04
2.06
2.06
2.08
2.15
2.19
2.22
2.22
413
COCOA 1965-1969
STD.DEV.
0.40
0.45
0.67
0.83
0.94
1.09
1.14
1.22
1.20
1.36
1.48
1.61
1.68
1.72
1.72
1.79
1.91
1.96
1.99
2.06
DAY
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
EXP(DP)
0.23
0.17
0.15
0.17
0.18
0.17
0.17
0.22
0.23
0.24
0.26
0.21
0.19
0.20
0.22
0.23
0.28
0.29
0.27
0.31
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS =
STD.DEV.
2.17
2.19
2.19
2.24
2.26
2.36
2.42
2.48
2.58
2.68
2.73
2.76
2.76
2.80
2.89
2.94
2.97
3.02
3.12
3.23
143
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
s
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP( OP)
0.05
0.02
0004
0.11
0.12,
0.10
0.10
0.08
0.11
0.15
C.12
0.16
0.19
C.16
0.13
0.13
0.15
0.16
0.22
0.23
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(24) PRICE UP W/ HIGH VOL MOV
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
C.06
0.05
0.09
C.08
0.08
0.07
0006
-0 .01
-0.06
-0.10
-0.15
-0.18
-0.26
-0.29
-0.40
-0.46
-C.51
-0.54
-C.51
-C.48
AVG COCOA 1960-1969
STD.DEV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.40 21 -0.46
0.40 22 -0.52
0.66 23 -0.57
0.84 24 -0.62
0.93 25 -0.68
0.96 26 -0.73
1.00 27 -0.74
1.05 28 -0.83
1.06 29 -0.87
1.17 30 -0.98
1.26 31 -1.01
1.29 32 -1.06
1.38 33 -1.13
1.48 34 -1.22
1.55 35 -1.31
1.54 36 -1.38
1.62 37 -1.42
1.72 38 -1.50
1.82 39 -1.57
1.93 40 -1.64
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
STD.DEV.
2.10
2.28
2.46
2.55
2.56
2.59
2.63
2.62
2.55
2.53
2.58
2.63
2.67
2.71
2.72
2.74
2.70
2.72
2.70
2.66
80
(25) PRICE UP W/ INCR VOL & 01 CHANGE COCOA 1960-1969
STD.EV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.40 21 0.33
0.39 22 0.34
0.62 23 0.33
0.78 24 0.39
0.94 25 0.44
1.07 26 0.39
1.13 27 0.39
1.23 28 0.36
1.32 29 0.35
1.35 30 0.33
1.41 31 0.32
1.50 32 0.31
1.64 33 0.29
1.80 34 0.23
1.88 35 0.18
1.86 36 0.14
1.85 37 0.08
1.88 38 0.01
1.95 39 -0.01
1.97 40 -0.02
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
STD.CEV.
1.99
2.12
2.30
2.43
2.50
2.54
2.61
2.60
2.63
2.66
2.70
2.77
2.84
2.88
2.93
2.99
3.04
3.04
3.06
3.14
118
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
0.07
0.15
0.23
0.28
0.34
0.37
0.38
0.35
C.31
0.29
C.31
0.34
0.37
0.40
0.39
C.34
0.27
0.25
0.28
0.31
-70-
(27) PRICE DOWN W/ HIGH VOL MOV AVG
DAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
-0.01
-0.05
-0.10
-0.13
-0.15
-C.19
-0.25
-0.32
-0.37
-0.42
-C.48
-0.55
-0.57
-C.60
-0.62
-0.62
-0.62
-0.66
-0.68
-0.70
COCOA 1960-1969
STD.DEV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.39 21 -0.73
0.40 22 -0.76
0.52 23 -0.78
0.57 24 -0.80
0.66 25 -0.83
0.75 26 -0.83
0.77 27 -0.84
0.81 28 -0.83
0.85 29 -0.83
0.89 30 -0.85
0.94 31 -0.89
0.99 32 -0.92
1.03 33 -0.93
1.09 34 -0.95
1.13 35 -0.99
1.21 36 -1.03
1.26 37 -1.07
1.33 38 -1. 11
1.39 39 -1.13
1.46 40 -1.14
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
STD.DEV.
1.48
1.49
1.53
1.57
1.63
1.70
1.77
1.84
1.90
1.92
1.95
1.96
1.99
1.99
1.99
2.01
2.01
2.04
2.08
2.11
94
(28) PRICE DOWN W/ INCR VOL & 01 CI-ANGE COCOA 1960-1969
570.DEV.
0.35
0.37
0.49
0.46
0.54
0.64
0.66
0.63
0.60
0.67
0.77
0.76
0.82
0.93
1.03
1.05
1.03
1.11
1.18
1.22
DAY
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
EXP(DP)
-0.98
-0.95
-0.91
-0.91
-0.91
-0.86
-0.85
-0.89
-0.95
-0.94
-0.94
-0.90
-0.94
-1.01
-1.00
-0.95
-1.01
-1.08
-1.11
-1.13
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS =
STD.DEV.
1.23
1.28
1.30
1.37
1.44
1.55
1.60
1.66
1.68
1.69
1.76
1.79
1.80
1.75
1.72
1.71
1.77
1.78
1.83
1.89
49
OAY
1
2
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
-0.06
-0.10
-0.16
-0.22
-C.28
-0.31
-0.40
-0.49
-0.55
-0.58
-0.68
-0.70
-0.72
-0.73
-0.78
-0.83
-0.90
-0.99
-1.01
-0.99
I
-71-
(32) PRICE ABOVE SEAS HIGH COCOA 1965-1969
CAY EXP(DP) STD.DEV.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
C,.07
0.17
C.25
0.27
0.29
C.38
0.44
0.49
0.55
0.56
C.59
C.68
0.72
C.73
0.86
0. 93
0.98
1.03
1.05
1.14
0.48
0.47
0.66
0.82
0.91
1.04
1.14
1.29
1.40
1.50
1.61
1.66
1.73
1.80
1.89
1.97
2. C6
2.18
2.30
2.45
DAY EXP(DP) STD.DEV.
21 1.19
22 1.32
23 1.43
24 1.51
25 1.56
26 1.63
27 1.72
28 1.81
29 1.89
30 1.95
31 2.01
32 2.04
33 2.15
34 2.16
35 2.19
36 2.23
37 2.25
38 2.28
39 2.33
40 2.36
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
(33) PRICE BELOW SEAS LOW COCOA 1965-1969
STD.DEV.
0.30
0.26
0.39
0.46
0.58
0.71
0.81
0.85
0.89
0.99
1.03
1.05
1.12
1 *26
1.41
1.48
1.50
1.58
1.71
1.84
DAY
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
EXP(DP)
-0.75
-0.79
-0.81
-0.83
-0.88
-0.91
-0.95
-1.01
-1.04
-1.04
-1.05
-1.09
-1.12
-1.14
-1.18
-1.21
-1.20
-1.20
-1.22
-1.23
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS
STD.CEV.
1.90
1.92
1.97
2.04
2.07
2.04
2.09
2.13
2.20
2.27
2.35
2.40
2.45
2.49
2.52
2.60
2.71
2.81
2.89
2.98
89
2.59
2.72
2.78
2.88
3.03
3.12
3.26
3.34
3.39
3.37
3.37
3.34
3.38
3.48
3.60
3.72
3.89
4.11
4.30
4.39
101
CAY
1
2
3
4
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
-0.04
-C.06
-0.11
-0.18
-C.26
-0.31
-0.34
-C.37
-0.42
-0.48
-C.52
-0.53
-C.57
-0.59
-0.59
-0.59
-0.60
-0.62
-C.66
-0.72
-72-
(39) MKT VANE ABOVE EG % CCCOA 1960-1969
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
-0.10
-0.25
-0.31
-0.40
-0.32
-0.36
-0.41
-0.46
-0.57
-0.51
-0.50
-0.54
-0.64
-0.76
-0.68
-C.68
-0.75
-0.71
-0.81
-0.77
(41) toKT VANE BELO% 30 % COCOA 1965-1969
STD.DEV.
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.28
0.30
0.10
0.20
0.22
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.22
0.24
0.14
0.10
DAY
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
EXP(DP)
0.89
1.00
1.04
1.06
0.98
1.15
1.12
1.18
1.35
1.47
1.61
1.78
1.86
1.96
2.25
2.51
2.64
2.81
3.46
3.70
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS =
STD.CEV.
0.17
0.17
0.10
0.20
0.45
0.36
0.10
0.50
0.20
0.22
0.14
0.17
0.10
0.39
0.26
0.58
0.33
0.28
0.52
0.93
2
STD.CEV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.17 21 -0.87
0.17 22 -1.05
0.28 23 -1.04
0.51 24 -1.09
0.42 25 -1.03
0.52 26 -1.02
0.57 27 -1.16
0.57 28 -1.07
0.79 29 -0.98
0.74 30 -0.91
0.81 31 -0.91
0.86 32 -0.93
0.79 33 -0.88
0.94 34 -0.93
0.90 35 -0.81
0.93 36 -0.93
1.05 37 -1.14
1.03 38 -1.05
1.00 39 -0.96
0.98 40 -0.99
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
STD.CEV.
0.94
1.15
1.15
1.23
1.24
1.39
1.48
1.48
1.68
1.81
1.80
2.11
2.43
2.33
2.55
2.26
2.14
2.43
2.72
2.73
10
£AY
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
0*00
-C.07
0.07
0.11
0.11
0.25
0.42
0.43
0.45
0.65
0.66
0.52
0.70
0.74
0.70
0.80
0.81
0.77
0.80
0.82
III 111111111 11111 1 1111 11111 I*hIIIIinIuEuu -
-73-
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
1 .ccco
2 .0CCC
3.0CC0
4.CCCO
5.CCCC
6.0C00
7.CCCO
8.cCcc
9.0000
10. 0CCc
11.cccc
12.0CCO
13.CCCC
14. COCO
15.CCO
16.Cccc
17. CCCO
18.00CC
19 .cCCC
2C.CCCC
21.OCO0O
22.00CC
23.C CCC
24. 0000
25.CCCO
26. CCC
27.0COO
28. CCCC
29 .COCO
30.0 CCC
31.CCCO
32.00CC
33.CCCC
34.0000
35.CCCO
36. CC
37.00CC
38.0 COO
39.CCC
40.00CC
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
I
-2.758
I
-2.100
I
-1.443
I .
-0.7851
I
-C. 1276
(10) PRICE UP W/ UPSIDE GAP CCCOA 1960-1969
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS = 213
j
+
+
4.
+
+
+.
+
4.
+
4.
4.
0
*
4.
-I
4.
4.
+
4.
+
4.
4.
4.
4.
+
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
+
+
4.
4.
U
I
0.5300
I
1.188
4.81
I
1.845
I
2.503
I
3.160
.
.
0
CHART 2
*
*
*
*
*
*
1.0000
2.0 CO
3.CCCC
4.00CC
5.0000
6 .0CCC
7.ccCC
8.0C00
9.00CC
10.0000
11.0000
12.OCCC
13.OCCO
14.0000
15. CC
16.GCOC
17.0000
18.CCCC
19.0000
2C.CCCC
21.CCCC
22.0000
23.OCCO
24.0 000
25.CCCO
26.00CC
27.CCCC
28. CCC
29.CCCC
30.0000
31 .CCCC
32. 0000
33.CCCC
34.0CCC
35 .ccc0
36.C CCO
37. CC
38. OCCO
39.0000
40.CCOC
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
I
-0.1910
I
-0.6200
+
+
+
4.
'I.
4.
+
+
4.
+
+
4.
+
4.
4.
4.
+
4.
+
4.
+
4.
+
4.
4.
4.
+
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
(13) PRICE DCWN W/ DOWJASIDE GAP COCOA 1960-1969
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS = 256
-74-
*
*
*
*
*
I
-2.765
I
-2.336
I
-1.907
I
-1.478
1
-1.049
4.
4.
1 I
0.2379
4.
4.
I
1.525
I
0.6669
I
1.096
.s
0
0
I ~I1~TIIIUhIiIGfGhI~flhII lii. - - -
CHART 3
*
* 4
*
*
*
*
1.0000
2.00CC
3.00CO
4.CCCC
5.00CC
6.0000
7.CCCO
8.CCCC
9.0000
1c.C CCC
11.0000
12.0000
13. 00CC
14.0000
15.0000
16.COCC
17.00CC
18.0000
19.0 CCC
20.CCOO
21.CCCC
22.CCCC
23.0 CCC
24.CCC
25. 00CC
26.0000
27.00CC
28 .OCC
29.C CCC
30.0COCC
31.00CC
32.CCCO
33.00CC
34.00CC
35. 0000
36.C CCC
37. 00CC
38.0000
39.OCOO
40.CCCO
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
I
-C. 7816
I
-0.3350
(20) 5 DAY MOV AVG @ PRICE PEAK
+
+
+
4.
4.
+
4.
+
4.
+
4.
4.
4.
4.
+
4.
+
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
I
0.5582
I
1.005
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
+
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
I
1.898
'I
0.1116
COCOA 1960-1969
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS = 413
N
-75-
*
*
I
-2.568
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
I
-2.121
I
-1.675
I
-1.228
I
1.451
.I
0
a
0
C-ART 4
-76-
1.CCC
2.00CC
3.0000
4.00CC
5.0000
6.0000
7.00CC
8.CCCO
9.00CC
10.0000
11.0000
12.0000
13.000CC
14.COCC
15.0000
16.CCCC
17.CCCO
18.CCCO
19.ccC
20.0000
21.0000
22.CCOC
23.0000
24.CCOC
25.00CC
26. OCOC
27.00CC
28. 0000
29.0000
30.0CCC
31.0000
32.CCO
33. 00CC
34.0000
35.0000
36.C 000
37. OOCO
38.CCC
39.00CC
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
40.0000 *
I
-2.'l6
I
-2.271
I
-1.626
I
-0.9E06
I
-0.3353
0
+
+
+
+
4.
4.
+
+
4.
4.
+
+
+
+
+
4-
+
4.
4.
+
4.
+
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
0 +
4.
4.
4.
+
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
+
I I
0.3100
I
0.9553
(21) 5 DAY MOV AVG @ PRICE TROUGH
I
1.601
1
2.246
COCOA 1965-1969
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS = 143
I I
3.5 36
2.891
I
CHART 5
-77-
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
1.0000
2.0CCC
3.00cC
4.CCOC
5.00CC
6.0000
7.00CC
8.CCCC
10.00CC
11.eCOCO
12 .OCCO
13 .0000
14.00CC
15 .0000
16.0000
17. 0000
18.00CC
19.0000
20.CCCC
21.0000
22.C 000
23.CCC
24.0 CCC
25 .CC CC
26.C CCC
27.00CC
28.C CCC
29.0 000
30.OCCO
31.00CC
32.0000
33.OCCC
34.CC
35.0000
36.0C cc
37.0000
38.COCC
39.0 CCC
40.OCCO
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
4
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
I
-3.054
I
- 2.431
I
-1.807
I
-1.184
I
-0.5603
(24) PRICE UP W/ HIGH VOL MOV AVG
Il
0 .6315E-01
COCOA 1960-1969
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS = 0
*
*
+
+
+
4.
4.
4.
+
4.
4.
+
4.
4.
+
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
I
-4.301
I
-3.677
I
0.6866
I
1.310
I
1.933
+
4.
+
4-
4.
4.
+
4.
4-
4-
4.
4.
+
4.
+
a
0
0
0
90
CHART 6
-78-
*
*
*
*
*
*
1.CCC
2 .3C00
3.CCCO
4.CCCC
5.CCCC
6.0000
7 .O00
8.C CCC8 .ccco
1C .00CC
11.0000
12 .UCOO
13.CCC
14.CCCC
15 .CC
16.0000
17.CCCC
18.0000
19.0000
2CCCCO
21.400C
22.0000
23.0 C
24.0 COC
25.CCC
26.CCCO
27.00CC
28.CCCO
29.CCCC
3C.0CGO
31.00CC
32.OCCC
33.0000
34. CCO
35.CC(C
36.C CC
37.CCCC *
38.CCCC *
39.CCCO *
4C.CCCO *
I
-3. 157
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
I
-2.529
I
-1.900
I
-1.272
I
-0.6435
I I
-0.1512 E-01
+
+
4-
4-
+
+
+
*1-
+
+
+
+
4.
+
4.
+
*
4-
4.
+
+
* 4.
* +
+
4-
+
+
+
+
+
4.
0 +
+
+
+
*
+
+
+
4.
I
0.6132
I
1.242
I
1.870
I
2.498
I
3.127
(25) PRICE UP W/ INCR VOL & 01 CHANGE COCOA 1960-1969
NUMBER OF CBSERVATIONS = 118
*
0
9
CHART 7
-79-
*
*
*
*
1.c ccc
2.00CC
3.0000
4.0000
5.CCCO
6.GCCC
7.CCCC
8.0000
9.0000
i.Ceccc
11.0000
12.00CC
13.cccc
14.00CC
15.CCC
16.CC CC
17.0 0CO
18.CCCC
19.OCC0
20.0000
21.CCCC
22. OCOC
23.0 CCC
24.0 CCC
25.C CCC
26.0CC
27.00 CO
28.0000
29.C000
30.CCCC
31.00CC
32.C0CCC
33.0000
34.CCCC
35.CCCO
36.0000
3 7. 00CC
38.00CC
39C.0000
40. 00CC
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
I
-2.387
I
-1.955
I
-1.523
I
-1.091
I
-0.6587
(27) PRICE CCWN W/ HIGH VOL MOV AVG COCOA 1960-1969
NUPBER OF OBSERVATIONS =
06
*
*
*
4
0
*
fD
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
4.
+
4.
4.
4.
4.
+
+
+
4.
4.
4-
+
4.
4.
+
4-
+
+
*
*
*
)
4
*
*
*
*
0
1
-3.252
I
I
-2.820
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
+
+
4.
+
4.
4.
4.
4.
I
1.070
I
-0.2266
I I
0.2056
I
0.6378
1 0
0
0
0
0
CHART 8
-80-
*
*
*
*
*
1.00CC
2.00CC
3.0000
4.C CCC
5.CCCO
6.00CC
7.CCCC
8 .00CC
9.0000
l0.CCcO
1 .ccc0
12.0 000
13.CCCO
14.CCCC
15.0003
16.CCCC
17.CCCC
18.00CC
19.00CC
2C.CCCO
21.0000
22.0 CCC
23.CCCC
24.0000
25.00CC
26.00CC
27.0000
28. CCCC
29.0000
30.0C00
31.0000
32 .0000
33. 00CC
34.00CC
35.00CC
36.CCOO
37.0000
38. 00CC
3S. 0000
40.000C
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
4
*
*
I
-2.241
I
-1. E50
I
-1.458
-1.067
I
-0 .6749
(28) PRICE DOCWN W/ INCR VOL & CI CHANGE COCOA 1960-1969
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS =
4-
4-
+
+
*
*
4-
+
+
4-
+
4.
+
4.
+
4.
+
4.
4.
+
4.
+
4.
4.
4.
I
-3. C2 5
I
-2.633
4.
-I.
4.
4.
4.
4.
+
4
4.
+
4.
+
4.
+
4.
I
0.8916
I
-0.2833
j I
0. 1084
I
0.5000
.0
0
0
0
0
a
49
I -
r
~
1 .0000
2.0000
3.00CC
4.0000
5.CCCC
6.CCCC
7.00CC
8.00CC
9.0 CCC
10.0000
11 .cccc
12.0000
13 .0000
14.0CCC
15.0000
16. 0000
17. COCC
18.0000
19.CCCC
20. 0000
21.CCCC
22.0000
23. 00CC
24. 0000
25.0000
26.0 CCC
27.0000
28.CCCC
29.0 CCC
30.COCO
31.0000
32.CCOO
33.0000
*
*
*
*
I
-2.026
I
-1.149
I
-0.2718
. +
..
+.
+.
-81-
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
+
+
+
4.
+
+
+
4.
+
4.
4.
4.
+
4.
+
4.
4.
4.
+
+
4.
4.
4.
4.
+
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
+
4.
4.
I
0.6C55
I
1.483
I
2.360
I
3.237
I I
4.992
4.115
(32) PRICE ABOVE SEAS HIGH COCOA 1965-1969
CHART 9
+
34.CCC C
35.0CCO0
36. 0000
37.0000
38.0000
39.00CC
40.0000
I
5.869
6.746
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS = 101
§
)
0
9
0
9
0
imE~===iIIrI~.~TTTF~=
-82-
1 .00CC
2.0000
3.CCCC
4.CCCC
5.0 CCO
6.OCOO
7.0CC
8.CCCC
9.0000
1c.GCCC
11.00CC
12.0000
13.CCCC
14.00CC
15.0000
16 .occc
17.CCCC
18.CCO
19.C0CCC
20.0000
21. COO
22.00CC
23.0000
24.CCCC
25 CC00
26.0000
27.0CCC
28.OCCCC
29.0000
30. CCCC
31.00CC
32.0000
33.CCCC
34.C 000
35.00CC
36.0000
37.00CC
38.00CC
39.CCOO
40.0000
*
*1
* .
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
I
-2.421
I
-1.825
I
-1.230
(33) PRICE BELOW SEAS LOW
I
-0.6347
COCOA 1965-1969
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS = 8
III
0.5559
-0.3937E-01
+
+
+
4.
+
+
+
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
+
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
)
I
p, *..
*
*
4
*
*
*
I
-4.207
I I
-3.016
-3.611
I
1.141
I
1.151
CHART 10
.0
c
-
0
9
ID~
CHART 11
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1.0000
2.CCCO
3.0COC
4.0000
5.CCCC,
6.CCCC
7.0000
8.0000
9.0000
1c.cccC
11.0000
12.0000
13.oCCCC
14.000C
15.0 CCC
16.CC
17.C00
18.CCCC
19.CCC
20.OCCO
21 .CCCO
22.CCCC
23.OCOO
24.C CCC
25.CCCO
26,.OCCO
27.OCCC
28 .C CCC
29,.OCCO
3C.CCC
31.CCCC
32.OCCC
33.GCCC
34 .COO
35.OCCO
36. OCOC
37.CCCO
38. CCCC
39.CCCC *
40.OCCC *
I
-3.719
* .
* .3 +
I
0.1164
+
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
* 0
*
*
*
*
*
*
0
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
I
-3.171
I
-2.624
I
-2.C76
I
-1.528
I
-0.9796
I
-0.4316
(39) MKT VANE ABOVE 80 %
I
0.6643
COCOA 1960-1969
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS =
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
4.
4.
4
+
+
+
4.
+
+
+
+
+
4.
+
4.
4.
+
4.
4.
4.
4.
+
4.
4.
4.
4.
+
I
1.212
I
1.760
0
0
0
10
CHART 12
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1.0C0C
2.CCCC
3.OCCC
4.CCCG
5.CCCC
6.CCCC
7.0000
8.CCCC
q.GCCO
icoCCO
11.0 0CC
12.00CC
13. GOC
14.C CCC
15.OC CC
16. CCCC
17 .0000
18.00CC
19.CCC C
20.00CC
21.00CC
22.0 CCC
23.00CC
24. OCOC
25.OCCC
26.0000
27.CCCC
28.00CC
29.0000
30.00CC
31.0000
32 .C CCC
33.CCCC
34.CCCC
35.0 000
36. COCC
37.OCCC
38.CCCC
39.C CCC
40.00C
+
+
+.
+
+
+
*
* .
*
*
* .
*
*
*
*
I
0.7905
+
+
+
*4..
. .+
** . +
* .
*
*
I
1.271
I
1.751
+.
I
2.231
+.
+.
4.
+
(41) PKT VANE BELCW 30 % CCCOA 1965-1969
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS =
*
*
. +
4.4+
*
*
+
+
+
* .4+
*
*
. +
.4+
*4.+
* -
I
-0.1700
I
0.3103
+
* 0
+.
*
*
I
2.712
I
3.192
I
3.672
I
4.152
4.633
.
.0
2
EXHIBIT VII-4
Simulation From 1970 to 1973 of Trading in September Cocoa
Futures Using Each of a Set of Selected Conditional Forecasts
Event 1970 1971 1972
Type Gross Net Obsrv* Gross Net Obsrv* Gross Net Obsrv*
(24) .00 .00 0 ( .65) (30.05) 147 .69 (39.31) 200
(25) ( .13) ( 8.53) 42 ( .52) ( 8.52) 40 ( .23) ( 7.83) 38
(27) .00 .00 0 .00 .00 0 .00 .00 0
(28) .00 .00 0 ( .15) (13.15) 65 ( 2.10) (17.30) 76
(10) ( .15) ( 1.15) 5 .26 .06 1 .00 .00 0
(13) 11.70 11.50 1 (2.90) ( 4.10) 6 17.10 15.70 7
(39) ( .97) (13.97) 65 .99 (10.61) 58 27.20 15.80. 57
(41) .35 (11.25) 58 (1.32) (13.12) 59 .71 (12.89) 68
(20) 26.70 26.50 1 1.20 1.00 1 ( 5.18) ( 5.38) 1
(21) .00 .00 0 .00 .00 0 .00 .00 0
(32) .57 (25.03) 128 ( .32) (26.12) 129 (27.73) ( 5.73) 115
(33) 8.45 2.45 30 (5.79) (19.39) 68 ( 2.92) (18.32) 77
*Obsrv = Observations
w w w ww
EXHIBIT VII-4 (Continued)
Event 1973 All Years
Type Gross Net Obsrv* Gross Net Obsrv*
(24) (57.54) (63.34) 29 (57.50) (132.70) 376
(25) 5.68 3.48 11 4.80 ( 21.40) 131
(27) ( 1.20) ( 2.80) 8 ( 1.20) ( 2.80) 8
(28) ( 9.60) (16.20) 33 (11.85) 46.65) 174
(10) .00 .00 0 .11 ( 1.09) 6
(13) (27.11) (29.71) 13 ( 1.20) ( 6.60) 27
(39) (92.07) (93.67) 8 (64.85) (102.45) 188
(41) 1.60 (19.60) 106 1.34 ( 58.86) 291
(20) .00 .00 0 22.72 22.12 3
(21) .00 .00 0 .00 .00 0
(32) ( 7.13) (17.53) 52 (35.11) (119.91) 424
(33) 1.16 (23.16) 110 .90 ( 56.10) 285
*Obsrv = Observations
w  mw 1w
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EXHIBIT VII-5
Simulation From 1970 to 1973 of Trading in
September Cocoa Futures Using a Portfolio
of Selected Conditional Forecasts
Forecasts Selected
(10)
(13)
(20)
(21)
(24)
(25)
(27)
(28)
(32)
(33)
(39)
(41)
Price up w/ upside gap
Price dn w/ downside gap
5 day mov avg @ price peak
5 day mov avg @ price trough
Price up w/ hi vol mov avg
Price up w/ incr vol & op int change
Price dn w/ hi vol mov avg
Price dn w/ incr vol & op int change
Price above seas hi
Price below seas low
Mrkt vane above 80%
Mrkt vane below 30%
Results
1970
1971
1972
1973
All Years
Gross
3.71
(4.50)
.19
22.95
22.35
Net
( .29)
( 7.10)
( 1.61)
21.35
12.35
Number of
Transactions*
20
13
9
8
50
*Transaction Cost = .20/transaction
I
EXHIBIT VII-6
Simulation From 1970 to 1973 of Trading in September Cocoa
Futures Using a Portfolio of Selected Conditional Forecasts
and Forecast Adjusting Mechanism #1
1970
Net
(4.80)
(4.00)
(3.26)
(2.68)
(2.68)
(2.68)
(3.08)
(3.12)
(3.86)
(4.32)
1971
Obsrv*
20
16
13
11
12
12
14
15
18
21
Days **
81
74
99
58
52
61
57
49
49
49
Gross
.54
.54
.00
(.18)
(.38)
(.38)
(.38)
(.54)
(.40)
(.54)
Net
(4.46)
(3.46)
(4.00)
(4.58)
(5.38)
(5.38)
(5.38)
(5.74)
Obsrv*
25
20
20
22
25
25
25
26
Days = Days In Market
a Gross **
Days
.02
.04
.06
.08
.10
.12
.14
.16
.18
.20
(.80)
(.80)
(.66)
(.48)
(.28)
(.28)
(.28)
(.12)
(.26)
(.12)
co
co
50
40
45
45
49
65
59
64
Obsrv = Observations
Dav
_
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EXHIBIT VII-7
Simulation From 1970 to 1973 of Trading in
September Cocoa Futures Using a Portfolio
of Selected Conditional Forecasts and Fore-
cast Adjusting Mechanism #2
1970
Net
( 4.36)
(5.08)
(10.05)
( .20)
Observa-
tions
Days In
Market
.08 .00
.02
.04
.06
Gross
(.16)
(.28)
(.85)
21
24
49
94
125
182
1 3
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B. Potatos
The results of the mean and standard deviation of potato
price movements subsequent to each of the event-types described
in Chapter 4 for the time period 1960 to 1969 are sumnarized in
Exhibit VII-8. The complete results are tabulated in the Appen-
dix. A set of event-types which manifested relatively high
absolute values of expected price change and relatively low
standard deviations are presented in Exhibit VII-9. These were
selected, as before, subjectively by the writers. The selected
event-types and their associate 40-day expected price change/
standard deviation statistics were used as forecasts for the
simulation tests for years 1970 to 1973. The selected event-
types gave the trading simulation results shown in Exhibits
VII-ll, 12. The results from the simulation of individual
event-types forecasts are shown in Exhibit VII-ll. The results
from the event-types combined into a portfolio of forecasts are
shown in Exhibit VII-12.
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EXHIBIT VII-E SUMMARY OF FUTURES PRICE CHANGES SUBSEQUENT TO ALL EVENT TYPES
MAY MAIN POTATO 1960 TO 1969
TYPE OF EVENT MAX. EXP/STD.DEV. CONF. MAX. EXP(DP) CCNF.
EXP/SD EXP SD DAY + GAIN EXP/SD EXP So DAY + GAIN
(1) EXTREMELY GOOD EVENT 11.00 0.11 0.01 28 100. 11.00 0.11 0.01 28 Icc.
(3) NEUTRAL EVENT 0.20 0.02 C.10 3 61. 0.20 0.11 0.56 40 61.
(5) EXTREMELY BAD EVENT 3.00 0.03 0.01 2 100. 0.80 0.08 0.10 11 87.
(10) PRICE UP W/ UPSIDE GAP 0.40 0.04 0.10 2 71. 0.40 0.04 0.10 2 71.
(11) PRICE UP W/ OCWNSIDE GAP 0.41 0.26 0.64 40 72. 0.41 0.26 0.64 40 72.
(12) PRICE DOWN W/ UPSIDE GAP 0.70 0.07 0.10 4 84. 0.14 0.09 0.63 39 58.
(13) PRICE DOWN W/ DOWNSIDE GAP 1.00 0.01 0.01 2 92. 0.07 0.05 0.67 40 54.
(14) KEY REVERSAL I/ SEAS. HIGH 0.30 0.03 0.10 2 66. 0.23 0.07 0.30 12 63.
(15) KEY REVERSAL W/ SEAS. LOW 2.00 0.02 0.01 3 100. 0.20 0.07 0.35 40 61.
(18) KEY REVERSAL W/ MONTHLY HIGH 0.30 0.03 0.10 2 66. 0.13 U.07 0.53 40 57.
(19) KEY REVERSAL W/ MONTHLY LOW 2.00 0.02 0.01 3 100. 0.28 0.04 0.14 8 66.
(20) 5 DAY MOV AVG 2 PRICE PEAK 0.12 0.04 0.35 20 56. 0.09 0.05 0.53 38 55.
(21) 5 CAY MOV AVG @ PRICE TROUGH 0.12 0.07 0.57 39 57. 0.12 0.07 0.57 39 57.
(22) 10 DAN MOV AVG @ PRICE PEAK 1.00 0.01 0.01 2 92. 0.06 0.02 0.35 22 53.
(23) 10 CAY MOV AVG R PRICE TROUGH 0.10 0.01 0.10 3 56. 0.02 0.01 0.57 39 51.
(24) PRICE UP W/ HIGH VGL MOV AVG 0.19 0.10 0.53 37 61. 0.18 0.10 0.57 40 60.
(25) PRICE UP W/ INCR VOL & 01 CHANGE 0.40 0.08 0.20 10 71. 0.26 0.14 0.55 40 64.
(26) PRICE UP W/ DECR VOL & 01 CHANGE 0.42 0.06 0.14 4 73. 0.34 0.15 0.45 32 68.
(27) PRICE DOWN W/ HIGH VOL MOV AVG 0.16 0.05 0.32 22 59. 0.12 0.05 0.42 28 57.
(28) PRICE DOCWN W/ INCR VOL & 01 CIANGE 0.28 0.04 C.14 4 66. 0.23 0.13 0.57 32 63.
(29) PRICE DOWN W/ DECR VOL & 01 CHANGE 0.21 0.07 0.33 22 62. 0.17 0.07 0.40 26 60.
(30) HIGH INCREASING 01 CHANGE 0.24 0.08 0.33 21 63. 0.20 C.11 0.54 40 61.
(31) HIGH DECREASING 01 CHANGE 0.11 0.03 0.28 20 56. 0.10 0.05 0.49 40 56.
(32) PRICE ABOVE SEAS HIGH 0.22 0.13 0.58 38 62. 0.22 0.13 0.58 38 62.
(33) PRICE BELOW SEAS LCW 0.23 0.08 0.35 40 63. 0.23 0.08 0.35 40 63.
(36) PRICE ABOVE MONTHLY HIGH 0.21 0.11 0.53 37 62. 0.20 0.11 0.55 40 61.
(37) PRICE BELOW MCNTHLY LOW 1.00 0.01 0.01 2 92. 0.04 0.02 0.46 36 52.
(38) MKT VANE ABOVE 90 % 0.00 0.00 0.01 40 50. 0.00 0.00 0.01 40 50.
(39) MKT VANE ABOVE 80 % 8.70 0.87 0.10 35 100. 8.70 0.87 0.10 35 100.
(40) MKT VANE BELOW 20 % 3.00 0.03 0.01 2 100. 0.40 0.08 0.20 28 71.
(41) MKT VANE BELOW 30 % 0.80 0.08 0.10 37 87. 0.80 0.08 0.10 37 87.
(43) MKT VANE LAGGED ABCVE 80 % 87.00 0.87 0.01 35 100. r7.00 0.87 0.01 35 130.
(45) MKT VANE LAGGED BELOW 30 % 8.00 0.08 0.01 2 100. 0.90 0.09 0.10 3 90.
# CF
CBS.
1
126
9
75
12
16
55
51
54
84
85
335
345
181
193
289
91
23
189
26
89
446
446
179
163
283
285
0
4
7
1
5
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EXHIBIT VII-9
Complete Expected Value and Standard Deviation
Computations of Futures Price Changes Subsequent
to the Occurrence to Selected Event-Types:
May Maine Potatos, 1960-1969
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(11) PRICE UP W/ DONSIDE GAP
DAY EXP(DP) STD.DEV.
1 C.04 0.10
2
23
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
0.04
C.04
0.05
-0.01
-0.03
-0.06
-C004
-0.05
-0.05
-C.05
-0.08
-C. 10
-C. 10
-0.08
-0.07
-0.11
-0.10
-C.08
-0.05
0.10
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.17
0.24
0.28
0.33
0*39
0.35
0.41
0.41
0.45
0.51
0.46
0.50
0.55
0.55
0.50
POTATC 1960-1969
DAY EXP(DP) STODEV.
21 -0.07 0.54
22 -0.04
23 -0.04
24 -0.02
25 -0.07
26 -0.13
27 -0.11
28 -0.12
29 -0.15
30 -0.16
31 -0.14
32 -0.13
33 -0.19
34 -0.18
35 -0.17
36 -0.23
37 -0.22
38 -0.23
39 -0.24
40 -0.26
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
(12) PRICE CCWN W/ UPSIDE GAP POTATO 1960-1969
STD.DEV.
0.14
0.14
0.10
0.10
0.14
0.17
0.17
0.14
0.10
0.14
0.14
0.20
0.22
0.22
0.22
0.22
0.28
0.28
0.30
0.33
DAY
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
EXP(DP)
0.03
0.01
0.05
0.02
0.00
0.02
0.03
0.08
0.06
0.07
0.05
0.06
0.09
0.07
0.02
0.05
0.06
0.08
0.09
0.06
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS =
STD.DEV.
0.32
0.30
0.30
0.35
0.33
0.37
0.39
0.41
0.46
0.45
0.45
0.50
0.50
0.52
0.55
0.59
0.59
0.61
0.63
0.61
16
0.52
0.49
0.46
0.55
0.60
0.56
0.56
0.57
0.57
0.57
0.58
0.59
0.62
0.62
0.65
0069
0.66
0.66
0.64
12
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP( DP)
0.00
C004
0.05
0.07
0.09
0.06
0.05
0.03
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
c.00
0.03
0.02
c.oo
0.01
0.02
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(20) 5 DAY MCV AVG @ PRICE PEAK
DAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
POTATO 1960-1969
DAY EXP(DP) STC.CEV.
21 0.03 0.37
22 0.04 0.37
23 0.03 0.37
24 0.03 0.39
25 0.04 0.40
26 0.04 0.41
27 0.04 0.42
28 0.04 0.44
29 0.03 0.45
30 0.04 0.47
31 0.04 0.48
32 0.04 0.48
33 0.04 0.49
34 0.04 0.50
35 0.04 0.50
36 0.04 0.51
37 0.05 0.52
38 0.05 0.53
39 0.04 0.55
40 0.04 0.56
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS =
(21) 5 DAY MCV AVG @ PRICE TROUGH
335
POTATO 1960-1969
STD.DEV.
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.14
0.14
0.17
0.17
0.20
0.22
0.22
0.24
0.26
0.26
0.28
0.32
0.32
0.33
0.33
0.35
0.36
DAY
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
EXP(DP)
0.03
0.02
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.04
0.04
01.04
0.05
0.04
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.07
0.06
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS =
STD.DEV.
0.36
0.37
0.39
0.41
0.42
0.42
0.45
0.45
0.46
0.48
0.48
0.50
0.51
0.52
0.52
0.54
0.55
0.57
0.57
0.57
345
EXP(DP)
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.02
C.02
0.03
C.02
C .03
0.03
C.C3
0.03
0.03
C.03
0.04
STD.DEV.
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.14
0.17
0.17
0.20
0.22
0.24
0.24
0.26
0.26
0.28
0.30
0.30
0.32
0.33
0.35
0.35
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
s
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
0.00
-0.01
0.00
0. 00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.01
c.01
C.01
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.01
C.02
0 .02
C.02
0.02
0.02
C.03
(24) PRICE UP W/
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HIGF VCL MOV AVG POTATO 1960-1969
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
C.00
c. oc
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
-c.01
-0.01
-0.01
-0.01
-0.02
-0.02
-0.03
-0.03
-0.04
-0.04
-C.05
-0.05
-0.05
(25) PRICE LP W/ INCR VCL & 01 CHANGE PCTATC 1960-1969
CAY EXP(DP) STD.DEV.
1 0.00 0.10
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
0.00
c.00
0.00
0.01
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.08
0.08
0.07
0.07
C.07
0.07
0.06
0.04
0 .04
C.C5
0.06
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.14
0.17
0.17
0.20
0.20
0.24
0.24
0.26
0.26
0.26
0.28
0. 32
0.32
0.33
0.36
DAY EXP(DP) STD.DEV.
21 0.07 0.37
22 0.08
23 0.10
24 0.10
25 0.11
26 0.11
27 C.11
28 0.11
29 0.10
30 0.09
31 0.08
32 0.09
33 0.10
34 0.10
35 0.10
36 0.10
37 0.10
38 .11
39 0.13
40 0.14
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
STD.DEV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.10 21 -0.05
0.10 22 -0.06
0.14 23 -0.06
0.14 24 -0.06
0.17 25 -0.07
0.20 26 -0.07
0.22 27 -0.07
0.24 28 -0.08
0.26 29 -0.08
0.26 30 -0.08
0.28 31 -0.08
0.30 32 -0.08
0.32 33 -0.08
0.33 34 -0.09
0.35 35 -0.09
0.35 36 -0.09
0.36 37 -0.10
0.37 38 -0.10
0.39 39 -0.10
0.40 40 -0.10
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
STO.DEV.
0.40
0.41
0.40
0.41
0.41
0.42
0.42
0.42
0.44
0.45
0.46
0.47
0.49
0.49
0.51
0.52
0.53
0.54
0.55
0.57
289
0.39
0.39
0.39
0.40
0.41
0.42
0.42
0.44
0.44
0.45
0.45
0.47
0.49
0.49
0.50
0.52
0.53
0.53
0.55
91
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(26) PRICE UP W/ DECR VCL & 01 CANGE POTATO 1960-1969
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP (OP)
C.03
01.01
-0*04
-0.06
-0.04
-0.04
-0.06
-0.06
-C.02
-0.01
-0.03
-C.03
-0.03
-0.02
-0.06
-0.05
-C.07
-0.08
-0.07
-C06
STD.OEV.
0.10
0.10
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.17
0.20
0.20
0.22
0.26
0.26
0.28
0.32
0.33
0.39
0.39
0.44
0.45
0.46
0.46
NUMBER GF OBSERVATIONS =
DAY
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
(27) PRICE DOWN W/ HIGH VOL MOV AVG POTATC 1960-1969
STD.DEV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.10 21 -0.04
0.10 22 -0.05
0.14 23 -0.05
0.14 24 -0.05
0.14 25 -0.05
0.17 26 -0.05
0.20 27 -0.05
0.20 28 -0.05
0.22 29 -0.04
0.22 30 -0.04
0.22 31 -0.03
0.22 32 -0.01
0.22 33 0.00
0.22 34 0.00
0.24 35 -0.01
0.26 36 0.00
0.26 37 0.00
0.26 38 -0.01
0.28 39 -0.02
0.30 40 -0.02
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
STD.DEV.
0.32
0.32
0.35
0.36
0.36
0.37
0.40
0.42
0.42
0*44
0.46
0.47
0.48
0.49
0.49
0.50
0.51
0.52
0.54
0.54
189
EXP(DP)
-0.04
-0.04
-0.06
-0.08
-0.08
-0.08
-0.11
-0.12
-0.13
-0.13
-0.13
-0.15
-0.14
-0.12
-0.12
-0.14
-0.11
-0.08
-0.10
-0.13
STD.DEV.
0.48
0.46
0.41
0.45
0.47
0.50
0.47
0.41
0.41
0.42
0.41
0.45
0.45
0.46
0.46
0.42
0.42
0.42
0.48
0.48
23
DAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
is
20
EXP(DP)
0.00
-0.01
-0.01
-0.02
-C.02
-0.02
-0.02
-C.02
-0.02
-0.02
-0.03
-0.03
-C.03
-0.03
-0.03
-0*03
-0.04
-0.04
-0.04
-0.04
(28) PRICE DCWN W/
-97-
INCR VOL & CI Cf-ANGE PCTATO 1960-1969
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
-0.01
-0.02
-0.04
-0.04
-0.05
-0.05
-0.04
-0.04
-C.04
-0.01
-0.03
-0.04
-0.01
0.01
-0.02
-0.02
-0.01
0.01
-C.02
-0.04
STD.DEV.
0.10
0.10
0.14
0.14
0.20
0.22
0.22
0.26
0.32
0.35
0.33
0.28
0.30
0.28
0.28
0.32
0.35
0.35
0.36
C. 36
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS =
DAY
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
(30) HIGH INCREASING 01 CHANGE
CAY EXP(DP) STD.DEV.
1 0.00 0.10
2 0.00 0.10
3 0.00 0.10
4 0.01 0.14
5 0.01 0.14
6 0.01 0.17
7 C.02 0.17
8 0.02 0.20
9 0.03 0.20
10 0.03 0.22
11 0.04 0.22
12 0.04 0.24
13 C.04 0.24
14 0.05 0.26
15 0.05 0.28
16 0.06 0.28
17 0.06 0.28
18 C.07 0.30
1' 0.07 0.32
20 0.07 0.33
POTATO 1960-1969
DAY
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
EXP(DP)
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.09
o09
0.09
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.11
0.11
0.111
0.11
0.11
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
STD.DEV.
0.33
0.35
0.36
0.37
0.39
0.40
0.41
0.42
0.44
0.46
0.47
0.48
0.48
0.49
0.50
0.51
0.52
0.53
0.53
0.54
446
EXP(DP)
-0.03
-0.01
-0.01
-0.04
-0.05
-0.04
-0.06
-0.08
-0.05
-0.09
-0.12
-0.13
-0.11
-0.09
-0.06
-0.05
-0.05
-0.05
-0.04
0.00
STO.DEV.
0.36
0.40
0.42
0.44
0.42
0.47
0.47
0.50
0.47
0.49
0.52
0.57
0.57
0.57
0.56
0.56
0.57
0.56
0.57
0.57
26
(321 PRICE ABOVE SEAS HIGH
-98-
POTATO 1960-1'69
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
6
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
0.00
0.01
c.01
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.02
0.03
0*03
0.04
0.04
C.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.04
0.04
0.04
(33) PRICE BELOW SEAS LOW POTATO 1960-1969
STD.DEV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.10 21 0.03
0.10 22 0.03
0.10 23 0.03
0.10 24 0.03
0.10 25 0.03
0.10 26 0.02
0.10 27 0.03
0.10 28 0.03
0.10 29 0.04
0.10 30 0.05
0.14 31 0.05
0.14 32 0.05
0.14 33 0.05
0.14 34 0.05
0.14 35 0.06
0.17 36 0.06
0.17 37 0.07
0.17 38 0.07
0.17 39 0.07
0.17 40 0.08
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
STD.DEV.
0*20
0.20
0.20
0.22
0.22
0.24
0.24
0.26
0.28
0.28
0.30
0.30
0.30
0.30
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.33
0.35
163
STD.DEV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.10 21 0.04
0.10 22 0.05
0.10 23 0.06
0.14 24 0.06
0.14 25 0.07
0.17 26 0.07
0.17 27 0.08
0.20 28 0.08
0.22 29 C.08
0.22 30 0.08
0.26 31 0.08
0.28 32 0.09
0.30 33 0.09
0.30 34 0.10
0.33 35 0.11
0.35 36 0.11
0.36 37 0.12
0.36 38 0.13
0.37 39 0.12
0.39 40 0.12
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
STD.CEV.
0.40
0.40
0.42
0.44
0.44
0.45
0.45
0.46
0.48
0.49
0.50
0.52
0.54
0.56
0.57
0.57
0.57
0.58
0.58
0.59
179
DAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
s;
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
-0.01
0.00
0.00
0.01
0 .01
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
'I
-99-
(39) PKT VANE ABOVE 80 1
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
-0.04
-0.11
-0.13
-0. 18
-0. 17
-0.20
-0.14
-0.12
-0.09
-C.09
0.00
0.001
-0.01
0.30
C.28
C.37
0.38
C.35
0.33
0.34
POTATO 1960-1969
STD.CEV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.10 21 0.42
0.10 22 0.48
0.10 23 0.35
0.10 24 0.43
0.10 25 0.59
0.10 26 0.54
0.10 27 0.62
0.10 28 0.62
0.10 29 0.69
0.10 30 0.61
0.10 31 0.62
0.10 32 0.49
0.10 33 0.46
0.10 34 0.51
0.10 35 0.87
0.10 36 0.82
0.10 37 0.78
0.10 38 0.82
0.10 39 0.57
0.10 40 0.64
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
(41) MKT VANE BELO% 30 1
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
s
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
0.03
0.06
c.C5
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.01
C .00
0.01
0.00
0.02
0.02
-0.02
-0.01
0.00
-0.01
0.00
-0.01
-0.02
STD.DEV.
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
= 1
POTATO 1960-1969
STD.DEV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.10 21 -0.03
0.10 22 -0.03
0.10 23 -0.03
0.10 24 -0.05
0.17 25 -0.04
0.17 26 -0.04
0.14 27 -0.05
0.14 28 -0.02
0.20 29 -0.05
0.24 30 -0.02
0.22 31 -0.02
0.22 32 -0.04
0.24 33 -0.03
0.28 34 -0.05
0.30 35 -0.05
0.30 36 -0.05
0.26 37 -0.08
0.24 38 -0.05
0.32 39 -0.07
0.32 40 -0.05
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
STD.DEV.
0.30
0.28
0.28
0.28
0.26
0.24
0.22
0.22
0.20
0.14
0.14
0.10
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.14
= 7
I ____________________________________________________________________
CHART I
-100-
*
*
*
*
*
1.0000
2.00CC
3 .0CO
4.O000
5.CCCC
6.CCOO
7.OCCC
8.0000
9.cC0C
10.0000
11 . Co
12.0000
13.00CC
14. CCC
15.CCCO
16.0000
17.0CCC
18.0COO
19.cccC
2C.CC
21.0000
22.C CCC
23 .0000
24.CCOO
25.CCCC
26.0 000
27.0000
28. CCCC
29.00CCc
3C.CCOC
31.CCC0
32 .00CC
33.0 CCC
34.0000
35.0 000
36.00CC
37.OCCO
38.00CC
39 .CCCO
40.0000
*
*
*
*
4
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
I
-C.4t00
I
-0.3515
I
-C. 2130
(11) PRICE UP W/ DOWNSIDE GAP
I
-0.7446E-01
I
0.6406E-01
PCTATC 1960-1969
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS =
+
+
+.
*
*
+
+
+
4.
4.
+
*
+
+
*
+
4.
+
4.
4.
+
4.
+
4.
+
4.
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
I
-0.9056
I
-0.7670
I
-0.6285
+
+
4.
4.
4.
4.
+
+
+
4.
+
I
0.2026
4.
I
0.3411
I
0.4796
.
.
.
'.
0
0
0
0
0
0
12
I ___________________________________
CHART 2
-101-
I .ccc0
2.CCCC
3.00CC
4.CCOO
5.CCCC
6.0000
7.CcCCC
8.C CCC
9.0000
1l.CcCC
11. 1 c c
12.OCCO
13.GCCC
14.C CCC
15.CCCC
16.CCCC
17.C CCC
18 .00C
19. CCCC
2C GCCC
21. OCCC
22.C CCC
23. CCCC
24.CCCC
25.CCCO
26.CCC0
27.CCOC
28.C CCC
29.00CC
3C.CCCC
31.CCCC
32. CCC
33.0C000
34.C CCC
35.COCC
36.C CCC
37.C CCC
38.0000
3S.CCCC
4C.CCCC *
I
-0. 5483
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
I
-0.4212
I
-0.2941
I
-0. 1671
I I
-0.3998E-01
4.
+
4.
4.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
4.
+
+
4.
+
+
I
0. 8709E-CI
(12) PRICE CCWN W/ UPSIDE GAP POTATO 1960-1969
NUMBER OF CBSERVATIONS =
+
4.
+
+
4.
+
+
+
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
+
4.
4.
I
0.2142
I
0.3412
I
0.4683
I
0. 7225
I
0.5954
.
.
.
.
a
0
0
0
16
CHART 3
*
*
*
*
I
-0.7136E-01
I +
+
4-
4.
+
1 .0CC0
2.0CCC
3.CCCC
4 .CCCC
5.00CC
6.CCCC
7.0 COO
8,.GCCO
9.CCCC
IC.OCCC
11. 0cc
12. CCCC
13.00c
14.0000
15.C CC
16.OCC
17.CO
18.CCCC
19.O0CO
2C.OCCC
21.CCCC
22.0000
23.CCOO
24. CCCC
25.0C000
26.CCOO
27. CCCC
28 .COCO
29.CCCC
3C.CCCG
31.OCOO
32.00CC
33.CCCC
34.CCCC
35. CCCC
36.OCCO
37. CCCC
38.CCCC
39. 0000
40.CCCO
+
+
+
+
4-
+
+
+
+
+
4.
4.
+
+
4.
4.
4.
*
4.
4.
0.1514
0.4000E-01
I I
0.3741
0.2627
I
0.4854
4.
+
+
+
+
+
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
I
0.5968
(20) 5 DAY MOV AVG @ PRICE PEAK POTATO 1960-1969
NUMBER OF CBSERVATIONS = 335
-102-
+
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
I
-0.5168
I I
-0.2941
-0.4054
I
-0.1827
-s
-
-
-
-
-
CHART 4
1.0CCC
2 .0CCC
3.00CC
4.0CCC
5.00CC
6.0000
7.CCCC
8.00CC
9.0000
IC.00CC
11.00CC
12.CCCQ
13.0 CCC
14.CCOC
15.0000
16. CCCC
17.00CC
18.CCCO
19.C CCC
2C .OCCO
21.CCCC
22.OCCC
23.0000
24.CCCC
25.000CC
26.OCCC
27.C CCC
28.CCC
29. CCOC
3C.OCCC
31.000C
32.00CC
33.0000
34.CCCO
35.CC00C
36.0000
37. CCO
38. CCCC
39.00CC
40.00CC *
I
-0.5 145
-103-
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
I
-0.3994
I
-0.2844
I
-0.1694
I
-C.5440E-01
+
+
+.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
4.
4.
+
+
+
+
+3
4.
4.
+
+
+3
4.
4.
4.
+
4.
4.
4.
4.
0
I
0.6061E-01
I
0.1756
I
0.2906
I
0.4057
I
0.5207
4.I
4. 35
(21) 5 DAY MOV AVG @ PRICE TROUGH POTATO 1960-1969
NUPBER CF GBSERVATIONS = 345
.
.
|.
.
I
_______________________________________________________________________________________ I
CHART 5
I .cCC
2.0CCC
3.0GCc
4.COOC
5.OCCC
6.CCCC
7.0000
8.CCCO
9 .Occc
1C.OCCO
11.CCO
12.00CC
1.3 .00CC
14.C CCC
15 .OCCO
16.OCCC
17.CcCC
18.0000
19.0000
2C.CCCC
21.0000
22.CCCC
23. 00CC
24. CCOC
25.CCCC
26.0COO
27.CCCO
28.CCCC
29.OCCO
3C.CCCO
31.CCCC
32.0000
33.CCCC
34.CCGC
35.CCOO
36. 00CC
37.CCCO
38.CCCO
39. COCO
40.0CCC
jI
0.1314E-01
+
+
4.
+
4.
-1o4-*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
+
4.
+
4.
+
4.
4.
4.
+
4.
4.
4.
+
4.
4.
4.
+
+
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
I
0.1263
I
0.2394
I
0. 35 25
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
I
0.4657
(24) PRICE UP W/ HIGH VOL MOV AVG PCTATC 1960-1969
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS = 289
-j
I -
4.
*
0
0
0
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
I
-0.6657
I
-0.5525
0
I
-0.4394
I
-0.3263
I
-0.2131
I
-0.1000
I
0
0
I -_____________________
CHART 6
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
1 .00CC
2.0000
3 .C0
4.CCCO
5.CCCC
6.CCCC
7.0000
8.CCCO
9.CCCC
10.0000
11. c c
12.CCOO
13.CCCC
14.00CC
15.cc cc
16.CCO0
17.CCCO
18.0000
19.CCCC
20.0000
21.00CC
22. CCCC
23.CCCC
24.OCOO
25.00CC
26.CCOO
27.0000
28.0CCC
29.00CC
3C.0 CCC
31.0CC
32.OCOO
33.CCCC
34.0000
35.OCCO
36.0CCCC
37.00CC
38.0000
39.C ccc
40.0CCC
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
I
- 7.841E-01
4.
+
+
4-
+
+
4.
4.
+
4.
+
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
+
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
+
4.
4.
I I
0.2332E-01
(25) PRICE UP Wi/ INCR VOt E &C CHANGE PCTATC 1960-1969
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS =
-105-
*
*
*
4
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
I
-0.4196
I
-C .3089
I
-0.1981
I I
0.2448
0.1341
I
0.3555
I
0.4663
I
0.6877
I
0.5770
.0
a
0
91
__________________________________ I
CHART 7
1 .0000
2.0000
3.0Ccc
4.CCCG
5.00CC
6 .CCcc
7.0000
8.CCCC
1.cccc
10.0000
11.00CC
12.CCCC
13.0000
14 . CC00
15.00CC
16.CCOO
17.CCCC
18.00CC
19.Cccc
20.CCCC
21.0000
22.CCO
23.0000
24.0C00
25.CC
26.C CCO
27.C 00
28.CCCC
29.OCOC
30.OCCO
31.CCCC
32.00CC
33.0000
34.CCOC
35.0000
36.CCGC
37.00CC
38.CCOC
39.0 CCC
40.00CC
-106-
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
I
-0.6096
I
-0.5047
I
-0.3S97
I
-C.2S48
I
-0.1899
I I
0. 1992E-01
-0.8500E-01
+
+
+
+
+
+
4.
+
+
I I
0.2297
0.1248
+
4.
I
0.3347
(26) PRICE UP W/ DECR VOL C CI CHANGE PCTATC 1960-1969
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS =
+
4.
+
+
4.
+
+
4.
4.
4.
+
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
+
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
+
4.
4.
4.
4.
I
0.4396
.*
23
________________________ I _________________
CHART 8
*
*
*
*
*
*
1.00CC
2.CCCO
3.CCCC
4.0000
5.OCCO
6.CCCC
7.CCOO
8.CCCC
9.CCCO
10.0C00
Il.ccoc
12.00CC
13.0000
14.C0CCC
15.CCCC
16.0000
17. CCCC
18.CCCC
19.0000
2C.OCOC
21.CCCO
22.OCOO
23.C CCC
24.0000
25.CCOO
26. OCCO
27.OCCO
28.0CCC
29. OCCO
30.C CO
31.C CO0
32 .OCGO
33.CCCO
34.CCC0C
35.0000
36.C COO
37.CCCC
38. OCOC
39. CCCC
4C.CCCO
*
*
*
4
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*1
.1
ii
-0.20JOE-01
+
+
+
+
+
4.
+
+
+
+
+
+
4.
+
+
+
+
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
+
+
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
I
0.8770E-01
(27) PRICE DOWN W/ HIGH VCL MCV AVG
I I
0.3031
0.1954
POTATO 1960-1969
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS = 189
-107-
*
*
*
*
I
-0.5585
I
-0.4508
I
-0.3431
I
-0.2354
I
-0.1277
4.
4.
4.
+
+
4.
+
4.
+
I
0.5185
I
0.4108
0.1
-
_____________________________________ I -
CHART 9
-108-
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
1 .00CC
2.0000
3 CC C
4.CCCC
5.00CC
6.CccO
7 .C CC
8 .0CCO
9.CCO
10.0000
11.OCO
12.0 CCC
13.OCCO
14.0000
15.CCCC
16 .0C30
17.00CC
18.CCCO
19.0COCO
20.0000
21.CCCO
22.0000
23.0000
24. 00CC
25.C CCC
26.0000
27. CC
28 .00CC
29.CCCOO
30.C CCC
31. 00CC
32.CCCC
33.0000
34.,CCOG
35.C CCC
36.0C CO
37.CCCC
38.CCCC
39.0000
4C.CCOC
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
4
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
I
-0.5687
*
I
-0.4417
1
-0.3146
I
-C. 1876
I I
0.664CE-01
-0.6061E-01
(28) PRICE COWN W/ INOR VOL & 01 CHANGE POTATO 1960-1969
NUMBER OF CBSERVATIONS =
+
+
+
4.
+
4.
4.
4.
+
+
4.
*
+
+
4.
4.
*
*
*
+
4.
4.
+
4.
4.
4.
+
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
4.
+
+
I
-0.6957
I
0.1934
4.
+.74
I
0.3204
I
0.4474
+
0
0
26
SI-I __
CHART 10
-109-
*
*
*
l.CCC0
2 .CCC0
3.CCOC
4.0 CC
5.0000
6.CCOO
7.CCCC
8.CCOO
9.0 CO
10.C CCC
i.CGcc
12.00CC
13.CCCC
14.00CC
15.CCCC
16.C CCC
17.0000
18.CCCO
19.0000
20.0000
21.CCCC
22.0000
23.OCOG
24,C CCC
25.0000
26.0CC C
27.CCCC
28.00C
29.0 CCC
30.00CC
31.00CC
32.0000
33.0000
34.0CCO
35.CCCC
36.0000
37. 00CC
38.0000
39.0CGO
40.00CC
*
*
*
*
*
*
4
*
*
I
0.2296E-02
+
4.
4.
+
+
4.
+
+
4.
+
4.
+
+
+
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
I
0.1100
I
0.2177
I I
0.4331
0.3254
I
0.5408
I
0 .6485
(30) HIGH INCREASING CI CHANGE PCTATO 1960-1969
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS = 446
j
+
+
+
+
+
+
4.
4.
+
4.
4.
+
+
4.
+
4.
+
4.
+
4.
+
4.
4.
4.
4.
*
*
*
*
I
-0.4285
I
-0.3208
I
-0.2131
-C.1C54
.
.
.
0
0
.~ ~w I
-110 -
*
*
*
*
*
*
1.CcC
2.0COO
3.CCCO
4.CCCC
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*
*
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*
*
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-
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+
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+
+
+
4.
+
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3.CCCC
4.0 COO
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6.0COO
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13.CCC
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16.0 CCOC
17 .0000
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22.0000
23.0000
24.00CCC
25.0000
26.CCOC
27.CCC0
28.0000
29. OCO
30.0 CCC
31.0000
32.0000
33.0000
34.0COO
35. CC C
36.0000
37.0000
38.0 CCC
39.0000
40.0000 *
I
-0.2664
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
I
-C. 1971
I
-0.1278
I
-0.5856E-01
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
4.
+
+
+
+
+
4-
4.
4-
+
4-
4.
4.
+
4-
+
+
4.
I1I
C. 1072E-01
I
C.8000E-01
1
0.1493
I
0.2186
I
0.2878
I
0.3571
4.I
+ .26
(33) PRICE BELOW SEAS LOW POTATO 1960-1969
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS = 163
0
CHART 13
1.CCC
2.0CCOO
3.0000
4.OCCC
5.0 000
6.0000 *6.OCOC
87.0 000
9.0000
Ic. 00CC
11.0000
12.0000
13.0000
14.000C
15.00CC
16.CCCO
17.0000
18.CCOC
19.0000
20.0000
21 .0COO
22.0000
23.0000
24.0000
25.0 CCC
26.0 CCC
27.3000
28.CCCOO
29.CCCC
30.0000
31.00CC
32.0000
33 .CCG
34.CCOO
35.C COO
36 .0000
37.0000
38. 00CC
39.0000
40.0000
I
-0.3000
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EXHIBIT VII-l1
Simulation From 1970 to 1973 of Trading in May Maine Potatos
Futures Using Each of a Set of Selected Conditional Forecasts
Obsrv* Gross
Event
Type
(24)
(25)
(26)
(27)
(28)
(30)
(11)
(12)
(39)
(41)
(20)
(21)
(32)
(33)
.14
(.23)
(.10)
.00
.02
.01
(.57)
.00
.67
.03
.00
.00
(.25)
(.19)
1971
NetNet
( .52)
(1.67)
(2.80)
.00
(2.62)
( .83)
(4.11)
.00
(6.71)
(1.23)
.00
.00
(1.93)
( .31)
Obsrv* Gross
11
24
45
0
44
14
59
0
123
21
0
0
28
2
.,93
.18
.09
.00
.22
(.52)
(.04)
.00
(.11)
(.11)
.00
.00
(.74)
(.14)
Net Ob srv*
11
1
17
0
2
15
1
0
6
14
0
0
27
3
Gross
(.22)
.13
(.03)
.00
(.06)
(.09)
.53
.00
(.66)
(.09)
.00
.00
.21
.02
1970
Net
( .88)
( .07)
(1.05)
.00
( .18)
( .99)
.47
.00
(1.02)
( .93)
.00
.00
(1.41)
( .16)
H
H
1972
Net
(1.29)
( .96)
(2.13)
.00
(2.42)
(1.78)
(3.64)
.00
(2.15)
( .41)
.00
.00
(2.78)
( .32)
37
19
37
0
44
21
60
0
34
5
0
0
34t
3
Obsrv*
EXHIBIT VII-l1 (Continued)
Event 1973
Net
(5.60)
1.69
(8.28)
.00
(4.84)
(2.64)
(2.96)
.00
(2.89)
( .11)
.00
.00
3.48
C .31)
*Obsrv = Observations
Gross
(5.48)
2.35
(7.32)
.00
(2.20)
2.82
( .02)
.00
(2.11)
.13
.00
.00
4.08
( .01)
(24)
(25)
(26)
(27)
(28)
(30)
(11)
(12)
(39)
(41)
(20)
(21)
(32)
(33)
All Years
Net
( 8.29)
( .87)
(14.26)
.00
(10.06)
( 6.24)
(10.24)
.00
(12.77)
( 2.81)
.00
.00
( 2.64)
( .91)
Obsrv*
61
55
115
0
134
141
169
0
176
44
0
0
99
13
Obsrv*
2
11
16
0
44
9
49
0
13
4
0
0
10
5
H
H
U'
Gross
(4.63)
2.43
(7.36)
.00
(2.02)
2.22
( .10)
.00
(2.21)
( .17)
.00
.00
3.30
( .13)
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EXHIBIT VII-12
Simulation From 1970 to 1973 of Trading in
May Maine Potato Futures Using a Portfolio
of Selected Conditional Forecasts
Forecasts Selected
(11)
(12)
(20)
(21)
(24)
(25)
(26)
(27)
(28)
(30)
(32)
(33)
Price up w/ downside gap
Price dn w/ upside gap
5 day mvg avg @ price peak
5 day mbg avg @ price trough
Price up w/ hi vol mov avg
Price up w/ incr vol & op int change
Price up w/ decr vol & op int change
Price dn w/ hi vol mov avg
Price dn w/ incr vol & op int change
Hi incr op int change
Price above seas hi
Price below seas lo
Results
1970
1971
1972
1973
All Years
Gross,
(4.66)
4.67
(8.48)
(3.04)
(6.85)
Net
Number of
Transactions*
(5.62)
4.55
(8.66)
(3.22)
(8.29)
16
2
3
3
24
*Transaction Cost = .06
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CHAPTER 8
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
As stated in Chapter 4, the general hypothesis which was
tested by this thesis effort is as follows: commodities fut-
ures short term price movements are non-random and predictable
within acceptable levels of confidence conditional upon and
subsequent to the occurrence of certain causal events external
to the market and effect-events internal to the market.
The results from evaluation of price movements condition-
al upon specific event-types and from simulation of forecasts
subsequently established from the evaluation of the event-
types was presented without critical comment in the previous
chapter. The following paragraphs contain a critical analysis
of these results and some suggestions for further research.
Exhibits VIII-1 and VIII-2 show graphs of actual price
movements during most of the testing period.
A. Evaluation of Event-Types
The test of price movements subsequent to external causal
events--as defined by the data organized by Neiderhoffer--did
not validate that portion of the hypothesis concerning external
events. That is, the gains which were observed subsequent to
the world events used in the tests were insignificant on the
average although the level of confidence of some positive
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gaini before transaction costs were relatively high. In the
case of Cocoa, Exhibit VII-1 shows the expected gain after
"good" or "bad" events to be .43 and .53 respectively with a
60 percent confidence of positive gain expected. With trans-
action costs of .20, these gains are reduced by more than 50
percent and the remaining gain insignificant.
In the case of Maine Potatos, the maximum expected gains
for extremely good events and extremely bad events as display-
ed in Exhibit VII-8 are .11 and .08 respectively. The con-
fidence of a positive gain is relatively high (100 and 87
percent) but the number of observations (1 and 9 respectively)
are very low. With a transaction cost of .06, the gains also
become insignificant.
It is interesting to note, .however, that the price move-
ment reactions one or two days after either ah extremely good
or extremely bad event,as observed by Neiderhoffer for the
stock market,tends to also exist in the observations made in
tests conducted during this effort. In the Cocoa tests, for
example, (See Appendix) the price movement was downward for
three days after a good event and then consistently upward;
after a bad event, prices moved down for one day and then con-
sistently upward.
1 Confidence of positive gain is defined as follows; assuming
a normal distribution: Z(AP) = AP-1
so, (AP>O) Pr(Z(AP)>Z( )) = r (Z >-P/a)
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The portion of the hypothesis pertaining internal effect-
events was validated to a much greater extent. A number of the
event-types tested from this general class of events proved
to have relatively large expected short term gains and rela-
tively high levels of confidence of positive gain. Referring
to Exhibit VII-1 for Cocoa again, one can see by examining the
statistics on the left-hand side of the table where the ratio
of expected price change to standard deviation is maximum for
each particular event, that seven event-types (8, 19, 28, 38,
39, 41, 45) had a confidence of positive gain above 90 percent
with an average expected gain associated with those seven
events of 1.51. Three event-types (6, 24, and 32) had confid-
ence of positive gain between 80 and 90 percent and an average
expected gain of 1.44.
The event-types which generally gave the best results
were the market-vane indicators with contrary action in estab-
lishing market positions. Acting on market-vane indicators
above 90 percent yielded a maximum expected gain of 2.48 with
100 percent confidence of positive gain while action, subsequ-
ent to market-vane indicators of 30 percent or below resulted
in an expected gain of 3.70 with 100 percent confidence of
positive gain.
Some event-types in the Cocoa analysis proved not to be
indicators of non-random behavior but, rather, indicated
random behavior with an expected gain of approximately zero
and low confidence of positive gain. Event types 11, 19, 20,
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and 22 are examples.
Other event-types in the Cocoa analysis as presented in
the Appendix showed some positive gain, but the trend of the
gain was opposite of that expected. For example, event-type
number 8 (price down with limit move up) resulted in a general
continuing down trend although the maximum expected gain associ-
ated with that event was 1.93 with an 83 percent confidence of
positive gain.
Referring to Exhibit VII-8 for Potatos, similar but some-
what less dramatic expected price behavior may be observed
which supports the portion of the hypothesis concerning inter-
nal event-types. In this case, many of the event-types with
high levels of confidence of positive gain had insignificant
expected gains which would have been all but depleted by
transaction costs (see events 10, 15, 19, and 40). The market
vane events (39 and 43) had expected gains of .87 with 100
percent confidence of positive gain.
Only one other event-type manifested subsequent price
movements with significant expected gains and positive gain
confidence levels above 70 percent; that was number 11--price
up with downside gap. This event-type, however, manifested
somewhat unexpected initial price movement upward before re-
versing direction downwards on the average as one might
expect by the nature of the event.
Many other event-types, in the case of Potatos, tended to
have expected gains close to zero suggesting that they are in-
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dicators of subsequent random, not non-random, price behavior.
Event-types 10, 13, 18, 19, 23, 24, and 37 are good examples.
This relatively high incidence of event-types indicating par-
tial random behavior is compatible with the widely held view
mentioned in Chapter 1 that perishable conmodities such as
potatos tend to have more volatile price behavior on the fut-
ures market than non-perishable commodities.
Reviewing the results for both commodities in a more gen-
eral manner, it is clear that the reliability of gain condition-
al upon certain events (as measured by the highest ratio of
expected gain to standard deviation of gain) is greatest in the
short term thus validating another portion of the hypothesis.
The internal event-types tested by this thesis had the greatest
y/a ratio (on the average) 17.9 days after such events occurred
for Cocoa and 17.3 days for Potatos.
B. Trading Simulation
The results of the first level of trading simulation as
displayed in Exhibit VII-4 for Cocoa and VII-ll for Potatos
yielded virtually no profits after commissions. This can be
explained in large part by the nature of the test. The testing
was done such that a market position would be maintained after
entry for the full forty days of the forecast. As observed in
the previous section, the average length of time for an optimum
p/a ratio was about 17 days. It is quite likely that the high
risk of maintaining a market position for longer time periods
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based on a forecast that maximized p/a ratios much earlier re-
sulted in the net losses incurred.
Also, in the case of market-vane indicators, which were
only used in Cocoa and not in the "lagged" form, the tremendous
upward trend manifested in price movements during the early
1970s as shown in Exhibit VII-1 would prove unprofitable any
contrary action to a high "bullish" indicator until the indi-
cator itself began to decline.
The next set of tests, however, which combined all of the
selected event-types into one "portfolio" of forecasts yielded
much more profitable results in the case of Cocoa and to some
extent Potatos (Exhibits VII-5 and VII-12). This test adopted
a new forecast and disengaged from an old one whenever a new
forecast event occurred. Thus, the average time which the sim-
ulation followed one forecast was undoubtedly reduced from
forty days to a time period somewhat closer to the 17 day
"optimum." The result for the four-year simulation for Cocoa
was a sizeable gain of 22.35 before transactions and 12.35 after
transactions.
The gain for all four years of the simulation for Potatos
was negative but a positive net gain of 4.55 was achieved dur-
ing 1971.
The groundwork for a forecast adjusting mechanism was laid
in this thesis, but the two formulations which were tested were
both unprofitable and unworkable. In the first case, the ad-
justing mechanism stopped operating during 1972 due to overly
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large accummulation of actual versus forecasted price differ-
ences during periods of oscillating price changes. In the
second case, only one year of operation was obtained because
the adjustment mechanism overreacted to oscillating price
changes and tended to revise the forecast too quickly towards
zero,
C. Implications for Further Research
The opportunity for much more fascinating and potentially
fruitful research remains in the area of commodity futures
markets price behavior. Particular issues which these re-
searchers feel need further analysis and investigation are des-
cribed below.
The development and refinement df forecast adjusting mech-
anisms io an effort begun by this thesis but is both far from
finished and beyond the scope of this effort. Assessment of
speculator utility functions, while studied to some extent in
a previous thesis at M.I.T. needs more attention to facilitate
more rigorous selection of mean/variance positions from fore-
casts of price behavior. The assumption made in this thesis
was that the utility function of the investor is linear, his
asset position infinite and his risk premium constant. Study
should be made to determine more accurately how investor's
utility functions reflect finite asset positions and varying
interest rates and their effect on intertemporal change in
risk premium.
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In terms of the mechanics of a price forecast adjustment,
the main problem to be resolved, of course, is identifying the
effect of actual price deviations from the forecast. This th
thesis developed simple expected price change and standard de-
viation from that change for each day conditional upon a single
event. Future studies should be made concerning the effect not
only of such an event on a future price level Xt, but also the
effect of various different price movement patterns after such
an event but prior to a forecast on a paticulat date t. In
other words, instead of the conditional probability P(Xt event)
one would have P(Xt]event and Xt-1  Xt-2,' )
With the refinement of methods for improved performance
on the part of speculators (which may result if research sug-
gested above yields useful positive results), many will argue
that the market will become more efficient, information will
be reflected in price movements more quickly, and randomness
will eventually prevail without question. Others will argue,
of course, that the Keynes "insurance premium" deserved by
speculators for the risks they take will simply be more assured.
The debate will, in all likelihood, continue.
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A. WORLD EVENTS
The source of the data presented in the following pages of
the Appendix was a Ph.D. dissertation written by Victor
Nediderhoffer at the Graduate School of Business, University of
Chicago, in December of 1969. Neiderhoffer collected and or-
ganized this data for purposes of identifying the effect of '
events occurring around the world (as manifested in key news-
paper headlines) on stock market behavior.
That data provided this thesis effort with a readily avail-
able source of previously aggregated information pertaining to
a particular event-type and was well suited for the testing
which was performed during this research.
As described in the title on the following page, the data
was gleaned from NEW YORK TIMES headlines (five-to eight-
columns) from 1960 to 1968. The headlines were interpreted
by a group of untrained observers and classified into seven
good to bad categories. The coding on this scale was tb per-
tain to the country as a whole--not to any particular interest
group.
For a more detailed description of the world event data,
the reader is referred to Mr. Neiderhoffer's work which is en-
titled "World Events and Stock Prices: A Study of New York
Tines Headlines and Subsequent Movements in the Standard and
Poor's Composite Index" and which has subsequently been pub-
lished in a 1970 issue of JOURNAL OF FINANCE.
_1 flj -
HEADLINES OF FIVE COLUMNS OR MORE ON FIRST PAGE OF
LATE CITY EDITION NEW YORK TIMES 1960 - 1968*
Favorability
Date Description of Event Colu Ms Scale
1/5/60 .
1/8/60 .
1/14/60.
1/29/60.
1/30/60.
1/31/60.
3/3/60 .
3/4/60 .
3/12/60.
4/2/60 .
5/6/60 .
5/8/60 .
5/10/60.
5/17/60.
5/18/60.
5/19/60.
6/17/60.
7/10/60.
7/13/60.
7/14/60.
7/15/60.
7/16/60.
7/27/60.
7/28/60.
7/29/60.
9/13/60.
9/20/60.
9/23/60.
9/24/60.
9/30/60.
10/4/60.
11/9/60.
11/10/60
12/17/60
12/20/60
1/4/61 .
1/21/61.
1/31/61.
2/3/61.
2/5/61 .
2/15/61.
2/16/61.
4/12/61.
4/16/61.
4/19/61.
4/21/61.
5/6/61.
6/5/61.
6/14/61.
7/26/61.
8/7/61 .
8/14/61.
8/25/61.
8/31/61.
r5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
8
5
5
5
55
5
5
8
8
5
5
5
Steel Settlement Is Reached; Union Victor
Eisenhower Hopeful On Peace
Borough President Jack Indicted On 4 Counts
De Gaulle Sends Algiers Aides To Headquarters
De Gaulle Orders Rising Ended
Insurgents Defying De Gaulle
Ike Arrival In Uruguay Marred By Anti-U.S. Demonstration
Snow Cripples City
U.S. Rocket Put Into Sun Orbit
U.S. Orbits Weather Satellite
Soviet Downs American Plane
U.S. Concedes Flight Over Soviet Was On Spy Mission
Khrushchev Warns Of Rocket Attack On U.S. Bases
U.S.-Soviet Clash Disrupts Summit Talks
Summit Conference Breaks Up In Dispute
Khrushchev Rails Against U.S.
Japan Cancels Ike Trip to Forestall Mob Attacks
Ike Bars A Red Cuba, Tells Russian Not To Meddle
Plane Not Over Soviet U.S. Says
Kennedy Nominated On The 1st Ballot
Johnson Nominated For V.P.
Kennedy Calls For U.S. Sacrifices To Meet A New Frontier
Ike Challenges Soviet To World Vote On 2 Systems
Nixon Given Nomination By Acclamation
Lodge Is Nominated For V.P.
Hurricane Pounds City And Long Island
U.N. Chief Wins 70-0 Congo Vote
Ike Calls For Peace Throughout U.N.
Khrushchev Asks Hammarskjold Ouster
Macmillan Meets Khrushchev And Discusses Sumit
Hammarskjold Defies Demand By Khrushchev
Kennedy Is Apparent Victor
Kennedy's Victor, Won By Close Margin
127 Die As 2 Airliners Collide Over City
46 Killed, 7 Missing On Carrier In Fire
U.S. Breaks Diplomatic Ties With Cuba
Kennedy Sworn In, Asks Global Alliance Against Tyranny
Kennedy Challenges Congress To Meet Grave Perils Abroad
Kennedy Asks Increased Benefits For Aged
17-Inch Snow Paralyzes City
Soviet Will Boycott U.N. Chief
Kennedy Warns War Risks In A Unilateral Action In Congo
Soviet Man Orbits And Is Recovered
Castro Foes Bomb 3 Air Bases
Kennedy Warns Khrushchev On Cuba After Russians Vow Aid
Kennedy Says U.S. Won't Allow Communism In Cuba
U.S. Hurls Man 115 Miles Into Space
Kennedy And Khrushchev Find Limited Laos Accord
Power Fails. Ties Up Midtown 4-1/2 Hours
Kennedy Calls 217,000 Men And 3.4 Billion To Meet Soviet Threat
Soviet Astronaut Safe After 17 Orbits
Soviet Troops Encircle Berlin
U.S. Reject Moscow Threat To Block Berlin Access
Soviet Resuming Atomic Tests
Neutral
Neutral
Neutral
Neutral
Neutral
Neutral
Slightly Bad
Neutral
Slightly Good
Slightly Good
Fairly Bad
Extremely Bad
Extremely Bad
Extremely Bad
Extremely Bad
Slightly Bad
Fairly Bad
Neutral
Slightly Bad
Neutral
Neutral
Neutral
Neutral
Neutral
Neutral
Neutral
Neutral
Neutral
Slightly Bad
Slightly Good
Slightly Good
Neutral
Neutral
Neutral
Neutral
Slightly Bad
Neutral
Neutral
Slightly Good
Neutral
Slightly Bad
Slightly Bad
Fairly Bad
Neutral
Fairly Bad
Fairly Bad
Slightly Good
Neutral
Neutral
Slightly Bad
Slightly Bad
Fairly Bad
Neutral
Slightly Bad
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Favorability
Date Description of Event Columns Scale
9/6/61.
9/19/61.
9/26/61.
10/18/61
11/8/61.
11/29/61
1/31/62.
2/21/62.
3/19/62.
4/14/62.
5/25/62.
8/13/62.
8/14/62.
8/30/62.
9/26/62.
9/30/62.
10/1/62.
10/2/62.
10/23/62
10/24/62
10/25/62
10/26/62
10/27/62
10/28/62
10/29/62
10/30/62
11/7/62.
12/10/62
4/11/63.
5/16/63.
5/17/63.
6/4/63 .
7/26/63.
8/29/63.
11/2/63.
11/23/63
11/24/63
11/25/63
11/26/63
11/27/63
11/28/63
11/30/63
1/5/64 .
1/11/64.
4/10/64.
6/16/64.
6/20/64.
7/16/64.
7/17/64.
8/1/64 .
8/5/64 .
8/o/64 .
8/10/64.
8/27/64.
9/28/64.
10/13/64
10/16/64
11/4/64.
12/19/64
5
S
S
S
8
5
U.S. Will Resume Nuclear Tests Underground
Hamsarskjold Dies In African Air Crash
Kennedy Warns U.N. Of Atomic War Peril
Soviet Offers Delay On Berlin
Wagner Wins By 397,980 In Pary Sweep
Kennedy Tell@ Russians Their World Aims Perils Peace
O.A.S. Votes To Deny Cuba Any Inter-American Role
Glenn Orbits Earth 3 Times Safely
Algerian Cease-Fire Is Signed
Steel Gives In, Rescinds Rises
Carpenter Orbits Earth
Two Soviet Craft Circling Earth
Soviet Pilots Spin On In Orbit
Justice Frankfurter Retires
U.S. May Seud Troops As Hiss. Bars Negro Student
Kennedy Federalizes Mississippi Guard
Negro At Mississippi U. As Barnett Yields
3,000 Troops Put Down Mississippi Riots
U.S. Imposes Arms Blockade Of Cuba
Soviet Challenges U.S.. Right To Blockade
Some Soviet Ships Said To Veer From Cuba
Kennedy Khrushchev Agree To Talks
U.S. Finds Cuba Speeding Arms Build-up
Soviet Offers To End Cuba Bases But Not In Turkey
U.S., Soviet Reach Accord On Cuba
Thant's Cuba Talks Fruitful
Rockefellar, Javits, And Levitt Win
Strike. No Late City Edition Of N. Y. Times Available
Atom Sub With 129 Lost Off Boston
Cooper Flying Smoothly
Cooper Maneuvers To Landing
Pope John Dead At 81
U.S., Soviet, Britain Reach Atom Accord
200,000 In Civil Rights Rally
Rebels In Vietnam Oust Diem
Kennedy Killed By Sniper
Kennedy's Body Lies In White House
President's Assassin Shot In Jail
Kennedy Laid To Rest
Johnson Backs Existing Policy
Johnson Bids Congress Enact Civil Rights Bill Soon
Johnson Names Panel To Investigate Assassination
Pope Acclaimed In Holy Land
Panama Demands Canal Treaty Revision
Johnson Wins Rail Truce, Avert Strike
High Court Says States Must Apportion
Civil Rights Bill Passed
Goldwater Nominated On First Ballot
Goldwater Promises To Make Communism Give Way
Ranger Takes Close-Up Moon Photos
U.S. Planes Attack N. Viet Bases
U.S. Plans No New Vietnam Raids
Turkish Jets Hit Cyprus
Democratic Ticket: Johnson And Humphrey
Warren Commission Finds Oswald Guilty
Russians Orbit 3 In Single Craft
Khrushchev Ousted; Brezhnev In Power
Johnson Swamps Goldwater
U.S. To Dig New Canal In Latin America
Neutral
Neutral
Neutral
Slightly Good
Neutral
Neutral
Fairly Good
Slightly Good
Neutral
Fairly Good
Slightly Good
Slightly Bad
Neutral
Neutral
Fairly Bad
Extremely Bad
Fairly Bad
Extremely Bad
Fairly Bad
Extremely Bad
Fairly Good
Slightly Good
Neutral
Neutral
Slightly Good
Slightly Good
Neutral
Neutral
Slightly Good
Slightly Good
Neutral
Extremely Good
Neutral
Slightly Bad
Extremely Bad
Neutral
Slightly Bad
Neutral
Neutral
Neutral
Neutra
Neutral
Slightly Bad
Sligitly Good
Slightly Good
Neutral
Neutral
Neutral
Slightly Good
Fairly Bad
Slightly Good
Fairly Bad
Neutral
Neutral
Slightly Bad
Neutral
Neutral
Neutral
5
5
8
5
5
5
5
8
5
8
5
5
22...
Favorability
Date Description of Event Columas Scale
1/5/65 .
1/21/65.
2/8/65 .
2/21/65.
3/10/65.
3/26/65.
-3/27/65.
5/30/65.
6/4/65 .
6/8/65 .
6/11/65.
7/10/65.
7/29/65.
8/15/65.
8/30/65.
9/7/65 .
9/15/65.
10/5/65.
11/3/65.
11/4/65.
11/10/65
11/11/65
12/16/65
1/1/66 .
1/2/66 .
1/3/66
1/4/66 .
1/5/66 .
1/6/66 .
1/7/66 .
1/8/66 .
1/11/66.
1/13/66.
1/14/66.
2/1/66 .
2/4/66 .
3/17/66.
6/2/66 .
6/30/66.
10/22/66
11/9/66.
1/11/67.
1/28/67.
2/8/67 .
6/6/67 .
6/7/67 .
6/8/67 .
6/9/67 .
6/10/67.
6/11/67.
6/24/67.
6/26/67.
7/15/67.
7/25/67.
9/12/67.
11/8/67.
12/19/67
1/18/68.
1/24/68.
1/26/68.
3/15/68.
President Bids Russ Leaders Visit U.S.
Johnson Pledges Efforts To End Tyranny
U.S. Jets Attack N. Vietnam In Reprisal For Raids
Ranger 8 Hits Target On Moon
Dr. King Leads March In Selma
White Rights Worker Is Slain
Johnson Opens Fight On Klan
Wagner Says He May Not Run Again
American Floats In Space
2 Astronauts Down Safely
Wagner Says He Won't Run For Fourth Term
High Court Bans Electing Legislature In Fall
Johnson Orders 50,000 More Men To Vietnam
21 Dead In Los Angeles Riots
2 Astronauts End 8-Day Flight
Indian Troops Drive On Lahore
Beame Chosen Over Screvane
Pope Calls For 'No More War' As U.N. Goal
Lindsay Beats Beame In A Close Race
Lindsay Confers With Wagner
Power Failu-e Snarls Northeast
City Slowly Recovering From Blackout
Two Geminis Fly 6 To 10 Feet Apart
Transit Strike Apparently On
Subways And Buses Halted By Strike
Lindsay Insists All Workers Stay Home
Quill Held In Contempt, Faces Jail Today
Quill Jailed, Falls Ill, Taken To Hospital
Lindsay Sees Mr ement In Transit Talks
Johnson Sends Wirtz To Transit Parley
Transit Board Seeks $322,000 A-Day Fine
Mayor Deman.ds End To Strike
Transit Strike Accord Is Reached
Johnson Deplores Strike Pack
Johnson Asks U.N. To Summon Peace Conference
Soviet Achieves A Soft Landing On Moon
Gemeni 8 Crew Down In Pacific After Successful flight
Surveyor Makes Soft Landing On Moon
U.S. Extending Bombing, Raids
131, Mostly Children, Lost In Welsh Slag-File Slide
Rockefellar Wins: Police Board Out
Johnson Asks A 6% Surcharge On Taxes
3 Apollo Astronauts Die In Fire
Blizzard Cripples East Coast
Israel And Arab Forces Battling
Israel Sweeps Ahead On All Fronts
Israelis Rout The Arabs, Approach Sues
Egypt And Syria Agree To U.N. Cease-Fire
Nasser Says He Is Resigning
Cease-fire In Syria Accepted
Johnson, Kosygin Talk 5 Hours
Johnson, Kosygin End 'Useful' Talks
11 Die, 600 Hurt In Newark Riots
U.S. Troops Sent Into Detroit
Teachers Tie Up City's Schools
Constitution Beaten, Transit Bonds Win
Marcus, Ex-Lindsay Aide, Held
Johnson Budget $186 Billion
North Korea Seizes Navy Ship
U.S. Calls 14,787 Air Reservists
British Suspend Gold Trading For 1 Day At U.S. Request
S
S
5
S
Slightly Good
Slightly Good
Fairly Bad
Slightly Good
Neutral
Neutral
Neutral
Neutral
Slightly Good
Slightly Good
Neutral
Neutral
Slightly Bad
Neutral
Slightly Good
Slightly Bad
Neutral
Nuetral
Neutral
Neutral
Neutral
Neutral
Neutral
Slightly Sad
Neutral
Neutral
Neutral
Neutral
Neutral
Neutral
Neutral
Neutral
Slightly Good
Neutral
Neutral
Slightly Bad
Slightly Good
Slightly Good
Slightly Bad
Neutral
Neutral
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Favorability
Date Description of Event Columns Scale
3/18/68. . . . 7 Nations Back Dual Gold Price
411/68 . . . . Johnson Says He Won't Run; Halts N. Viet Raids 8
4/2/68 . . . . Johnson Agrees To Confer With Kennedy 8
4/4/68 . . . . North Viet & U.S. Agree To Contact 8
4/5/68 . . . . Martin Luther King, Jr. Slain In Memphis 8
4/6/68 . . . . Army Troops In Capital As Negroes Riot 8
4/7/68 . . . . More Soldiers Called To Control Riots 5
4/8/68 . . . . U.S. Troops To Baltimore; Violence Eases In Pittsburgh 5
4/10/68. . . . Martin Luther King Buried In Atlanta 8
5/25/68. . . . DeGaulle Sets Referendum 5
5/30/68. . . . DeGaulle Goes To Rural Home 5
5/31/68. . . . DeGaulle Dissolves Assembly 5
6/5/68 . . . . Kennedy Shot, Gravely Wounded After Winning Calif. Primary 8
6/6/68 . . . . Robert Kennedy Dead. Arab Suspect Arraigned 8
6/7/68 . . . . Kennedy's Body Flown To New York City For Funeral 5
6/8/68 . . . . 100,000 Pass Kennedy Bier 5
6/9/68 . . . . Thousands Pay Tribute To Kennedy 8
7/4/68 . . . . Gunman Terrorizes Central Park 5
8/8/68 . . . . Nixon Nominated On 1st Ballot 8
8/9/68 . . . . Nixon Selects Agnew, Pledges End Of War 8
8/21/68. . . . Czechoslovakia Invaded By USSR & Other Warsaw Pact Members 8
8/22/68. . . . Russians Seize Dubcek And 6 Colleagues 8
8/23/68. . . . Pro-Moscow Czechs Name Trio To Replace Dubeek 5
8/24/68. . . . Svoboda In Moscow For Talks 5
8/29/68. . . . Humphrey Nominated On 1st Ballot 8
8/30/68. . . . Humphrey Bars Viet Policy Rigidity 8
10/12/68 . . . 3 On Apollo 7 Circle Earth 5
10/23/68 . . . Apollo Splashdown - Perfect Mission 5
11/1/68. . . . Attacks On North Vietnam Halt Today 8
11/6/68. . . . Nixon-Humphrey Race Tight 8
11/7/68. . . . Nixon Wins By Thin Margin 8
11/18/68 . . . School Agreement Reached 5
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B. COCOA RESULTS
The tables presented on the following pages represent the
complete computations for expected price change and standard
deviation of that change in futures price movements for forty
trading days subsequent to the occurrence of each event-type
described in Chapter 4. The years for which these computa-
tions were made were 1960 through 1969. A summary of the com-
putations is presented in Exhibit VII-l.
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(2) GCOD EVENT
DAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
-0.05
-C.05
-0.01
0.09
C. 13
0.18
0.15
0.13
0.13
0.08
0.11
0.14
0.19
0.25
0.24
C.26
0019
0.20
0.16
C .19
COCOA 1960-1969
STD.DEV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.33 21 0.29
0.37 22 0.36
0.57 23 0.40
0.72 24 0.28
0.91 25 0.36
1.01 26 0.43
1.15 27 0.37
1.21 28 0.29
1.16 29 0.40
1.08 30 0.40
1.28 31 0.37
1.51 32 0.42
1.52 33 0.29
1.71 34 0.25
1.66 35 0.33
1.72 36 0.26
1.79 37 0.23
1.82 38 0.22
1.94 39 0.24
2.04 40 0.24
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
STD.DEV.
2.15
2.25
2.34
2.25
2.26
2.32
2.38
2.46
2.69
2.81
2.74
2.90
2.78
2.66
2.76
2.75
2.81
2.77
2.85
2.89
45
(3) NEUTRAL EVENT
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(OP)
0.00
-0.02
-0.05
-0.14
-0.18
-0.22
-0.22
-0.27
-C.26
-0.30
-0.29
-0.27
-0.23
-0.20
-0.18
-0.18
-C.22
-0.25
-0.24
-C.23
COCOA 1960-1969
STDD.EV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.32 21 -0.26
0.30 22 -0.28
0.45 23 -0.28
0.50 24 -0.29
0.59 25 -0.27
0.69 26 -0.25
0.77 27 -0.24
0.82 28 -0.27
0.95 29 -0.24
1.01 30 -0.23
1.11 31 -0.15
1.18 32 -0.19
1.23 33 -0.18
1.29 34 -0.19
1.37 35 -0.23
1.47 36 -0.21
1.53 37 -0.25
1.52 38 -0.30
1.52 39 -0.29
1.62 40 -0.24
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS
STD.DEV.
1.69
1.69
1.62
1.61
1.70
1.77
1.71
1.76
1.78
1.83
1.92
1.95
1.98
1.99
2.03
2.09
2.10
2.20
2.22
2.36
93
COCOA 1960-1969
CAY EXP(DP) STD.DEV.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1C
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
-0.02
c.00
0.00
0.01
0.04
0.05
0*06
0.05
0.05
0.07
0.12
C.12
C.16
0.13
0.12
0.15
0.18
0.20
0.21
C.24
0.26
0.33
0.51
0*64
0*84
0.91
1.05
1.08
1.17
1.31
1.47
1.48
1.49
1.52
1.55
1.66
1.72
1.81
1.88
2.02
DAY EXP(DP) STD.DEV.
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
0.21
0.17
0.18
0.14
0.19
0.25
0.28
0.34
0.35
0.39
0.37
0.47
0*49
0.49
0.53
0.52
0.47
0.42
0.40
0.41
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS =
2.08
2.13
2.19
2.12
2.09
2.04
2.02
2.08
2.12
2.14
2.19
2*26
2.31
2.33
2.37
2.44
2.38
2.38
2.39
2.39
61
(6) PRICE UP W/ LIMIT MOVE UP COCOA 1960-1969
STD.DEV.
0.59
0.56
0.81
0.99
1.08
1.10
1.10
1.29
1.42
1.65
1.72
1.95
1.94
1.89
1.70
1.84
1.98
2.15
2.39
2.65
DAY
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
EXP(DP)
0.59
0.32
0.29
0.34
0.23
0.34
0.39
0.55
0.66
0.67
0.75
0.79
0.84
0.92
0.85
0.76
0.69
0.57
0.41
0.37
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS =
ST0.0EV.
2.89
2.85
3.00
3.10
3.37
3.52
3.60
3.70
3.84
3.84
3.88
3.79
3.83
3.86
3.95
3.99
4.21
4.50
4.82
5.01
30
(4) BAD EVENT
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DAY
1
2
3
4
5
67
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
0.18
0.35
0.53
0.57
0.37
0.24
0.09
0.25
C.32
0.42
C.6C
0.64
0.64
0.66
0.58
0.58
0.62
0.79
0.81
C.71
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(7) PRICE UP W/
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP (DP)
C.00
0.00
0000
0000
0.00
0.00
0.00
0000
0000
0.00
0.00
co0
0.00
0.00
0.00
0000
0000
0.00
0.00
co0
LIMIT MOVE
STD.DEV.
0*00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0000
0.00
0.00
0.00
0 * CO
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
DOWN
DAY
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
COCOA 1960-1969
EXP(DP)
0000
0000
0000
0000
0.00
0000
0000
0.00
0.00
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0.00
0.00
0.00
0000
0000
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS =
STD.DEV.
0.00
0000
0000
0.00
0.00
0.00
0000
0.00
0000
0.00
0000
0000
0000
0000
0.00
0000
0000
0000
0.00
0000
0
(8) PRICE DOWN W/ LIMIT MOVE UP COCOA 1960-1969
STD.OEV.
0.71
0069
0.82
0.98
1.28
1.62
1.75
2.10
2.22
2.37
2.43
2.69
2.76
2.55
2045
2.49
2.60
2053
2.32
2.35
DAY
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
EXP(DP)
-0.63
-0.71
-0.71
-0.40
-0.69
-1.05
-1.32
-1.44
-1.62
-1.85
-1.93
-1.60
-1.43
-1045
-1.80
-1.88
-1.84
-1.83
-1.53
-1.51
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS =
STD.DEV.
2.17
2.11
2.38
2.42
2.53
2.57
2033
2.28
2037
2.63
2.88
2.81
2.41
2.43
2.58
2.82
2.75
2.53
2.48
2.32
11
DAY
1
2
3
4
6
7
8
S
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
I's
20
EXP(DP)
0.11
-0.33
-C.75
-0.76
-0.42
-0.12
0.05
-C.03
0014
0.16
-0.15
-0.21
-0.07
0.03
-C.02
-0.25
-0.39
-0.35
-0.22
-0.47
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(9) PRICE DOWN W/ LIMIT MOVE DCN COCOA 1960-1969
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
C.40
2.06
2.13
2.75
3.54
3.05
3*60
2.85
2.88
2.88
2.35
1.80
0.81
-0.07
C.93
1.93
1.70
1.08
0.85
1.15
STD.DEV.
0.00
0.00
0000
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0*00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0. CO
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS =
DAY
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
(10) PRICE UP W/ UPSIDE GAP COCOA 1960-1969
SID.DEV.
0*36
0.36
0.51
0.66
0.74
0.83
0093
1.03
1.20
1.31
1.36
1.42
1*53
1 .58
1.62
1.64
1 .64
1.73
1.78
1.87
DAY
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
EXP(OP)
0.37
0.39
0.39
0039
0.39
0.39
0044
0.48
0.49
0.52
0054
0.56
0.60
0.60
0.61
0.57
0.57
0054
0.55
0.53
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS =
STO.DEV.
1.98
2.08
2.17
2*24
2.23
2.28
2.42
2.52
2.61
2.68
2.74
2.78
2.81
2.85
2.87
2.93
3.02
3.10
3.19
3.29
213
EXP(DP)
2.15
2.92
2.53
2.45
2.57
1.90
2.25
2.41
3.10
2.45
2.25
2.24
2.45
1.75
0.75
0*84
0.05
-0.25
-0.29
0.71
STD.DEV.
0.00
0.00
0.00
0000
0000
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0000
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
94
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
0.06
Coll
0.13
0.16
0.19
0.17
0.21
0.21
0.24
C.25
0.24
0.29
C.29
0.30
0.32
0.34
0.35
C.38
0.38
0.38
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(11) PRICE UP W/ COWNSIDE GAP COCOA 1960-1969
DAY
1
2
3
4
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
2C
EXP(DP)
0.07
0.08
Col
0.07
C.12
0.11
0.12
0.15
0.12
0.13
0.24
0.25
C.23
0.34
0.37
0.32
0.32
0.36
0.37
0.38
STD.DEV.
0.30
0.26
0.47
0.50
0.62
0.71
0.80
0.88
1.01
1.14
1.28
1.33
1.38
1.52
1.53
1.57
1.69
1.85
1.94
2.02
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS =
DAY
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
(12) PRICE DOWN W/ UPSIDE GAP
DAY EXP(DP) STD.0EV.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
-0.02
-0.11
-0.14
-0.07
-0.07
-0.06
-0.07
-0.11
-0.10
-0.10
-0.13
-0.17
-C.12
-C.08
-0.08
-C. 10
-0.11
-0.11
-0.10
-0.14
0.35
0.35
0.54
0.62
0.75
0.87
0.91
1.04
1.12
1.19
1.29
1.42
1.40
1.41
1.44
1.57
1.60
1.64
1.67
1067
COCOA 1960-1969
DAY EXP(DP) STD.EV.
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
-0.17
-0.21
-0.22
-0.24
-0.29
-0.30
-0.36
-0.40
-0.44
-0.46
-0.41
-0.34
-0.36
-0.32
-0.31
-0.32
-0.26
-0.23
-0.18
-0. 14
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS =
1.64
1.67
1.77
1.84
1.88
2.02
2.04
2.08
2.11
2.16
2.23
2.20
2.16
2.23
2.32
2.32
2.34
2.33
2.35
2.44
81
EXP(DP)
0.39
0.35
0.40
0.37
0.31
0.34
0.36
0.38
0.38
0.31
0.36
0.35
0.34
C.28
0.25
0.21
0.12
0.20
0.18
0.13
STD.CEV.
1.97
1.99
2.15
2.24
2.21
2.22
2.27
2.21
2.17
2.28
2.41
2.55
2.65
2.56
2.67
2.79
2.83
2.83
2.83
2.78
66
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(13) PRICE OCWN W/
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
[5
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
0.00
0.02
0.02
c.00
-0.03
-0.07
-0.08
-0.06
-0.09
-0.13
-0.14
-0.17
-0.20
-0.24
-0.25
-0.24
-0.29
-0.34
-0.37
-0.38
DCWNSIDE
STD.DEV.
0.35
0.32
0.46
0.55
0.62
0.69
0.78
0082
0.88
0.94
1.01
1.C4
1.13
1.22
1.28
1.33
1.39
1.42
1.47
1.53
GAP
DAY
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
COCOA 1960-1969
EXPIDP)
-0.36
-0.38
-0.41
-0.44
-0.45
-0.48
-0.51
-0.54
-O.51
-0.55
-0.57
-0.59
-0.57
-0.58
-0.59
-0.60
-0.60
-0.62
-0.62
-0.62
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS =
STD.DEV.
1.52
1.53
1.55
1.57
1.60
l.62
1.66
1.69
1.71
1.73
1.79
1.85
1.88
1.86
1.86
1.92
2.00
2.05
2.11
2.14
256
(14) KEY
DAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
1
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
2C
REVERSAL
EXP(DP)
0.00
0004
0.08
0.19
0.23
0.23
coig
C.24
0.24
0.21
0.28
0.33
0.34
0.36
0.37
0.36
0.45
C.38
0.40
0.47
W/ SEAS. HIGH
STDoDEV.
0049
0*44
0.61
0.75
0.87
1.09
1.17
1.29
1.16
1.18
1.26
1.35
1.52
1.62
1.69
1.79
1.85
1.83
1.99
2.20
COCOA 1960-1969
DAY EXP(DP) STD.DEV.
21 0.51 2.30
22 0.72 2.44
23 0.81 2.45
24 0.81 2.61
25 0.95 2.94
26 1.03 2.98
27 1.05 3.05
28 1.14 3.04
29 1.17 3.03
30 1.18 3.03
31 1.12 3.00
32 1.11 3.02
33 1.14 3.12
34 1.17 3.23
35 1.17 3.35
36 1.13 3.47
37 1.17 3.50
38 1.22 3.73
39 1.27 3.80
40 1.24 3.73
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS 43
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(21) 5 CAY MCV AVG 2 PRICE TROUGH COCOA 1965-1969
DAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(OP)
0.05
0*02
0.04
0.11
0.12
0.10
0.10
0008
0.11
0.15
0.12
0.16
c0.19
C.16
0.13
C. 13
0.15
C.16
0.22
C.23
SiD.DEV.
0*40
0.45
0.67
0.83
0094
10C9
1.14
1.22
1.20
1.36
1.48
1.61
1.68
1.72
1.72
1.79
1.91
1.96
1.99
2.06
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS =
DAY
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
(22) 10 DAY MOV AVG a PRICE PEAK COCOA 1960-1969
STD.DEV.
0.32
0.33
0.50
0.61
0.73
0.85
0.92
0.96
1.08
1.11
1.16
1.19
1.26
1.32
1.39
1.45
1.49
1.57
1.59
1.64
DAY
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
EXP(DP)
-0.05
-0.09
-0.07
-0.09
-0.06
-0004
-0.04
-0.08
-0.05
-0.06
-0.03
-0.01
-0.01
-0.06
-0.08
-0.03
-0.03
-0.05
-0.04
-0005
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS =
STO.DEV.
1.65
1.66
1.73
1.78
1.83
1.84
1.89
1.89
1.93
1.96
2004
2.11
2.18
2.22
2.22
2.22
2026
2.28
2.33
2.34
224
EXP(DP)
0.23
0.17
0.15
0.17
0.18
0.1.7
0.17
0.22
0.23
0024
0.26
0.21
0.19
0.20
0.22
0.23
0.28
0029
0.27
0.31
STCDEV.
2.17
2.19
2.19
2.24
2.26
2.36
2.42
2.48
2.58
2.68
2.73
2.76
2.76
2.80
2.89
2.94
2.97
3.02
3.12
3.23
143
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXPIOP)
-0.03
-0.03
-0001
cool
0.01
-0.03
-0.02
-0.02
0.00
-cool
0.02
c.01
0.00
0.02
0.03
-0.01
0.00
0.03
-0.02
-C.06
I
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(19) KEY REVERSAL W/ MONTHLY LOW COCOA 1960-1969
CAY
1
2
12
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
(20) 5 CAY MCV AVG a PRICE PEAK
EXF(DP)
0.01
-0.08
-0.06
-0.08
-0.08
-0.07
-0.13
-0.10
-0.10
-0.14
-C0.1
-0. 11
-0.10
-0.07
-0.07
-0.13
-0.14
-0.13
-C.08
-0.08
COCOA 1960-1969
STD.DEV. DAY EXPIOP)
0.35 21 -0.19
0.32 22 -0.23
0.49 23 -0.23
0.59 24 -0.23
0.69 25 -0.23
0.79 26 -0.22
0.83 27 -0.23
0.89 28 -0.26
0.97 29 -0.26
1.C3 30 -0.27
1.09 31 -0.28
1.11 32 -0.28
1.15 33 -0.28
1.22 34 -0.30
1.29 35 -0.32
1.35 36 -0.30
1.38 37 -0.31
1.44 38 -0.32
1.51 39 -0.32
1.60 40 -0.35
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
STD.CEV.
1.62
1.62
1.67
1.72
1.73
1.77
1.82
1.87
1.89
1.91
1.95
1.98
2.04
2.06
2.06
2.C8
2.15
2.19
2.22
2.22
413
STD.DEV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.26 21 -0.06
0.28 22 -0.02
0.47 23 -0.01
0.54 24 -0.02
0.62 25 -0.07
0.77 26 -0.01
0.84 27 0.01
0.80 28 -0.03
0.84 29 -0.08
0.89 30 -0.05
0.92 31 -0.11
0.93 32 -0.15
1.03 33 -0.14
1.09 34 -0.20
1.15 35 -0.14
1.16 36 -0.18
1.20 37 -0.13
1.22 38 -0.19
1.29 39 -0.15
1.37 40 -0.17
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
STD.CEV.
1.47
1.54
1.57
1.56
1.55
1.53
1.64
1.71
1.77
1.82
1.78
1.87
1.90
1.93
1.96
1.97
1.99
2.01
2.10
2.11
63
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(OP)
-0.06
-0*06
-0.01
-0.02
-0.03
-0.06
-C.07
-0.06
-0.10
-0.13
-0.12
-0.14
-0.15
-C.15
-C. 16
-C. 17
-0.18
-C.18
-0.18
-0.20
I
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( 15) KEY
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
(16) KEY
DAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
REVERSAL
EXP(DP)
-0.01
-0.08
-0.011
-0.15
-0.16
-0*14
-0.23
-0.20
-0.28
-0.36
-0.39
-0.32
-0.31
-0.29
-0.29
-C.33
-0.36
-0.36
-C.36
-C.35
REVERSAL
EXP(DP)
-0.01
0.02
c.00
0.05
0.07
0.09
O .09
0.10
0.12
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.13
0.19
0.16
0.15
0.15
0.12
0.14
0.15
W/ SEAS. LOW COCOA 1960-1969
STD.CEV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.22 21 -0.35
0.24 22 -0.35
0.39 23 -0.38
0.47 24 -0.38
0.62 25 -0.44
0*77 26 -0.41
0.84 27 -0.40
0.83 28 -0.51
0.85 29 -0.52
0.92 30 -0.51
0.87 31 -0.54
0.82 32 -0.60
0.91 33 -0.56
1.06 34 -0.60
1.20 35 -0.58
1.21 36 -0.62
1.18 37 -0.56
1.22 38 -0.62
1.26 39 -0.59
1.41 40 -0.59
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
h/ WEEKLY HIGH
STD.DEV.
1.49
1.54
1.56
1.58
1.57
1.57
1.71
1.77
1.80
1.82
1.80
1.90
1.96
1.98
1.99
1.98
1.98
1.99
2.10
2.16
36
COCOA 1960-1969
STD.DEV. DAY EXP(OP)
0.36 21 0.14
0.33 22 0.19
0.49 23 0.23
0.66 24 0.25
0.77 25 0.26
0.88 26 0.26
0.95 27 0.24
1.01 28 0.25
1.C5 29 0.28
1.12 30 0.27
1.16 31 0.26
1.21 32 0.25
1.25 33 0.20
1.27 34 0.25
1.34 35 0.22
1.40 36 0.19
1.46 37 0.23
1.49 38 0.20
1.56 39 0.20
1.68 40 0.19
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
STD.DEV.
1.71
1.81
1.82
1.90
2.07
2.10
2.14
2.15
2.17
2.19
2.21
2.21
2.28
2.35
2.43
2.48
2.49
2.62
2.65
2.63
144
-145-
(17) KEY REVERSAL %/ WEEKLY LOW COCOA 1960-1969
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
(18) KEY REVERSAL W/ MONTHLY HIGH
EXP(DP)
0.01
-0.02
-0.04
-0.07
-0.12
-0.10
-0.10
-0.13
-C. 17
-0.17
-C. 14
-0.13
-0. 13
-C.15
-0.15
-0.15
-0.17
-0.17
-0.20
-0.17
COCOA 1960-1969
S7O.DEV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.44 21 0.41
0.39 22 0.53
0.55 23 0.59
0.68 24 0.64
0.79 25 0.70
0.94 26 0.74
1.04 27 0.69
1.12 28 0.71
1.08 29 0.78
1.14 30 0.80
1.18 31 0.79
1.24 32 0.78
1.35 33 0.76
1.40 34 0.78
1.49 35 0.76
1.58 36 0.70
1.61 37 0.72
1.64 38 0.68
1.75 39 0.70
1.92 40 0.68
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
STD.DEV.
1.99
2.06
2.10
2.21
2.44
2.49
2.54
2.55
2.53
2.56
2.54
2.56
2.66
2.73
2.81
2.91
2.90
3.10
3.17
3.11
73
STD.DEV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.26 21 -0.19
0.30 22 -0.19
0.44 23 -0.17
0.54 24 -0.17
O.65 25 -0.19
0.70 26 -0.20
0.72 27 -0.22
0.79 28 -0.27
0.87 29 -0.29
0.88 30 -0.29
0.93 31 -0.33
0.97 32 -0.41
1.07 33 -0.45
1.11 34 -0.48
1.16 35 -0.42
1.21 36 -0.49
1.31 37 -0.48
1.37 38 -0.46
1.42 39 -0.45
1.45 40 -0.49
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS
STD.DEV.
1.56
1.63
1.65
1.65
1.68
1.69
1.74
1.77
1.81
1.86
1.88
1.89
1.96
2.02
2.08
2.10
2.14
2.17
2.21
2.23
139
DAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
e
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(OP)
0.02
0.08
0*07
C. 17
C.20
0.22
0.20
C*22
0.21
0.17
C.22
0.27
C.26
C.32
0.31
C.29
0.33
0.27
0.33
0.39
I
IU
F
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(30) HIGH INCREASING 01 CHANGE COCOA 1960-1969
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
S
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
0.00
o .00
o .00
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.00
-C.02
-0.03
-0.05
-0.07
-0.09
-0.11
-Co.11
-c.09
-C.10
-0.08
-0.06
-0.05
STD.CEV.
0.39
0.37
0.57
0.70
0.81
0*90
0.98
1.07
1.14
1.20
1.26
1.32
1*39
1.47
1.53
1.60
1*67
1*77
1.85
1.96
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS =
DAY
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
(31) HIGH CECREASING 0! CHANGE COCOA 1960-1969
ST0.OEV.
0.32
0.32
0.42
0.48
0.55
0.58
0.62
0.63
0.66
0.69
0.75
0.81
0.83
0.85
0.90
0.92
0.95
0.98
1.00
1.03
DAY
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
EXP(DP)
0.05
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.02
0*00
-0.02
-0.03
-0.06
-0.07
-0.08
-0.09
-0.11
-0.14
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS =
STD.oDEV.
1.07
1.10
1.14
1.17
1.20
1.22
1.26
1.30
1.33
1.38
1.41
1.46
1.49
1.52
1.54
1.56
1.59
1.63
1.69
1.73
331
EXP(DP)
-0.04
-0.03
-0.04
-0.03
-0.03
-0.04
-0.05
-0.05
-0.04
-0.04
-0.04
-0.05
-0.06
-0.08
-0.11
-0.13
-0.16
-0.17
-0.17
-0.17
STD.DEV.
2.05
2.13
2.19
2.25
2.32
2.37
2.41
2.47
2.53
2.58
2.63
2*70
2.74
2.76
2.78
2.83
2.88
2.91
2.95
3.00
419
DAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
0.01
0.03
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.02
0.02
0*04
0.05
0.05
0.05
0*07
c0.10
0.11
0.12
0.11
0.10
0.10
Cl09
0.07
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(28) PRICE DCWN W/ INCR VOL & 01 CI-ANGE
DAY EXP(DP) STD.DEV.
1 -0.06 0.35
2 -0.10 0.37
3 -0.16 0.49
4 -0.22 0.46
5 -0.28 0.54
6 -0.31 0.64
7 -C.40 0.66
8 -0.49 0.63
s -0.55 0.60
10 -C.58 0.67
11 -0.68 0.77
12 -0.70 0.76
13 -0.72 0.82
14 -0.73 0.93
15 -0.78 1.03
16 -0.83 1.C5
17 -C.90 1.03
18 -0.99 1.11
19 -1.01 1.18
20 -C.99 1.22
(29) PRICE DOWN W/ DECR VOL
DAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(OP)
-0.02
-0.01
0.02
0.04
0.10
0.12
0.14
0.13
C.12
0.10
C.08
0.08
0.07
0.08
0.10
0.12
C.13
0.11
0.10
0.11
STD.DEV.
0.33
0.35
0.51
0.65
0.77
0.88
1.00
1.01
1.01
1.01
1.05
1.11
1. 14
I .14
1. 19
1.27
1.38
1.35
1.38
1.40
COCOA 1960-1969
DAY EXP(DP)
21 -0.98
22 -0.95
23 -0.91
24 -0.91
25 -0.91
26 -0.86
27 -0.85
28 -0.89
29 -0.95
30 -0.94
31 -0.94
32 -0.90
33 -0.94
34 -1.01
35 -1.00
36 -0.95
37 -1.01
38 -1.08
39 -1.11
40 -1.13
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
& 01 CHANGE COCOA
DAY
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29,
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
EXP(DP)
0.14
0.15
0.19
0.20
0.19
0.17
0.14
0.12
0.12
0.12
0.15
0.14
0.10
0.06
0.05
0.10
0.13
0.18
0.18
0.15
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS =
STD.DEV.
1.23
1.28
1.30
1.37
1.44
1.55
1.60
1.66
1.68
1.69
1.76
1.79
1.80
1.75
1.72
1.71
1.77
1.78
1.83
1.89
49
1960-1969
STD.DEV.
1.44
1.49
1.49
1.51
1.53
1.57
1.61
1.66
1.66
1.67
1.71
1.80
1.90
1.92
1.97
1.99
2.02
2.06
2.08
2.13
106
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(24) PRICE UP W/ HIGI- VOL MOV AVG
DAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXPfDP)
0.06
0*05
0.09
0008
0.08
0.07
0.06
-0.01
-0.06
-0.10
-0.15
-0.18
-C.26
-0.29
-0.40
-0.46
-0.51
-0.54
-0.51
-0.48
COCOA 1960-1969
STD.DEV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.40 21 -0.46
0.40 22 -0.52
0.66 23 -0.57
0.84 24 -0.62
0.93 25 -0.68
0*96 26 -0.73
1.00 27 -0.74
1.05 28 -0.83
1.06 29 -0.87
1.17 30 -0.98
1.26 31 -1.01
1.29 32 -1.06
1.38 33 -1.13
1.48 34 -1.22
1.55 35 -1.31
1.54 36 -1.38
1.62 37 -1.42
1.72 38 -1.50
1.82 39 -1.57
1.93 40 -1.64
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
(25) PRICE UP W/ INCR VOL & 01 CHANGE
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
10
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(OP)
0.07
0.15
0.23
0.28
C.34
0.37
0.38
0.35
0.31
C.29
0.31
C.34
0.37
0.40
0.39
0.34
0.27
0.25
0.28
C.31
STD.CEV.
2.10
2.28
2*46
2.55
2.56
2.59
2.63
2.62
2.55
2.53
2.58
2.63
2.67
2.1
2.72
2.74
2.70
2.72
2.10
2.66
80
COCOA 1960-1969
STD.DEV. DAY EXP(OP)
0.40 21 0.33
0.39 22 0.34
0.62 23 0.33
0.78 24 0.39
0.94 25 0.44
1.07 26 0.39
1.13 27 0.39
1.23 28 0.36
1.32 29 0.35
1.35 30 0.33
1.41 31 0.32
1.50 32 0.31
1*64 33 0.29
1.80 34 0.23
1.88 35 0.18
1.86 36 0.14
1.85 37 0.08
1.88 38 0.01
1.95 39 -0.01
1.97 40 -0.02
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS
STD.DEV.
1.99
2.12
2.30
2.43
2.50
2*54
2.61
2.60
2.63
2.66
2.7C
2.77
2.84
2.88
2.93
2.99
3.04
3.04
3.06
3.14
118
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(26) PRICE UP W/ DECR VOL & 01 CHANGE COCOA 1960-1969
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
-0.02
C.03
0.13
0.20
C.19
0.11
0.11
0.20
0.17
C.19
0.13
0.13
C.08
0.13
C*06
0.02
0.03
-0.02
0.00
-0.04
STD.DEV.
0.37
0.39
0.61
0.81
0.84
0.77
0.67
0.74
0*78
0.83
0.81
0*84
0* 84
0.87
0.88
0.84
0*84
0.85
0.92
0.98
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
DAY
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
(27) PRICE DOWN W/ HIGH VOL MOV AVG COCOA 1960-1969
ST0.0EV.
0.39
0.40
0*52
0.57
0*66
0.75
0.77
0.81
0.85
0.89
0.94
0 * 99
1.03
1.09
1.13
1.21
1.26
1.33
1.39
1.46
DAY
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
EXP(DP)
-0.73
-C.76
-0.78
-0.80
-0.83
-0.83
-0.84
-0.83
-0.83
-0.85
-0.89
-0.92
-0.93
-0.95
-0.99
-1.03
-1.07
-1.11
-1.13
-1.14
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS =
STD.DEV.
1.48
1.49
1.53
1.57
1.63
1.70
1.77
1.84
1.90
1.92
1.95
1.96
1.99
1.99
1.99
2.01
2.01
2.04
2.08
2.11
94
EXP(DP)
-0.14
-0*21
-0.21
-0.28
-0.31
-0.35
-0.31
-0.31
-0.39
-0.42
-0.51
-0.46
-0.46
-0.41
-0.33
-0.31
-0.30
-0.31
-0.24
-0.30
STD.0EV.
1.08
1.16
1.27
1.43
1.60
1.58
1.53
1.62
1.83
2.00
2.01
2*04
1.97
1.84
1.85
1.83
1.91
1.92
2.06
2.17
34
C AY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Is
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(OPj
-0.01
-0.05
-C.10
-0.13
-0.15
-0.19
-0,25
-0.32
-0.37
-0.42
-0.48
-C.55
-0.57
-C.60
-0.62
-0.62
-C.62
-0.66
-0.68
-C.70
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(32) PRICE ABOVE
DAY
1
2
3
4
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
0.07
0.17
0.25
0027
0.29
0.38
0.44
0.49
0.55
0.56
C.59
0.68
0 .72
C.73
0.86
0.93
0.98
1.03
1.05
1.14
SEAS HIGH
STD.CEV.
0.48
0*47
0.66
0.82
0.91
1.04
1*14
1.29
1.40
1.50
1.61
1.66
1.73
1.80
1.89
1.97
2.C6
2.18
2.30
2.45
COCOA 1965-1969
DAY
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
EXP(DP)
1.19
1.32
1.43
1.51
1.56
1.63
1072
1.81
1.89
1.95
2.01
2.04
2.15
2.16
2.19
2.23
2.25
2.28
2.33
2.36
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS =
STD.DEV.
2.59
2.72
2.78
2.88
3.03
3.12
3.26
3.34
3.39
3.37
3.37
3.34
3.38
3.48
3.60
3.12
3.89
4.11
4.30
4.39
101
(33) PRICE eELOW SEAS LOW
CAY EXP(DP) STD.DEV.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
-0.04
-0.06
-0.11
-0.18
-0.26
-0.31
-0.34
-0.37
-0.42
-C.48
-0.52
-0.53
-0.57
-0.59
-0.59
-0.59
-0.60
-0.62
-C .66
-0.72
0.30
0.26
0.39
0.46
0.58
0.71
0.81
0.85
0.89
0.99
1.03
1.05
1.12
1.26
1.41
1.48
1.50
1.58
1.71
1.84
COCOA 1965-1969
DAY EXP(OP) STO.DEV.
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
-0.75
-0.79
-0.81
-0.83
-0.88
-0.91
-0.95
-1.01
-1.04
-1.04
-1.05
-1.09
-1.12
-1.14
-1.18
-1.21
-1.20
-1.20
-1.22
-1.23
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS =
1.90
1.92
1.97
2.04
2.07
2*04
2.09
2.13
2.20
2.27
2.35
2.40
2.45
2.49
2.52
2.60
2.71
2.81
2.89
2.98
89
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(34) PRICE ABOVE WEEKLY HIGH
CAY
1
2
4
5
6
7
8
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
0.02
0.05
0.06
0.08
0.08
0.12
0.17
0.19
0.21
0.21
0.22
0.26
0.27
C.28
0*34
C*39
C.39
0.41
C.43
0.46
COCCA 1965-1969
STD.DEV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.42 21 0.48
0.37 22 0.53
0.56 23 0.58
0.72 24 0.62
0.84 25 0.66
0.95 26 0.69
1.04 27 0.75
1.15 28 0.79
1.29 29 0.83
1.37 30 0.83
1.41 31 0.85
1.48 32 0.88
1.52 33 0.92
1.58 34 0.97
1.64 35 1.00
1.69 36 1.02
1.75 37 1.03
1.83 38 1.02
1.91 39 1.03
2.02 40 1.04
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
(35) PRICE BELOW WEEKLY LOW
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
0.01
C.03
0.03
0.01
-0.02
-0.01
C*00
-C.02
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
-0.01
-0.03
-0.o05
-0.03
-0.03
-0.03
-0.06
-0.06
-C.05
STD.DEV.
2.10
2.17
2.24
2.34
2.42
2.50
2.59
2.65
2.69
2.74
2.78
2.78
2.82
2.87
2.96
3.01
3.08
3.20
3.32
3.37
300
COCOA 1965-1969
STD.DEV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.40 21 -0.06
0.37 22 -0.09
0.56 23 -C.09
0.66 24 -0.09
0.78 25 -0.10
0.85 26 -0.09
0.94 27 -0.12
1.04 28 -0.16
1.14 29 -0.16
1.19 30 -0.17
1.25 31 -0.18
1.32 32 -0.20
1.40 33 -0.21
1.52 34 -0.25
1.62 35 -0.24
1.68 36 -0.25
1.76 37 -0.26
1.84 38 -0.27
1.90 39 -0.28
1.97 40 -0.29
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS =
STD.DEV.
1.98
2.03
2.10
2.17
2.19
2.22
2.27
2.32
2.39
2.45
2.54
2.61
2.68
2.67
2.67
2.75
2.83
2.88
2.89
2.96
284
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(36) PRICE ABOVE MCNTHLY HIGH COCOA 1965-1969
CAY
1
2
3
4
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
0.04
c0.11
0.14
0.16
Co17
0.23
0*27
C.30
0.32
C.30
0.32
0.39
0*42
0*45
C.55
C.62
0.64
C.67
0.70
0.76
STD.DEV.
0.44
0.41
0.58
0.73
0.82
0.94
1.05
1.18
1.31
1.39
1.47
1.54
1.58
1.61
1.70
1.75
1.82
1.93
2.01
2.15
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
DAY
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
(37) PRICE BELCW MCNTHLY LOW COCOA 1965-1969
STD.CEV.
0.37
0.35
0.51
0*59
0*66
0.76
0.88
0.96
1.04
1.11
1.15
1.18
1.30
1.39
1.48
1.53
1.57
1.66
1 .75
1.85
DAY
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
EXP(DP)
-0.36
-0.38
-0.39
-0.38
-0.40
-0.41
-0.45
-0.46
-0.47
-0.46
-0.47
-0.50
-0.50
-0.52
-0.56
-0.58
-0.57
-0.58
-0.58
-0.60
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS =
STD.DEV.
1.94
2.03
2.10
2.14
2.14
2.10
2.13
2.16
2.22
2.27
2.32
2.37
2.42
2.47
2.51
2.56
2.65
2.73
2.80
2.84
131
EXP(DP)
0.8C
0.89
0.97
1.05
1.12
1.17
1.24
1.30
1.39
1.46
1.52
1.57
1.65
1.68
1.71
1.71
1.72
1.71
1.70
1.69
STD.OEV.
2.26
2.36
2.41
2.50
2.59
2.67
2.78
2.85
2.88
2.88
2.89
2.87
2.91
2.98
3.07
3.17
3.31
3.48
3.64
3.10
165
DAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
-0.02
-0.02
-0.04
-C.09
-0.15
-0.17
-C.20
-0.24
-0.25
-0.26
-0.25
-0.26
-0.26
-0.26
-0.25
-0.25
-c.25
-0.27
-C.28
-C.33
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(38) MKT VANE ABOVE 90 1 COCOA 1960-1969
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
'C
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
-0.21
-C.47
-0.63
-1.02
-0.79
-0.84
-1.06
-1.06
-1.26
-1.09
-1.04
-1.19
-1.28
-1.24
-1.00
-1.10
-1 .34
-1.45
-1.49
-1.47
(39) MKT VANE ABOVE 80 X COCOA 1960-1969
STO.OEV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.17 21 -0.87
0.17 22 -1.05
0.28 23 -1.04
0.51 24 -1.09
0.42 25 -1.03
0.52 26 -1.02
0.57 27 -1.16
0.57 28 -1.07
0.79 29 -0.98
0.74 30 -0.91
0.81 31 -0.91
0.86 32 -0.93
0.79 33 -0.88
0.94 34 -0.93
0.90 35 -0.81
0.93 36 -0.93
1.05 37 -1.14
1.03 38 -1.05
1.00 39 -0.96
0.98 40 -0.99
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS
STDD.EV.
0.94
1.15
1.15
1.23
1.24
1.39
1.48
1.48
1.68
1.81
1.80
2.11
2.43
2.33
2.55
2.26
2.14
2.43
2.72
2.73
10
STD.DEV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.20 21 -1.65
0.24 22 -2.01
0.20 23 -2.04
0.46 24 -2.20
0.48 25 -2.11
0.78 26 -2.14
0.70 27 -2.25
0.82 28 -2.13
1.24 29 -2.10
1.25 30 -2.01
1.33 31 -2.04
1.26 32 -2.17
0.92 33 -2.31
1.16 34 -2.30
1.37 35 -2.12
1.29 36 -2.08
1.46 37 -2.48
1.36 38 -2.42
1.26 39 -2.31
1.14 40 -2.30
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
STD.DEV.
0.98
1.16
0.85
0.54
0*69
0.52
0.60
0.69
0*64
0.60
0.76
0.69
0.61
0.48
0.53
0.61
0.61
0.61
0.71
0.62
= 3
DAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
-0.10
-0.25
-0.31
-Co40
-0.32
-C.36
-0.41
-0.46
-C.57
-0.51
-0.50
-C.54
-0.64
-C.76
-0.68
-0.68
-C.75
-0.71
-0.81
-0.77
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(40) MKT VANE BELOW 20 %
IAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
IC
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
c.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
o .00
C .00
0.00
0.00
c.00
0*00
c.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
c.00
COCOA 1960-1969
STDD.EV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.00 21 0.00
0.CO 22 0.00
0.00 23 0.00
0.00 24 0.00
0.00 25 0.00
0.00 26 0.00
0.00 27 0.00
0.00 28 0.00
0.00 29 0.00
0.00 30 0.00
0.00 31 0.00
0.00 32 0.00
0.00 33 0.00
0.00 34 0.00
0.00 35 0.00
0.00 36 0.00
0.00 37 0.00
0.00 38 0.00
0.00 39 0.00
0.00 40 0.00
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
(41) MKT VANE BELOW 30 2
C AY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
1
20
EXP(OP)
0.00
-0.07
0.07
0.11
0.11
0.25
0.42
0.43
0.45
C.65
0.66
0.52
0.70
C.74
0.70
0.80
0.81
0.77
0.80
0.82
STD.DEV.
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
= 0
COCOA 1965-1969
S7D.DEV. DAY EXPIDP)
0.10 21 0.89
0.10 22 1.00
0.10 23 1.04
0.10 24 1.06
0.10 25 0.98
0.10 26 1.15
0.28 27 1.12
0.30 28 1.18
0.10 29 1.35
0.20 30 1.47
0.22 31 1.61
0.10 32 1.78
0.10 33 1.86
0.10 34 1.96
0.10 35 2.25
0.10 36 2.51
0.22 37 2.64
0.24 38 2.81
0.14 39 3.46
0.10 40 3.70
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
STDOEV.
0.17
0.17
0.10
0.20
0.45
0.36
0.10
0.50
0.20
0.22
0.14
0.17
0.10
0*39
0.26
0.58
0.33
0.28
0.52
0.93
= 2
(43) MKT V ANE LAGGED ABOVE 80 %
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
11
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
0.00
0.00
c.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
O.00
C.00
c.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0000
0.00
0.00
0000
0.00
0000
0.00
0.00
(45) MKT VANE LAGGED BELOW 30 X COCOA 1965-1969
STD.OEV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.00 21 0.89
0.10 22 1.00
0.10 23 1.04
0.10 24 1.06
0.10 25 0.98
0.10 26 1.15
0.28 27 1.12
0.30 28 1.18
0.00 29 1.35
0.20 30 1.47
0.22 31 1.61
0.10 32 1.78
0.00 33 1.86
0.10 34 1.96
0.10 35 2.25
0.10 36 2.51
0.22 37 2.64
0.24 38 2.81
0.14 39 3.46
0.00 40 3.70
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
STD.DEV.
0.17
0.17
0*00
0.20
0.45
0.17
0.00
0.50
0.20
0.22
0.14
0.17
0.10
0.39
0.26
0.58
0.33
0.28
0.52
0.93
= 2
STD.DEV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.00 21 0.00
0.00 22 0.00
0.00 23 0.00
0.00 24 0.00
0.00 25 0.00
0.00 26 0.00
0.00 27 0.00
0.00 28 0.00
0.00 29 0.00
0.00 30 0.00
0.00 31 0.00
0.CO 32 0.00
0.00 33 0.00
0.00 34 0.00
0.00 35 0.00
0.00 36 0.00
0.00 37 0.00
0.00 38 0.00
0.00 39 0.00
0.00 40 0.00C
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
STD.DEV.
000
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
= 0
DAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
1!3
14
15
16
17
18
1'
20
EXP(DP)
0.00
-C.07
0.07
0.11
C.11
0.25
C.42
0.43
0.45
C.65
C .66
0.52
0.70
0.74
0.70
C.80
0.81
0077
0.80
0.82
COCOA 1965-1969
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C. POTATO RESULTS
The tables presented on the following pages represent the
complete computations for expected price change and standard
deviation of that change in futures price movements for forty
trading days subsequent to the occurrence of each event-type
described in Chapter 4. The years for which these computations
were made were 1960 through 1969. A summary of the computa-
tions is presented in Exhibit VII-8.
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(1) EXTREPELY GOOC EVENT
DAY
1
2
12
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
0.00
-0.01
-C.03
-C.02
0.00
-0.03
0.01
0.02
0.05
0.06
0002
0.03
Col
0.01
0.01
C.02
0.05
0.06
0.09
C.09
(3) NEUTRAL EVENT
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
1
8
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(OP)
0.00
0.01
0.02
C.01
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.03
C.02
C.02
0.02
C.0l
POTATO 1960-1969
STD.DEV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.00 21 0.08
0.00 22 0.05
0.CO 23 0.06
0.00 24 0.04
0.00 25 0.03
0.00 26 0.05
0.00 27 0.08
0.00 28 0.11
0.00 29 0.09
0.00 30 0.10
0.00 31 0.09
0.00 32 0.09
0.00 33 0.07
0.00 34 0.10
0.00 35 0.10
0.00 36 0.09
0.00 37 0.08
0.00 38 0.09
0.00 39 0.04
0.00 40 0.06
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS
STC.CEV.
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
= 1
POTATO 1960-1969
STD.DEV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.00 21 0.00
0.10 22 0.03
0.10 23 0.03
0.10 24 0.02
0.14 25 0.03
0.14 26 0.03
0.14 27 0.04
0.20 28 0.03
0.20 29 0.04
0.20 30 0.04
0.22 31 0.04
0.22 32 0.05
0.24 33 0.05
0.24 34 0.06
0.26 35 0.07
0.26 36 0.07
0.26 37 0.08
0.28 38 0.09
0.30 39 0.10
0.30 40 0.11
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS
STD.DEV.
0.32
0.33
0.33
0.35
0.36
0.39
0.40
0.41
0.44
0.44
0.44
0.45
0.46
0.48
0.48
0.51
0.53
0.52
0.55
0.56
126
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(5) EXTREPELY BAD EVENT POTATO 1960-1969
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
(10) PRICE UP W/ UPSIDE GAP
EXP( DP)
-0.01
-0.03
-0.02
-0*01
-0.01
-0.02
-0.03
-0.04
-0.05
-0.06
-0.08
-0004
-0.02
0.03
*04
C.06
0.03
c.oc
0.03
0.04
POTATO 1960-1969
STD.DEV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.10 21 -0.01
0.10 22 -0.01
0.14 23 0.00
0.17 24 0.01
0.17 25 0.01
0.20 26 0.01
0.20 27 0.01
0.22 28 0.00
0.24 29 -0.01
0.24 30 -0'.01
0.26 31 -0.02
0.30 32 0.00
0030 33 -0.01
0.33 34 -0.01
0.36 35 0.00
0.37 36 0.01
0.37 37 0.02
0.39 38 0.00
0.40 39 0.00
0.39 40 -0.01
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
STDD.EV.
0.40
0042
0.44
0.46
0.45
0.47
0.48
0.48
0.48
0.49
0.49
0.51
0.54
0.56
0.58
0.59
0.59
0.60
0.62
0.60
75
STD.DEV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.00 21 0.04
0.00 22 0.05
0.10 23 0.07
0.10 24 0.03
0.14 25 -0.01
0.14 26 -0.05
0.17 27 -0.04
0.20 28 -0.03
0.17 29 -0.01
0.14 30 -0.01
0.10 31 -0.02
0.14 32 -0.02
0.22 33 -0.03
0.22 34 -0.03
0.20 35 -0.02
0.20 36 0.02
0.17 37 0.02
0.14 38 0.00
0.17 39 -0.01
0.20 40 0.02
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
STD.DEV.
0.17
0.14
0.14
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.14
0.14
0.17
0.17
0.17
0.17
0.22
0.22
0.22
0.20
0.20
0.22
0.22
9
C AY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(OP)
-0.03
-0.04
0.00
-0.01
-0.02
c.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
-0.01
0.01
-cool
-0.02
-0.03
-0.02
-0.03
-0.03
-C.02
-159-
(11) PRICE UP W/ DCWNSIDE GAP
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
0004
0.04
0*04
0.05
-cool
-0.03
-0.06
-0.04
-0.05
-0.05
-0.05
-C.08
-0.10
-C.10
-C.08
-0.07
-C.ll
-Col
-0.08
-0.05
PCTATC 1960-1969
STD.DEV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.10 21 -0.07
0.10 22 -0.04
0.14 23 -0.04
0.14 24 -0.02
0.14 25 -0.07
0.17 26 -0.13
0.24 27 -0.11
0.28 28 -0.12
0.33 29 -0.15
0.39 30 -0.16
0.35 31 -0.14
0.41 32 -0.13
0.41 33 -0.19
0.45 34 -0.18
0.51 35 -0.17
0.46 36 -0.23
0.50 37 -0.22
0.55 38 -0.23
0.55 39 -0.24
0.50 40 -0.26
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS
(12) PRICE DOCWN W/ UPSIDE GAP
S*TO.DEV.
0.54
0.52
0*49
0.46
0.55
0.60
0.56
0.56
0.57
0.57
0.57
0.58
0.59
0.62
0.62
0.65
0.69
0066
0.66
0.64
12
POTATO 1960-1969
STD.DEV.
0.14
0.14
0.10
0.10
0.14
0.17
0.17
0.14
0.10
0.14
0.14
0.20
0.22
0.22
0.22
0.22
0.28
0.28
0.30
0.33
DAY
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
EXP(DP)
0.03
0.01
0.05
0.02
0.00
0.02
0.03
0.08
0*06
0.07
0.05
0.06
0.09
0.07
0.02
0.05
0.06
0.08
0.09
0006
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS =
STC.DEV.
0.32
0.30
0.30
0.35
0.33
0.37
0.39
0.41
0.46
0.45
0.45
0.50
0.50
0.52
0.55
0.59
0.59
0.61
0.63
0.61
16
DAY
1
2
3
4
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
15
20
EXP(DP)
0.00
0.04
0.05
0.07
0.09
0.06
0.05
0.03
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.03
0.02
0.00
0.01
0.02
(13) PRICE DCWN W/ DCWNSIDE GAP
DAY
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
EXP(DP)
0.01
0.01
-0.01
-0.01
-0.02
-0.02
-0.04
DAY,
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
0.02
0.01
col
-0.01
-0.01
-0.02
-cool
-C.02
-C.04
-0.02
-0.01
-0.01
-0*02
-Cool
-0.02
-0.02
-0.03
-0.01
-Cool
-0.01
(14) KEY REVERSAL W/ SEAS. HIGH POTATO 1960-1969
STD.DEV.
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.14
0.14
0.17
0.20
0.22
0.26
0.30
0.30
0.32
0.30
0.33
0.36
0.39
0.36
0.37
0.39
DAY
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
EXP(DP)
0.04
0.05
0.05
0.04
0.05
0.05
0.03
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.01
0.03
0.02
0.04
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.04
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
STO.DEV.
0.39
0.41
0.44
0.42
0.44
0.42
0.44
0.44
0.47
0.48
0.49
0.51
0.55
0.57
0.56
0.57
0.55
0.56
0.55
0.55
51
STD.CEV.
0.10
0.00
0.10
0.14
0.17
0.17
0.20
0.20
0.22
0.24
0.22
0*22
0.22
0.24
0.26
0.30
0.30
0.32
0.32
0.33
28 -0.03
29 -0.01
30 -0.02
31 -0.04
32 -0.04
33 -0.03
34 -0.02
35 -0.02
36 -0.04
37 -0.03
38 -0.04
39 -0.04
40 -0.05
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
DAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(OP)
0.01
0.03
0.00
0.00
-0.01
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.03
C.05
0.05
0.07
0.06
0.05
C.04
0.06
0.05
0.03
0.04
0.02
PCTATC 1960-1969
STD.DEV.
0.33
0.37
0.40
0.41
0.42
0.41
0.42
0.44
0.48
0.51
0.50
0.50
0.52
0.56
0.54
0.57
0.59
0.62
0.66
0.67
55
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(15) KEY REVERSAL W/ SEAS. LOW POTATO 1960-1969
DAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
0.00
-0.01
-0.02
-0.01
-0.01
-0.02
-0.02
-0.02
-0.01
-0.03
-0.03
-0.02
-cool
c.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
C .00
0.00
c.01
(18) KEY REVERSAL W/ MONTHLY HIGH POTATO 1960-1969
STO.DEV. DAY EXPIOP)
0.10 21 0.05
0.10 22 0.06
0.10 23 0.07
0.10 24 0.06
0.14 25 0.06
0.14 26 0.06
0.17 27 0.06
0.17 28 0.05
0.20 29 0.05
0.24 30 0.05
0.26 31 0.06
0.26 32 0.05
0.28 33 0.06
0.28 34 0.05
0.30 35 0.06
0.32 36 0.06
0.35 37 0.07
0.33 38 0.07
0.33 39 0.07
0.35 40 0.07
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
STD.DEV.
0.36
0.37
0.40
0.39
0.39
0.39
0.41
0.40
0.42
0.45
0.46
0.48
0.49
0.52
0.51
0.52
0.51
0*52
0.52
0.53
84
STD.DEV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.00 21 0.03
0.00 22 0.03
0.00 23 0.01
0.10 24 0.01
0.10 25 0.00
0.10 26 0.00
0.10 27 0.00
0.10 28 0.01
0.10 29 0.02
0.10 30 0.02
0.10 31 0.02
0.14 32 0.03
0.14 33 0.03
0.14 34 0.03
0.14 35 0.04
0.14 36 0.04
0.17 37 0.05
0.17 38 0.05
0.17 39 0.07
0.17 40 0.07
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
STO.CEV.
0.20
0.20
0.20
0.20
0.20
0.22
0.24
0.26
0.28
0.26
0.26
0.26
0.26
0.28
0.28
0.30
0.30
0.30
0.32
0.35
54
DAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
12
8
14
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
18
19
2C
EXP(DP)
c.01
0.03
C.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
C.03
0.03
0.04
C.06
0.o06
0.06
0*06
0 *06
C.06
0.07
C.06
0.05
0.05
0.05
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(19) KEY
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
REVERSAL
EXP(DP)
0.00
-0.02
-0.02
-0.02
-0.03
-0.03
-0.03
-0.04
-0.03
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
-0.01
0.00
-0.01
-0.02
-0.02
-Cool
-0.02
-0.01
k/ MONTHLY LOW POTATO 1960-1969
STD.DEV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.00 21 0.00
0.00 22 0.00
0.00 23 -0.01
0.10 24 -0.02
0.10 25 -0.02
0.10 26 -0.03
0.14 27 -0.03
0.14 28 -0.02
0.14 29 -0.01
0.14 30 -0.02
0.14 31 -0.02
0.14 32 -0.02
0.14 33 -0.02
0.17 34 -0.02
0.20 35 -0.01
0.20 36 -0.01
0.22 37 -0.01
0.22 38 -0.01
0.24 39 -0.01
0.24 40 -0.01
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
ST0.DEV.
0.28
0.28
0.28
0.30
0.28
0.32
0.33
0.35
0.37
0.36
0.37
0.35
0.37
0.39
0.39
0.40
0.39
0.40
0.41
0.42
85
(20) 5 DAY MCV AVG @ PRICE PEAK
CAY
1
2
4
5
6
7
8
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.02
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
C.03
C.04
POTATO 1960-1969
STD.DEV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.10 21 0.03
0.10 22 0.04
0.10 23 0.03
0.10 24 0.03
0.14 25 0.04
0.17 26 0.04
0.17 27 0.04
0.20 28 0.04
0.22 29 0.03
0.24 30 0.04
0.24 31 0.04
0.26 32 0.04
0.26 33 0.04
0.28 34 0.04
0.30 35 0.04
0.30 36 0.04
0.32 37 0.05
0.33 38 0.05
0.35 39 0.04
0.35 40 0.04
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
STD.DEV.
0.37
0.37
0.37
0.39
0.40
0.41
0.42
0.44
0.45
0.47
0.48
0.48
0.49
0.50
0.50
0.51
0.52
0.53
0.55
0.56
335
(21) 5 DAY PCV AVG
-163-
@ PRICE TROUGH POTATC 1960-1969
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
12
8
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
(22) 10 DAN MOV AVG i PRICE PEAK
EXP(DP)
0000
-0.01
C0o
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.00
C .00
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
C.02
C.03
POTATO 1960-1969
STD.DEV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.00 21 0.02
0.00 22 0.02
0.10 23 0.01
0.10 24 0.01
0.14 25 0.01
0.14 26 0.01
0.17 27 0.01
0.20 28 0.00
0.20 29 0.OC
0.22 30 0.01
0.24 31 0001
0.24 32 0.01
0.24 33 0.01
0.28 34 0.01
0.28 35 0.00
0.30 36 0.01
0.30 37 0.01
0.32 38 0.01
0.33 39 0.01
0.33 40 0.01
NUMBEF CF OBSERVATIONS
STO.oEV.
0.35
0.35
0.36
0.36
0.39
0.40
0.40
0.42
0.41
0.44
0.45
0044
0.46
0.47
0.48
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.53
0.55
181
STD.DEV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.10 21 0.03
0.10 22 0.02
0.10 23 0.03
0.14 24 0.03
0.14 25 0.03
0.17 26 0.03
0.17 27 0.03
0.20 28 0.04
0.22 29 0.04
0.22 30 0.04
0.24 31 0.05
0.26 32 0.04
0.26 33 0.05
0.28 34 0.05
0.32 35 0.05
0.32 36 0.05
0.33 37 0.06
0.33 38 0.07
0.35 39 0.07
0.36 40 0.06
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
STD.DEV.
0.36
0.37
0.39
0.41
0.42
0.42
0.45
0.45
0.46
0.48
0.48
0.50
0.51
0.52
0.52
0.54
0.55
0.57
0.57
0.57
345
DAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
0.00
0001
0.01
0.01,
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.02
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(23) 10 DAN MOV AVG R PRICE TROUGH
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXfP(DP)
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.01
cool
0.00
0000
C. 00
0.00
c.00
0.00
0.01
cool
0.00
0.00
c.0l
0.01
0.00
0.00
PCTATC 1960-1969
STD.DEV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.10 21 0.00
0.10 22 0.00
0.10 23 0.00
0.14 24 0.00
0.14 25 0.00
0.17 26 0.00
0.17 27 0.00
0.20 28 0.00
0.20 29 0.00
0.22 30 0.00
0.24 31 0.01
0.26 32 0.00
0.26 33 0.00
0.28 34 -0.01
0.30 35 0.00
0.32 36 -0.01
0.33 37 0.00
0.35 38 0.00
0.36 39 0.01
0.36 40 0.00
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
STD.DEV.
0.36
0.37
0.39
0.41
0.42
0.45
0.46
0.45
0.46
0.47
0.48
0.49
0.50
0.51
0.52
0.54
0.55
0.57
0.57
0.57
193
(241 PRICE UP W/ HIGI VOL MOV AVG POTATO 1960-1969
STD.DEV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.10 21 -0.05
0.10 22 -0.06
0.14 23 -0.06
0.14 24 -0.06
0.17 25 -0.07
0.20 26 -0.07
0.22 27 -0.07
0.24 28 -0.08
0.26 29 -0.08
0.26 30 -0.08
0.28 31 -0.08
0.30 32 -0.08
0.32 33 -0.08
0.33 34 -0.09
0.35 35 -0.09
0.35 36 -0.09
0.36 37 -0.10
0.37 38 -0.10
0.39 39 -0.10
0.40 40 -0.10
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
STD.DEV.
0.40
0.41
0.40
0.41
0.41
0.42
0.42
0.42
0.44
0.45
0046
0.47
0.49
0.49
0.51
0.52
0.53
0.54
0.55
0.57
289
DAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
1
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
0000
C000
0.00
0.00
0000
0.00
C.00
-0.01
-0.01
-0.01
-0.01
-0.02
-0.02
-0.03
-0.03
-0.04
-0*04
-0005
-0.05
-C.o05
(25) PRICE UP W/
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INCR VOL & 01 CHANGE POTATO 1960-1969
STD.DEV.
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
DAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
0000
0.00
0.00
0.00
cool
C.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.08
0.08
0*07
0.07
0.07
0.07
C.06
0.04
0.04
0.05
0.06
DAY
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
0.10
0.14
0.17
0.17
0.20
0*20
0.24
0.24
0*26
0.26
0.26
0.28
0.32
0.32
0.33
0.36
(26) PRICE UP W/ DECR VOL E 0I CHANGE
=
EXP(DP)
0.07
0.08
0.10
0.10
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.10
0.09
0.08
0.09
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.11
0.13
POTATO 1960-1969
STD.DEV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.10 21 -0.04
0.10 22 -0.04
0.14 23 -0.06
0.14 24 -0.08
0.14 25 -0.08
0.17 26 -0.08
0.20 27 -0.11
0.20 28 -0.12
0.22 29 -0.13
0.26 30 -0.13
0.26 31 -0.13
0.28 32 -0.15
0.32 33 -0.14
0.33 34 -0.12
0.39 35 -0.12
0.39 36 -0.14
0.44 37 -0.11
0.45 38 -0.08
0.46 39 -0.10
0.46 40 -0.13
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
STD.DEV.
0.48
0*46
0.41
0.45
0.47
0.50
0.47
0.41
0.41
0.42
0.41
0.45
0.45
0.46
0.46
0.42
0.42
0*42
0.48
0.48
23
40 0.14
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
STD.ZEV.
0.37
0.39
0.39
0.39
0.40
0.41
0.42
0.42
0.44
0044
0.45
0.45
0.47
0.49
0.49
0.50
0.52
0.53
0.53
0.55
91
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(OP)
0.03
0.01
-0.04
-0.06
-0.04
-0004
-0.06
-0.06
-0.02
-0.01
-0.03
-0.03
-0*03
-0.02
-0.06
-0.05
-0.07
-0.08
-0.07
-C.06
(27) PRICE COWN W/
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HIGH VOL MOV AVG POTATO 1960-1969
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
79
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
(28) PRICE DCWN W/ INCR VOL & CI CHANGE
EXP(DP)
0.00
-0.01
-0.01
-0.02
-C.02
-0.02
-0.02
-0.02
-0.02
-0.02
-0.03
-0.03
-0.03
-0.03
-0.03
-0.03
-0.04
-0.04
-0.04
-0.04
POTATO 1960-1969
STD.DEV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.10 21 -0.03
0.10 22 -0.01
0.14 23 -0.01
0.14 24 -0.04
0.20 25 -0.05
0.22 26 -0.04
0.22 27 -0.06
0.26 28 -0.08
0.32 29 -0.05
0.35 30 -0.09
0.33 31 -0.12
0.28 32 -0.13
0*30 33 -0.11
0.28 34 -0.09
0.28 35 -0.06
0.32 36 -0.05
0.35 37 -0.05
0.35 38 -0.05
0.36 39 -0.04
0.36 40 0.00
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
STD.DEV.
0.36
0.40
0.42
0.44
0.42
0.47
0.47
0.50
0.47
0.49
0.52
0.57
0.57
0.57
0.56
0.56
0.57
0.56
0.57
0.57
26
STD.DEV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.10 21 -0.04
0.10 22 -0.05
0.14 23 -0.05
0.14 24 -0.05
0.14 25 -0.05
0.17 26 -0.05
0.20 27 -0.05
0.20 28 -0.05
0.22 29 -0.04
0.22 30 -0.04
0.22 31 -0.03
0.22 32 -0.01
0*22 33 0.00
0.22 34 0.00
0.24 35 -0.01
0.26 36 0.00
0.26 37 0.00
0.26 38 -0.01
0.28 39 -0.02
0.30 40 -0.02
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
STD.CEV.
0.32
0.32
0.35
0.36
0.36
0.37
0.40
0.42
0.42
0.44
0.46
0.47
0.48
0.49
0.49
0.50
0.51
0.52
0.54
0.54
189
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
-c.01
-0.02
-0*04
-0.04
-0.05
-0.05
-0.04
-0.04
-0.04
-0.01
-0.03
-0.04
-0.01
0.01
-C.02
-C*02
-c.01
0.01
-0.02
-C.04
DECR V-1 6 Joi Ct-ANGE POTATO 1960-196S
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
(30) HIGH INCREASING 01 CHANGE
EXP(DP)
0.00
-C.01
-0.01
-0.01
C600
0.01
col
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.00
0*00
-0.01
-0.02
-0.02
-0.C3
-0.04
-0.04
-0.05
-0.06
POTATO 1960-1969
STO.0EV. OAY EXP(DP)
0.10 21 0.08
0.10 22 0.08
0.10 23 0.08
0.14 24 0.08
0.14 25 0.09
0.17 26 0.09
0.17 27 0.09
0.20 28 0.09
0.20 29 0.09
0.22 30 0.09
0.22 31 0.09
0.24 32 0.09
0.24 33 0.10
0.26 34 0.10
0.28 35 0.10
0.28 36 0.11
0.28 37 0.11
0.30 38 0.11
0.32 39 0.11
0.33 40 0.11
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
STD.DEV.
0.33
0.35
0.36
0.37
0.39
0.40
0.41
0.42
0.44
0.46
0.47
0.48
0.48
0.49
0.50
0.51
0.52
0.53
0.53
0.54
446
STD.DEV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.10 21 -0.06
0.10 22 -0.07
0.10 23 -0.07
0.10 24 -0.07
0.14 25 -0.07
0.14 26 -0.07
0.14 27 -0.05
0.17 28 -0.04
0.20 29 -0.02
0.20 30 0.00
0.22 31 0.00
0.24 32 0.01.
0.22 33 0.01
0.22 34 0.00
0.22 35 -0.01
0.26 36 -0.02
0.26 37 -0.02
0.28 38 -0.02
0.28 39 -0.02
0.32 40 -0.02
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
STD.CEV.
0.35
0.33
0.36
0.37
0*40
0.40
0.41
0.41
0.42
0.42
0.45
0.45
0.46
0.48
0.48
0.50
0.51
0.52
0.53
0.55
89
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(OP)
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.02
0*03
0.03
C.04
C*04
0*04
C.05
0.05
0*06
C.06
0.07
0*07
0.07
-p
(29) PRICE CCWN W/
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(31) HIGH LECREASING 01 CHANGE
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
0.00
C .00
6.00
coa
0.00
0.00
-0.01
-0.01
-cool
-0.01
-0.02
-C*02
-0.02
-0.02
-C.02
-0.02
-0.02
-0.02
-0.02
-C.03
PCTATC 1960-1969
STD.DEV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.10 21 -0.03
0.10 22 -0.03
0.10 23 -0.03
0.10 24 -0.02
0.14 25 -0.02
0.14 26 -0.02
0.14 27 -0.01
0.17 28 0.00
0.17 29 0.00
0.17 30 0.01
0.20 31 0.01
0.20 32 0.02
0.20 33 0.02
0.22 34 0.03
0.22 35 0.03
0.24 36 0.03
0.24 37 0.04
0.26 38 0.04
0.28 39 0.05
0.28 40 0.05
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
(32) PRICE ABOVE SEAS HIGH
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(OP)
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.02
0.03
0*03
0.04
0.04
0005
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.04
0.04
0.04
STO.DEV.
0.10
0.10
0010
0.14
0.14
0.17
0.17
0.20
0.22
0.22
0.26
0.28
0.30
0.30
0.33
0.35
0.36
0.36
0.37
0.39
DAY
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35'
36
37
38
39
40
STD.DEV.
0.30
0.32
0.32
0.33
0.33
0.35
0.35
0.36
0.37
0.39
0040
0.41
0.42
0.42
0.44
0.45
0.46
0.47
0.48
0.49
446
PCTATC 1960-1969
EXP(DP)
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.06
0.07
0.07
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.09
0.09
0.10
0.11
0.11
0.12
0.13
0.12
0.12
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS =
STD.OEV.
0.40
0.40
0.42
0044
0.44
0.45
0.45
0.46
0.48
0.49
0.50
0.52
0.54
0.56
0.57
0.57
0.57
0.58
0.58
0.59
179
I
(33) PRICE BELOW
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SEAS LOW PCTATO 1960-1969
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
(36) PRICE ABOVE MONTHLY HIGH
EXP(DP)
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
-0.01
0.00
0000
0.01
cool
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
POTATO 1960-1969
STD.DEV.
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.14
0.14
0.17
0.17
0.20
0.20
0.22
0.24
0.26
0.28
0.30
0.32
0.32
0.33
0.35
0.35
0.36
DAY
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
EXP(DPI
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.06
0*06
0*06
0.07
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.09
0.10
0.10
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS =
STD.DEV.
0.37
0*39
0.40
0.40
0.40
0.41
0.41
0.42
0.44
0.46
0.46
0.48
0.49
0.51
0.52
0.52
0.53
0.54
0.55
0.55
283
STD.DEV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.10 21 0.03
0.10 22 0.03
0.10 23 0.03
0.10 24 0.03
0.10 25 0.03
0.10 26 0.02
0.10 27 0.03
0.10 28 0.03
0.10 29 0.04
0.10 30 0.05
0.14 31 0.05
0.14 32 0.05
0.14 33 0.05
0.14 34 0.05
0.14 35 0.06
0.17 36 0.06
0.17 37 0.07
0.17 38 0.07
0.17 39 0.07
0.17 40 0.08
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS
STD.DEV.
0.20
0.20
0.20
0.22
0.22
0.24
0024
0.26
0.28
0.28
0*30
0.30
0.30
0.30
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.33
0.35
163
DAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.01
C.02
0.02
0.03
0.03
0.03
C.04
0.04
0.04
C.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
c.05
0.04
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(37) PRICE BELOW MONTHLI LOW PCTATC 1960-1969
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
0.00
-0.01
-0.01
0.00
-C.01
0.00
-0.01
-0.01
0000
-0.01
-0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
-c.01
-0.01
-0001
-0.01
0.00
STD.DEV.
0.00
0.00
0.10
0.10
0.14
0.14
0014
0.14
0.17
0.17
0.17
0.17
0.17
0.17
0.20
0.20
0.22
0.24
0.24
0.26
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS =
DAY
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
(38) PKT VANE ABOVE 90 1 POTATO 1960-1969
STO.DEV.
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0. Co
000
0000
0.00
0.00
0000
0.00
0000
000
0.00
0000
0.C0
0.00
0.00
0000
0000
DAY
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
EXP(DP)
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0000
0.00
0000
0000
0.00
0000
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS =
STD.DEV.
0.00
0.00
0000
0.00
0000
0.00
0000
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0
EXP(DP)
0000
0.00
0.00
-0.01
-0.01
-0.01
-0.02
-0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0000
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
STD.DEV.
0.28
0.28
0.30
0032
0.32
0.32
0.35
0.36
0.39
0.40
0.41
0.41
0.42
0.45
0.45
0.46
0.47
0.48
0.49
0.49
285
CAY
1
2
3
4
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(OP)
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0000
0000
0000
0.00
0.00
0.00
C000
0000
0.00
0.00
0.00
Coo
0.00
0.00
(39) MKT VANE ABOVE 80 %
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POTATO 1960-1969
CAY EXP(DP) STD.DEV.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
-0.04
-0.11
-0.13
-0.18
-0.17
-0.20
-0.14
-0.12
-0.09
-0.09
0000
0.00
-co.01
0.30
0.28
C.37
0.38
C.35
0.33
0.34
0.10
0.10
0.10
0010
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
(40) MKT VANE BELCW 20 X
CAY EXP(DP) STD.DEV.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
0.01
0003
0003
-0.01
0.01
0.01
0.03
0.03
0.02
0.04
0003
0.03
0.04
0.01
-0.02
-0.01
-0.02
0.00
-0003
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.10
0.10
0.22
0.22
0.17
0.17
0022
0.28
0026
0026
0.33
0.39
0.41
0.41
0*35
0033
0.40
0.39
DAY EXP(DP) STD.CEV.
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
0.42
0.48
0.35
0.43
0059
0.54
0.62
0.62
0.69
0.61
0.62
0049
0046
0.51
0.87
0.82
0.78
0.82
0.57
0.64
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS =
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
1
POTATO 1960-1969
DAY EXP(DP) STD.DEV.
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
0.03
0.01
0.02
-0.02
0.04
0.02
0.02
0.08
0.03
0.01
0.01
-0.04
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.03
-0.03
-0.05
-0.08
-0.08
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS =
0.39
0.35
0.32
0.28
0.17
0.17
0.17
0.20
0.14
0.10
0.14
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0014
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.14
4
141) *KT VANE BELO1 30 X
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POTATO 1960-1969
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP)
0.03
C.06
0.05
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.02
0.02
-0.02
-0.01
c.00
-0.01
coa
-0.01
-0.02
STD.DEV.
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.17
0.17
0.14
0.14
0.20
0.24
0.22
0.22
0024
0.28
0.30
0*30
0.26
0*24
0.32
0.32
NUMBER CF OBSERVATIONS
DAY
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
(43) MKT VANE LAGGED ABCVE 80 2 PCTATC 1960-1969
STD.DEV. DAY EXP(DP)
0.00 21 0.42
0.00 22 0.48
0.00 23 0.35
0.00 24 0.43
0.00 25 0.59
0.00 26 0.54
0.00 27 0.62
0.00 28 0.62
0.00 29 0.69
0.00 30 0.61
0.00 31 0.62
0000 32 0.49
0.00 33 0.46
0.00 34 0.51
0.00 35 0.87
0.00 36 0.82
0.00 37 0.78
0.00 38 0.82
0.00 39 0.57
0.00 40 0.64
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS
STD.DEV.
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0 *00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0*00
= I
EXP(DP)
-0.03
-0.03
-0.03
-0.05
-0.04
-0.04
-0.05
-0.02
-0.05
-0.02
-0.02
-0.04
-0.03
-0.05
-0.05
-0.05
-0.08
-0.05
-0.07
-0.05
STD.DEV.
0.30
0.28
0.28
0.28
0026
0.24
0.22
0.22
0.20
0.14
0.14
0.10
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.14
7
CAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
EXP(DP I
-0.04
-0.11
-0.13
-0.18
-C. 17
-0.20
-0.14
-0.12
-0.09
-0.09
0.00
0.00
-0.01
0.30
0.28
0.37
0.38
0.35
0.33
C.34
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(45) MKT VANE LAGGED BELOW 30 % POTATO 1960-1969
CAY EXP(DP)
1 0.04
2 C.08
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
0.09
0.05
0.05
C*06
0.05
0.03
C003
0.02
0.00
Co04
0.04
-0.01
0.00
0.03
0.01
c.ol
0.01
0.02
STD .EV.
0.10
0.CC
0.10
0.00
0.17
0.20
0.17
0.17
0*24
0.30
0.26
0.26
0.30
0.33
0.32
0.35
0026
0.22
0.28
0.26
DAY
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
EXP(DP)
-0.01
0.00
0.01
-0.02
-0.06
-0.06
-0.07
-0.03
-0.05
-0.01
0.02
-0.01
-0.04
-0.07
-0.05
-0.07
-0.08
-0.02
-0.06
-0.04
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS =
STD.DEV.
0.24
0.26
0.32
0.28
0.28
0.28
0.22
0.22
0.22
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.17
0.14
0.17
0.17
0.14
0.10
0.10
0.17
5
